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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
“I speak as a woman and a mother . . . who was told she had one chance in a
million of having a child. I had a therapeutic abortion 20 years ago in a Catholic
hospital.”1 In 1969, Republican N. Lorraine Beebe, a first-term state senator from
Dearborn, stood before the Michigan Senate, which was considering a bill to
liberalize Michigan’s ban on abortion, and stunned her colleagues with that
admission. Her medically necessary abortion, while traumatic, was safely
performed in a hospital. She recognized, however, that many women who could
not legally terminate their pregnancies suffered long-term medical and
psychological difficulties, or even died, as a result of illegal, back-street abortions.
Beebe believed that her male colleagues could not understand the gravity and the
impact of the decision that they were about to make on behalf of women. By adding
a female perspective to the debate, she represented all those women who were
unable to obtain a legal abortion. She later emphasized that “only in dire
circumstances will a woman ask for an abortion, and that only she, not her husband
or doctor, only she . . . is the one who must live with this decision. Abortion is no

1

Barbara Holliday, “The Lady Said ‘Abortion,’ If You Want to Awaken Our State Senate,
Try Lorraine Beebe’s Method,” Detroit Free Press Magazine, August 3, 1969.

2

joke, especially to a woman.”2 Thus, Beebe, as the only woman in the Senate, felt
compelled to share her personal story with them. 3 The legislature, sensing the
gravity of the moment, gave her a standing ovation, but she did not convince them
to decriminalize abortion in Michigan.4 The proposed legislation was defeated.
Beebe paid a political and personal price for publicizing her pro-choice stand
on abortion. In 1970, she was not reelected to the Michigan Senate. She attributed
her loss to her gender and her public support for abortion.5 The morning after the
election, she said, “I stood up and spoke for women . . . and I see my defeat as a
slap against all women.”6 Her story, however, was a preview of events to come.
Over the next fifteen years, as the women’s movement developed and the
Republican Party took a conservative turn to the right, women who were both

2

Judy Jacob, “Dearborn’s Lady Senator Speaks Up on Abortion, Grapes and Problem
Kids,” Detroit News, July 14, 1969.
3

Ibid.

4

Jim Neubacher, “Abortion: Up from the Underground,” Detroit News, n.d., Lorraine
Beebe Scrapbook, N. Lorraine Beebe Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan
(hereafter cited as Beebe Papers).
5

Stephen Dobyms, “Newcomer Defeats Mrs. Beebe: Dearborn Senator Blames Abortion
Stand,” Detroit News, [November 4, 1970?], box 1, folder: Beebe-State Senate Election
Campaigns 1966 and 1970, Beebe Papers; Willa Weddon, “Is Bias a Bar to Women Candidates?”
Detroit Free Press, November 22, 1970.
6

Dobyms, “Newcomer Defeats Mrs. Beebe,” Detroit News.
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Republicans and feminists found it increasingly difficult to reconcile these two parts
of their lives. Ultimately they were forced to choose between two elements at the
core of their identities: Am I a Republican? Or am I a feminist?
Although it is sometimes overlooked and may be difficult to comprehend,
the conflict between the Republican Party and feminism was not inevitable.
Historically, women’s rights activists found that the Republican Party offered them
more support in their fight for equality. In 1920, in response to the not-yet-ratified
Nineteenth Amendment that provided women with the right to vote, the
Republican National Party platform provided that “we welcome women into full
participation in the affairs of government and the activities of the Republican Party.
We earnestly hope that Republican legislatures in states which have not yet acted
on the suffrage amendment will ratify the amendment, to the end that all of the
women of the nation of voting age may participate in the election of 1920, which
is so important to the welfare of the country.” 7 Pragmatically, Republicans
recognized the potential power of women, who would ultimately constitute half of
the expanded voting population.

7

“The Republican Party and Women: A Brief History,” Republican Women for I.W.Y.,
n.d., box 2, folder: International Women’s Year Houston Conference, 1977, Patricia Hill Burnett
Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter cited as Burnett Papers).

4

Despite these gestures, however, after 1920 the Republican Party, much like
the Democratic Party, did little to promote the interests of women. In fact, the
political parties became largely indifferent to women once they realized that
female voters would not change the outcomes of elections because they did not
vote in a bloc. While some women chose to become involved in party politics, the
men in charge accepted women only on their terms, and assigned them the menial
tasks that men refused to perform. These early political women did not gain any
real power in the parties, although, according to political scientist Jo Freemen,
women fared a little better in the Republican Party than the Democratic Party.8
With the advent of second wave feminism in the late 1960s, many of the
women who worked with or in the Republican Party became Republican feminists.
Because they sought gender equality, they believed that feminism and the party,
with its longstanding commitment to individual rights and opportunities, could be
easily integrated. By the late 1970s, however, conservatives had coalesced within
the Republican Party in opposition to both moderate Republicans, who were their
intra-party rivals, and feminists, who sought government solutions to their
inequality. Conservatives argued that the American way of life was threatened by

8

Jo Freeman, A Room at a Time: How Women Entered Political Parties (Lanham MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 228-29.

5

the continuous expansion and intrusion of the liberal federal government into the
lives of individuals; families; private institutions, such as the church; and local public
institutions, like schools. Feminist Republicans appeared to be on a collision course
with the conservatives in their own party. Despite this intra-party conflict, however,
historian Catherine Rymph found that “during the mid-1970s, there was an
ideological space in the party for Republican feminists, and it appeared briefly that
Republican feminism might be a real political force.”9 Michigan offered Republican
feminists similar opportunities because, from 1962 to 1982, under the leadership
of two consecutive moderate Republican governors, “Michigan was considered a
model in the nation for the possibilities of moderate Republicanism.”10
This dissertation examines the evolution of Republican feminism from the
late 1960s until the early 1980s through the experiences of seven of Michigan’s
most prominent Republican feminists. These women mediated the conflicts
between feminism and conservatism in order “‘to maintain a feminist presence in
the Republican Party and to maintain a Republican presence in the feminist

9

Catherine Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage
through the Rise of the New Right (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 189.
10

Francis X. Blouin, Jr., review of William G. Milliken: Michigan’s Passionate Moderate,
by Dave Dempsey, Michigan Historical Review 33, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 141,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/stable/20174206.

6

movement.’” 11 Republican feminists partnered with moderate party leaders to
stave off this conservative challenge by staking out “the sensible” center of the
women’s movement. 12 From this middle ground, they were able to engage in
feminist activism and simultaneously repudiate the radical feminism that many of
their moderate Republican colleagues found offensive. In exchange, they expected
the party to embrace their moderate feminist goals. As they battled with
conservatives to determine who would become the true representatives of
Republican women, they became a part of the struggle for control of the
Republican Party. As they feared, however, when moderate Republicanism was
displaced by conservatism, they were left without a political home. At the same
time, the “conservative ascendance” 13 undermined the attempts of Republican
feminists to incorporate a Republican voice into the feminist movement. They

11

Ken Fireman, “Angry GOP Women Disown Task Force,” Detroit Free Press, June 26,
1983; Position Statement, Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force, n.d., box 7, folder: Topical
files 1969-1982 Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force, Helen Milliken Papers, Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter cited as Helen Milliken Papers).
12

Elly Peterson, Elly!: Memoirs of a Republican Lady!, s.l., s.n., [1990?], 121-22, Elly
Peterson Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter cited as Peterson
Papers).
13

Donald Critchlow uses a variant of this phrase in the title of his monograph, The
Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History, which chronicles the rise
of the conservative movement in the United States. Donald Critchlow, The Conservative
Ascendency: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Boston: Harvard University Press,
2007).
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found that feminists were not interested in associating with a conservative
Republican Party that repudiated their feminist agenda. As the 1970s ended, so too
did their hopes of integrating their gendered interests with their Republicanism.
Michigan’s Republican feminists were each forced to choose between these two
different core identities.
These seven women came to the Republican Party from various backgrounds
and with different interests. However, because of their activism, their paths often
crossed. Over time, some of them became good friends. Beebe, the oldest of these
women, was born in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in 1910. She was elected to the
Michigan Senate as a Republican representative from blue-collar Dearborn,
Michigan, in 1966. Although she lost her reelection bid in 1970, she continued her
activism with an emphasis on abortion rights for all women.14 Only slightly younger
than Beebe, Elly Peterson was born in 1914 in New Berlin, Illinois and moved to
Charlotte, Michigan, in 1948. She spent much of her life working for the Republican
Party, but in her later years she led the nonpartisan fight to ratify the Equal Rights

14

Judy Jacob, “Dearborn’s Lady Senator Speaks Up;” N. Lorraine Beebe, Inductee,
Michigan Women’s Hall of Fame, http://www.michiganwomenshalloffame.org/home.aspx.
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Amendment (ERA).15 Patricia Hill Burnett, born in Ohio in 1920, was a wealthy wife,
mother and famous portrait artist. She never held a political office but was a cofounder of the Michigan chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW).
She remained active in Republican politics and in the feminist movement for her
entire life.16
Ruth McNamee, born in 1921, was married and had two college-aged
children when she became mayor of Birmingham, Michigan, a wealthy suburb of
Detroit, in 1970. As a ten-year representative from Birmingham in the state
legislature, she fought for both the ERA and abortion rights.17 Born in 1922, Helen
Milliken was married to Michigan’s Governor William Milliken and the mother of
two children. She never held elective office, but used her position as Michigan’s
first lady to promote feminist causes, especially the ERA. 18 Helen Milliken and
15

Sara Fitzgerald, Elly Peterson, “Mother of the Moderates” (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2011). Fitzgerald wrote this biography of Peterson with the cooperation of
Peterson. Fitzgerald, Elly Peterson, 20-22.
16

Patricia Hill Burnett, True Colors: An Artist’s Journey from Beauty Queen to Feminist
(Troy, MI: Momentum Books, 1995).
17

Ruth McNamee, Vita, n.d., box 1, folder: Ruth Braden McNamee Biographical Vita and
Overview Articles, Ruth Braden McNamee Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan (hereafter cited as McNamee Papers).
18

Dave Dempsey, William G. Milliken: Michigan’s Passionate Moderate (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2006), 130-45; Helen Milliken, Inductee, Michigan Women’s Hall
of Fame, http://www.michiganwomenshalloffame.org/home.aspx.

9

Peterson became life-long friends through their shared activism on behalf of
women’s rights. Similarly, Helen Milliken and McNamee became very close and
continued to correspond long after they left public service.
Born in northern Michigan in 1924, Connie Binsfeld had five grown children
when she became involved in politics. She “was the first women to hold leadership
posts in Michigan’s House, Senate, and executive branch.” 19 She served as assistant
minority leader in the House, assistant majority leader in the Senate and lieutenant
governor to conservative governor John Engler. 20 As a feminist who opposed
abortion, she was uniquely positioned to try to bridge the differences between
feminists and the conservatives in the Republican Party. The youngest of these
women, Lee Kefauver, was born in 1934. Her cousin was Estes Kefauver, the
prominent Democratic United States senator from Tennessee. Divorced and the
mother of two, she never held elective public office but was a lobbyist and activist

19

“Former Michigan Lt. Gov. Connie Binsfeld Dies,” Associated Press, January 13, 2014,
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/former_michigan_lt_gov_connie.html.
20

John Flesher and John Kennett, “Former Lt. Gov. Connie Binsfeld Remembered by
Local Officials, Others,” Midland Daily News, January 15, 2014,
http://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/Former-Lt-Gov-Connie-Binsfeld-remembered-by6927214.php.

10

for women’s rights for most of her adult life, with a special interest in abortion.21
While fighting for access to abortion for all women, she often worked with Beebe.
Beebe, Peterson, Burnett, McNamee, Milliken, Binsfeld, and Kefauver all
believed that they were both Republicans and feminists. This study does not
purport to determine or even try to examine whether they were genuine feminists
or real Republicans. While some may disagree with one or more of these selfassessments, the veracity of how they identified themselves is not important for or
relevant to this analysis. Rather, what is critical, and what this research is based
upon, is that these women believed that they were Republicans and feminists.
This analysis is both chronologically and geographically bounded. It begins
with the emergence of second wave feminism in the late 1960s and ends with the
ascendance of conservatism in the Republican Party in the early 1980s. At that
point, each woman had to decide how to prioritize and reconcile her potentially
conflicting interests. It is a grassroots analysis predicated on observations and
experiences gleaned from their correspondence, memoirs, notes, and other

21

David Holtz, “Lansing Lobbyists Strike from Dearborn,” Dearborn Press & Guide,
September 6, 1979, box 1, folder: Lee Kefauver, Organizations, WEAL, Michigan Division, 19731980, Lee Kefauver Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter cited as
Kefauver Papers). This article incorrectly identified Estes Kefauver as a Republican. Lee
Kefauver, “Personal History with Pro-Choice Activities,” n.d., box 1, folder: Lee Kefauver,
Biographical Information, Kefauver Papers.
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records, as well as the documents of both the partisan and feminist organizations
to which they belonged, and newspaper articles that contemporaneously described
their activities. Although this story is situated within a larger national context, the
focus is primarily on feminists who participated in Michigan Republican Party
politics.
As a study of Republican feminists during the 1970s, this dissertation is
situated at the point where the historiographies of feminism, the rise of Republican
conservatism, and women in the Republican Party intersect. The women who are
the subject of this study were all Republicans before they became feminists. They
shared with their male counterparts a conviction that party politics effectively
facilitated change and a commitment to the beliefs and goals of the Republican
Party. At least some of them were what historians have called “party women” who
sought to participate in party politics on the same terms as men.22 They immersed
themselves in the party bureaucracy and willingly performed the mundane
housekeeping duties of the party in order to convince the party’s leaders that they
could be loyal and competent partisans.23 However, the Republican Party did not

22

Rymph, Republican Women, 2-7.

23

Ibid.
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reward them for their loyalty and hard work. With the emergence of second wave
feminism, these female political activists finally had a frame of reference through
which to understand their dissatisfaction and redirect their activism.
Second wave feminists participated in the broader social movement activism
that swept the United States in the 1960s. Historians often divide the women who
participated in the second wave of feminism into two groups. 24 “Equal rights”
feminists worked within the existing legal, economic and political framework to
eliminate discrimination and produce a society that treated men and women as
equals. They tended to be older, professional women who became conscious of
gender inequality and the efficacy of legal remedies for discrimination. 25 Myra
Marx Ferree and Beth B. Hess noted that these feminists were likely to promote
feminism through their participation in feminist organizations such as NOW, the
Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), and the National Women’s Political Caucus
(NWPC).26

24

Jo Freeman, “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement,” American Journal of
Sociology 78, no. 4 (January 1973): 795-98; Myra Marx Ferree & Beth B. Hess, Controversy and
Coalition: The New Feminist Movement Across Four Decades of Change (New York: Routledge,
2000), 56-75; Sara M. Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New
York: Free Press, 2003), 21-24.
25

Evans, Tidal Wave, 21-26; Ferree and Hess, Controversy and Coalition, 59-65.

26

Ferree and Hess, Controversy and Coalition, 65-68.
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Women’s liberation feminists were often younger women who participated
in, but felt increasingly marginalized by the masculinity and militancy of the civil
rights, anti-war and New Left movements of the 1960s. They were more likely to
reject the political and legalistic solutions to inequality sought by their older
counterparts and, influenced by their membership in the protest and
counterculture movements of the 1960s, they emphasized self awareness,
nonhierarchical organizations, and collective, egalitarian strategies to achieve their
goals. These more unconventional feminists tended to divide into socialist
feminists, who believed that discrimination against women was due to the class
oppression that resulted from capitalism, and radical feminists, who argued that
the problem was patriarchy, which could only be resolved by revolutionizing the
system to make gender irrelevant. Some of these feminists believed that women
would be liberated, and men and women would be truly equal, only when the social
constructs that created the artificial differences between men and women were
eliminated by significant structural changes to society. 27 Cultural feminism grew

27

Evans, Tidal Wave, 21-24, 26-38; Ferree and Hess, Controversy and Coalition, 68-75.

14

out of radical feminism. These women believed in female superiority and
advocated gendered separatism.28
Although they were not a monolithic group, Michigan’s Republican feminists
can best be characterized as equal rights feminists. As a demographic group, they
were very homogenous–white, middle class, married or divorced and, for the most
part, mothers. Middle-aged when they became feminists in the late 1960s and early
1970s, none of them were products of or participants in any of the protest
movements of the 1960s. Republicans before they became feminists, they believed
that political power was the key to feminist success and that feminist success was
the key to political power. They promoted their feminism not only through the
Republican Party, but also by participating in feminist organizations, such as NOW,
WEAL, and the NWPC. 29 Michigan’s Republican feminists eschewed radical, or
women’s liberation feminism, with its ties to the anti-establishment social
movements of the 1960s. They disputed (or failed to recognize) the ties between
gender discrimination and class or racial oppression and, therefore, dismissed the
need to revolutionize the system to eliminate the social constructs that created

28

Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 1-11.
29

Ferree and Hess, Controversy and Coalition, 65-68.
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artificial differences between men and women. Instead, they believed that
incremental change within the system would remedy the disadvantages of women.
As feminists, Michigan’s Republican feminists sought “to maintain . . . a
Republican presence in the feminist movement.”30 They joined with like-minded
political feminists in a multipartisan network of coalitions through which they tried
to politicize and empower women. Political participation was a feminist goal in and
of itself. At the same time, however, coalition members understood that if women
participated in political parties and were elected and appointed to influential
leadership positions in the government, they would be able to enact laws and
policies that advanced both their feminist and partisan interests.31
This network of coalitions, however, experienced the same problems that
plagued most feminist coalitions. While members all shared the disadvantages they
experienced as women, they had other, competing identities that they had to
reconcile, integrate, or prioritize to be able to come together, at least temporarily,
to pursue their feminist goals. Stephanie Gilmore called these multiple identities

30
31

Position Statement, Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force.

Catherine E. Rymph, “Political Feminism and the Problem of Sarah Palin,” in Obama,
Clinton, Palin: Making History in Election 2008, ed. Liette Gidlow (Champagne: University of
Illinois Press, 2011), 137.
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the “intersecting hierarchies in their lives” that, for the most part, challenged the
coalitions that they built.32 Sara Evans described the resultant instability of these
coalitions as follows: “If human identities are both multiple and fluid, the human
communities generated by grassroots organizing are similarly never fixed and
always filled with competing perspectives and interests.”33 For a short time, the
political and gendered interests of these women aligned in this network of affiliated
political coalitions. Their differences soon emerged, however, and they struggled
to find common ground.
At the same time, Republican feminists realized that they could not
accomplish all of their gendered and partisan objectives through a feminist political
organization. Therefore, they needed “to maintain . . . a feminist presence in the
Republican Party.”34 They tried to convince party men and women that feminism
and Republicanism were synergetic. The Republican Party needed female voters
and participants, and feminism was the best way to politicize women.35 But as the

32

Stephanie Gilmore, ed., Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave
Feminism in the United States (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 2-3, 6-7; Ferree and
Hess, Controversy and Coalition, vii, 211.
33

Sara M. Evans, forward to Feminist Coalitions, by Gilmore, x.

34

Position Statement, Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force.

35

For a discussion of how male-dominated liberal and conservative institutions contain
pockets of feminism, see Susan M. Hartmann, The Other Feminists: Activists in the Liberal
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Republican Party turned to the right, Michigan’s Republican feminists met with
increased resistance, especially from conservative women.
The Republican Party had long encompassed moderate and conservative
wings that had managed to coexist as their fortunes waxed and waned in relation
to the Democratic Party and each other.36 However, by the middle of the twentieth
century, the conservative movement, while rife with internal conflicts, was
beginning to unite. Members opposed communism and big government, and
supported a laissez-faire, capitalist economy, low taxes, individual responsibility,
the traditional family, and, perhaps most importantly, a shared desire for power.
Yet conservatives did not follow a linear path as they took over the Republican
Party.
The nomination of conservative Barry Goldwater as the Republican
candidate for president in 1964 persuaded conservatives that they had finally

Establishment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Faithful
and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest inside the Church and Military (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
36

Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction
of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), xvii-xix; Geoffrey Kabaservice, “How Democrats are Complicit in the War Against
Women,” New Republic, April 8, 2012, https://newrepublic.com/article/102441/war-womendemocrat-snowe. Kabaservice noted that he did not address the role that women played in
opposition to the rise of conservatism in the Republican Party in Rule and Ruin because the
issue had been “amply chronicled” by other scholars, including Rymph.

18

gained control of the party. His overwhelming defeat by Democrat Lyndon Johnson,
however, quickly dashed their hopes. Instead of giving up, they regrouped.
Moderate party leadership largely underestimated and overlooked the growing
grassroots support they were building for conservatism. The Watergate debacle
that resulted in President Richard Nixon’s resignation severely damaged the
Republican Party with voters, and further divided moderates and conservatives as
they blamed each other for the scandal. In 1976, after a valiant effort, conservative
candidate Ronald Reagan lost the Republican nomination for president to
moderate Gerald Ford. While Reagan lost the nomination, Ford lost the presidential
election to Democrat Jimmy Carter, which, according to Kabaservice, “removed the
moderates’ last defense against a conservative takeover of the GOP.”37 In 1980,
Reagan came back to win the nomination and defeated Carter for president.
Reagan’s victory marked the completion of the conservative takeover of the
party.38

37
38

Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 348.

Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin; William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to
Clinton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the
Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1995); Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency.

19

The Michigan Republican Party faced similar conservative challenges, but for
many years the party’s moderate leaders minimized their influence. From 1962
until 1969, Michigan was led by Governor George Romney, a prominent member
of the moderate wing of the national Republican Party. He believed that a political
party needed to encompass a wide-ranging diversity of ideas to facilitate
compromise, political stability, and cohesion. As a pragmatist, he promoted an
inclusive political party and tried to appeal to a broad swath of Michigan voters,
including a large number of independents and traditionally Democratic union
members. Romney rejected conservatism because he opposed identity or
ideological politics that pitted one group against another. He feared that
conservatives espoused a single-minded political extremism that threatened the
future of the party.39 According to Kabaservice, Romney was one of the last chances
to save moderate Republicanism.40

39

“Text of Romney’s Letter to Goldwater After Defeat of Presidential Nominee in ‘64”
dated December 21, 1964, New York Times, December 21, 1966,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/docview/117638616?accountid=14925;
Dempsey, William G. Milliken, 166; David E. Rosenbaum, “George Romney Dies at 88: A Leading
G.O.P. Figure,” New York Times, July 27, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/27/obituaries/george-romney-dies-at-88-a-leading-gopfigure.html.
40

Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 211.
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In 1969, moderate Republican William Milliken succeeded Romney as
Michigan’s governor when Romney accepted a position in President Richard
Nixon’s cabinet. Milliken was elected governor in 1970, 1974, and 1978. Like
Romney, he believed in an open and inclusive Republican Party. He understood that
the party needed to attract independent voters in order to win elections and thus
eschewed conservative extremism. While Romney’s very public opposition to the
ERA made it difficult to characterize him as a feminist, Milliken actively supported
feminist causes. In fact, two female friends, his assistant for political appointments
Joyce Braithwaite and attorney Harriet Rotter, characterized Milliken as a long-time
feminist. His commitment to gender equality provided a political space within the
Michigan Republican Party and the state of Michigan that allowed feminists to
pursue their feminist goals.41 However, conservatives completed their efforts to
take control the Michigan Republican Party in 1982 when Republican primary
voters elected conservative Richard Headlee as the party’s candidate for governor.
By the early 1970s, conservatives openly opposed feminism. Many
conservatives were angered and frightened by the breakdown in the American
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family caused, they believed, by the women’s movement. In fact, the two belief
systems were understandably at odds because the rights sought by feminists
contradicted

the

longstanding

definition

of

the

family

embraced

by

conservatives. 42 Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Gray put it very simply:
“When the role of a woman is defined by her reproductive, sexual, and childrearing
functions within the family, then there is a ‘natural’ division of activities into the
public extrafamilial jobs done by the male and the private intrafamilial ones
performed by the female. If women act outside their ‘natural’ roles, that is as
individuals, that action is ipso facto anti-family.”43
Conservatives clung to the traditional definition of the family and argued that
feminists denied its fundamental foundation–the immutable biological differences
between men and women. By declaring that men and women were identical, the
ERA threatened to eliminate longstanding protections for women and force them
to work outside the home. As a result, conservatives worried, children would be
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raised by the state in day care centers and families would be destroyed.44 Pro-life
advocates believed that women were biologically destined to be mothers. They
argued that abortion, which was the murder of an unborn child, undermined
motherhood and disrupted the traditional roles of men and women within the
nuclear family.45 Conservatives were convinced that feminists promoted divorce,
dismissed the traditional roles of women as wives and mothers, and, in general,
legitimized immoral behavior.46
Feminists, on the other hand, challenged the notion of the traditional family.
They believed that society defined what it meant to be a man or woman. Without
these artificial constructs, they argued, women would have the same opportunities
as men to engage in the public sphere of politics, economics, and culture. 47
Feminists contended that an unwanted pregnancy was a barrier to gender equality.
Women needed to control their reproductive decisions so that they could prioritize
the relative importance of pregnancy and motherhood in their lives. According to
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feminists, the issues that had long been considered personal, including gender
relations, sexual preferences, reproductive rights, and family structure, involved
the distribution of power, which made them political.48 The ERA and abortion rights
would help to equalize men and women.
While feminists believed that the ERA and abortion rights would empower
women, conservatives argued that feminists, who sought to impose on them their
interpretations of sexual difference and gender neutrality, limited women.49 Thus,
in the context of the ERA, Donald G. Mathews and Jane Sherron DeHart concluded
that “the appeal to individual rights that elicited from ratificationists a liberating
vision evoked from their opponents different images–women forced to be men and
thus bereft of the female relationships that had defined and sustained them.”50
Conservative activists offered apocalyptic messages because they believed that
society would be irreversibly altered to the detriment of all Americans by the
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ratification of the ERA and the legalization of abortion. With such high stakes, the
debates were rancorous and compromise became impossible.
Historians believe that the anti-feminist activism of conservative women was
more than just a backlash to feminism and differing worldviews.51 Kim Phillips-Fein
argued that the conservatism of these women was tied “to a broader political
framework . . . [through which] ideas about gender shaped visions of the state,
economic regulation, anticommunism, and the proper role of government.” 52
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky cynically asserted that conservatives did not politicize
their opposition to abortion because they were concerned about pregnant women
and their fetuses. Instead, they used it to enhance their political power so that they
could impose their larger ideological agenda, including the privatization of the
traditional patriarchal family, business, religion, and education, upon the American
people.53
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In fact, both liberals, including feminists, and conservatives invoked the
notion of the family to justify their own political agendas. Matthew Lassiter found
that, during the 1970s, each group offered their own economic, political, and social
programs to address the breakdown of the traditional nuclear family. Liberals
attributed the breakdown to the flailing economy and proposed as solutions the
very types of programs, such as equal rights for women in the workplace and
government funded childcare, that conservatives disdained. Conservatives argued
that American families were under siege by feminism. Equal rights and legalized
abortion led to promiscuity and immorality. Moreover, the economic solutions
promoted by feminists encouraged women to work outside of the home, which
further undermined the family and expanded the government. The only way to
save the traditional family, according to conservatives, was to stop the women’s
movement.54
Robert O. Self argued that feminists battled with conservatives over the
appropriate definition of the American family. Both attacked the traditional liberal
construct of family–characterized by a white male breadwinner and a stay-at-home
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mother, propped up and supported by various social welfare programs–because it
did not reflect reality. Feminists believed that the notion of family had to be flexible
enough to incorporate alternative lifestyles, such as single parent families and
families with same-gender parents. Conservatives, on the other hand, constructed
their own idealized image of an economically independent family with a white male
breadwinner and a stay-at-home mother, which did not rely on government social
welfare programs. Instead, the conservative family needed government protection
from the moral threats posed by feminism, such as legalized abortion. Ironically
government interference became a moral threat to families, which required a
different type of government interference to protect families. Although they
argued about the appropriate definition of the family, each side was really debating
the economic, political, social, and ideological direction of the country.55
When Self’s contest between liberals, feminists and conservatives over the
family is superimposed on the two-party political system in Michigan, it becomes
apparent that this debate was situated largely within, and became a part of the
struggle over, who would dictate the future of the Republican Party. As Rymph
noted, “Conflicts between feminists and antifeminists were an important part of
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the process by which the Republican Party remade itself in the 1970s and 1980s.”56
Michigan’s Republican feminists were significant participants in this controversy.
They claimed the sensible center of the women’s movement as they emphasized
moderate political and legalistic, rather than radical, structural, solutions to the
problems that faced women. From this middle ground, they aligned with moderate
Republicans to refute conservative allegations about the dangerous extremism of
feminism and to stop conservatives from implementing their political agenda
through the Republican Party.
Ironically, the conservative movement embraced female activists, such as
Phyllis Schlafly, who used their political and organizational skills to politicize this
new constituency of anti-feminist conservative voters.
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conservative Michigan cohorts, Elaine Donnelly and Patt Barbour, spent the 1970s
battling Michigan’s Republican feminists. As they fought over who would represent
women and define the family within the Republican Party, the stakes were high.
These women identified, framed, constructed, and articulated their positions and
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arguments in response to and anticipation of each other. 58 They became a part of
the ongoing struggle over the control of the future of the Michigan Republican
Party.
In the context of abortion, where compromise between feminists and
conservatives appeared impossible, one group of women seemed to have the
potential to at least partially bridge the gap. Mary Ziegler identified a group of “prolife feminists” within the feminist movement.59 They promoted gender equality but
did not believe that it was dependent on access to abortion. These women
struggled to find an ideological home. Conservative leaders did not agree with their
commitment to gender equality and liberal feminists linked opposition to abortion
with anti-feminism. Ziegler noted that “ERA opponents [like Schlafly] helped to
convince anti-abortion activists that it was politically impossible to oppose abortion
while supporting the women’s movement.”60 In 1976, NOW leader Karen DeGrow
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delegitimized pro-life feminists when she stated, “I don’t think you can be a
feminist and be against the right of a woman to choose abortion.” 61 Ziegler
suggested that activists like these women, “who sought middle-ground positions
on gender issues,” created opportunities for compromise on issues about which
pro-life and pro-choice women might otherwise be able to agree. 62 Binsfeld
represented these pro-life feminists in Michigan.
Despite their optimism and the opportunities available to them, Michigan’s
Republican feminists, aligned with party moderates, were losing their battle “to
maintain a feminist presence in the Republican Party and to maintain a Republican
presence in the feminist movement.”63 By 1980, the brief window of opportunity
to align feminism with the Republican Party had passed and, as Rymph asserted,
conservatives had marginalized and forced feminists out of the Republican Party.
Rymph concluded with a suggestion that, by the end of the 1980s, a new type of
woman had replaced feminists in the Republican Party. This woman focused on
individualism rather than sexual difference or identity politics. Rymph’s new
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Republican woman did not expect the government to solve gender inequality and
did not believe that she would be empowered by joining with other women.64
These women were Rebecca Klatch’s laissez-faire conservative women. They
believed that a limited federal government should not become involved in the
economy or the lives of American citizens. 65 According to Klatch, these women
were genderless economic actors who, like men, benefited from a robust capitalist
economy to the extent of their individual initiative and effort. While laissez-faire
conservatives recognized that women were subject to discrimination, they
opposed the ERA because it allowed the federal governmental to become involved
in individual lives. Instead, they argued, problems of gender discrimination should
be resolved at the state and local level. Abortion was a private issue in which the
government should never be involved, even to subsidize poor women who would
otherwise be denied access to the procedure. Klatch argued that unlike feminists,
who advocated changing and expanding roles for women, and social conservatives,
who promoted traditional familial roles for women, laissez-faire conservative
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women did not identify with other women based on gender and never supported
positions that promoted the interests of women as women.66
As a result of this increasingly contentious intra-party conflict, and the
ultimate ascendance of conservatism within the Republican Party, the interests and
priorities of many Republican feminists changed, their identities and
commonalities diverged, and the women, who had often worked together but
never self-identified as a single cohesive group, fragmented. Each Republican
feminist had to choose whether to prioritize her feminist interests or her loyalty to
a Republican Party that no longer supported feminism. Some left the Republican
Party or supported candidates from other parties. A small number of them
continued to believe that the Republican Party provided them with the best
opportunities to meet their goals and, therefore, they remained loyal party
members. Those feminists who stayed, however, were not Klatch’s laissez-faire
conservatives. They did not abandon their identification with or support for the
women’s movement. Instead, they adapted their feminist rhetoric to the changes
in the party as they tried to make it more receptive to women’s rights.
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This dissertation begins in Chapter One with an examination of the
development of feminism in the Michigan Republican Party through the
experiences of three Republican feminists, Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett. When
the second wave of feminism emerged in the late 1960s, the moderation of the
leaders of the Michigan Republican Party provided space for the development of a
feminist consciousness and the active pursuit of feminist goals by many of the
women within the party. These women were all Republicans before they were
feminists. They adopted an interpretation of feminism that repudiated its more
radical elements, thereby facilitating its convergence with moderate Republicanism.
From this sensible center of the women’s movement, Michigan’s Republican
feminists positioned themselves to both promote feminism and oppose
conservatism within the Michigan Republican Party.
Chapter Two continues with an analysis of the formation and operation of
the NWPC and its state affiliate, the Michigan Women’s Political Caucus (MWPC).
When members realized that it was difficult to pursue their partisan interests
within this multipartisan organization, they created, under the auspices of the
women’s political caucuses, the National Republican Women’s Task Force (NRWTF)
and its state affiliate, the Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force (MRWTF).
Michigan’s Republican feminists organized and participated in these coalitions
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believing that their large numbers would provide them with access to political
power to promote their feminist interests in the male-dominated Republican Party
and the national, state, and local political systems more broadly. Through these
organizations, they tried “to maintain a Republican presence in the feminist
movement.”67 As this chapter illustrates, however, this network of organizations
suffered from the problems that all feminist coalitions faced. The Republican
feminists who participated in these feminist caucuses were partisan political actors
who struggled to reconcile their partisanship with the coalition’s feminism. As a
result, they were forced to regularly reprioritize and reconcile their multiple
interests in order to make the coalition work and to remain both Republicans and
feminists.
Chapter Three looks at how Republican feminists simultaneously
participated in single issue coalitions and the Michigan Republican Party to fight for
the ratification of the ERA. It focuses on the different ways that these activists
formulated and articulated their strategies and arguments depending on whether
they were working with other feminists to achieve these specific goals, or seeking
the support of the moderate wing of the Republican Party on this issue. When they
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worked with their Republican colleagues, they framed the issues in ways that fit
into a partisan narrative, emphasizing moderation and family values in response to
their conservative critics. They operated within a metaphoric middle ground,
mediating between the radical component of the feminist movement and the
conservative faction of the Republican Party, hoping to convince Republican
leaders to support this feminist goal. As the party became more conservative and
intensified its opposition to the ERA, however, Republican feminists found that the
middle ground became a very small space that was increasingly difficult to
negotiate.
Chapter Four continues to explore the activism of Michigan’s Republican
feminists in the context of abortion rights and other reproductive issues. Because
of the differences between the ERA and abortion, they had to adopt different
procedural and substantive strategies to promote and protect this right. Milliken’s
support for abortion made the work of Michigan’s Republican feminists easier,
especially with respect to women who could not otherwise afford to terminate
their pregnancies. As a Ziegler pro-life feminist, Binsfeld had ties to both the
moderate and conservative wings of the party. She challenged the alignment of
abortion opponents with the anti-feminist movement, and seemed uniquely
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positioned to bridge some of the differences between women on abortion rights.
This effort, however, proved more challenging than anticipated.
Chapter Five explores the ways that some of Michigan’s Republican women
participated in the 1977 International Women’s Year (IWY) Conference, which
marked a high point in the women’s movement. Five of Michigan’s Republican
feminists, and the daughter of a sixth, attended this conference. They joined with
women from around the United States to reiterate their commitment and
reenergize their efforts to ratify the ERA and protect abortion rights for all women.
Many of the members of Michigan’s growing conservative movement also
attended this convention. Their recollections of the event, read together with those
of Michigan’s Republican feminists in attendance, provide an interesting snapshot
of the status of feminism in the Republican Party at that time. However, by
endorsing a more radical feminist agenda that included support for homosexuality,
Michigan’s Republican feminists provided conservative women with evidence that
Republican feminists were no longer at the sensible center of the women’s
movement and, therefore, not moderate enough to represent women in the
Republican Party.
Chapter Six is a study of the ways in which the conservative ascendency
within the Republican Party, culminating in the presidential election of 1980 and
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the gubernatorial election of 1982, influenced Michigan’s Republican feminists.
They all felt excluded, to different degrees, by the party’s rightward shift that
caused it to change its positions on issues of concern to them. At the same time,
they were losing their influence in the political caucuses, which struggled to
support conservative Republican candidates who did not endorse their feminist
agenda.
Realizing that feminism would not survive in a Republican Party controlled
by conservatives, and that any connection to a conservative Republican Party
would jeopardize their political influence within the feminist movement, they all
had to recognize and try to reconcile the conflicts between these components of
their core identities. Many Republican feminists prioritized their interests as
women over their partisan loyalties and either left the party or publicly supported
candidates from other parties who were more responsive to their concerns as
feminists. These women walked away from their prior attempts to make the
Republican Party a broad-based, inclusive political organization. However, this
chapter complicates the assertion that conservatism left no room for a feminist
political presence in the Michigan Republican Party. While many left, a few of
Michigan’s Republican feminists chose to continue to work within the party,
believing that its stance on economic and foreign policy issues would ultimately
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benefit women. They hoped to continue a feminist influence within the Republican
Party in order to persuade party leaders to abandon the conservatism that quashed
their feminist goals.68 They remained committed to both their Republicanism and
their feminism. Thus, this chapter will illustrate how feminists within the Michigan
Republican Party both changed and were changed by the ascendance of
conservatism within the party.
Republicans who became feminists came together during the 1970s to
promote and reconcile their partisan and gendered interests. As this dissertation
will illustrate, for a short time they were successful. They formed coalitions with
feminists outside of the Republican Party, and created a coherent feminist voice
within the Republican Party that enabled them to partner with moderate
Republicans to try to stymie the rise of conservatism. As the Republican Party
became more conservative and less receptive to their feminist goals, however,
their different priorities undermined their ability to operate as a cohesive group
and they fragmented. Feminists who were Republicans, those who prioritized their
feminism over their partisanship, ultimately either supported non-Republican
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candidates or left the party altogether. Republicans who were feminists remained
in the Michigan Republican Party, despite the fact that it became increasingly
hostile to many of their feminist goals. In order to remain Republicans, their
feminism had to be moderated or to change in response to the conservative
ideology that was espoused by those who controlled the party. Ultimately, some of
the ideals of Republican feminism survived the rise of conservatism within the
Michigan Republican Party as its few remaining adherents continued to exert
pressure on the party to recognize the rights of women.
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CHAPTER 2 THE PATH TO THE SENSIBLE CENTER: 1960 TO 1970
Women, you must take the lead in building this party if it is to survive.

–Elly M. Peterson

It has been said that the home is the cradle of all, a grave if you stay there.
–N. Lorraine Beebe
We must turn men around to recognize that we are persons before we are women.
–Patricia Hill Burnett

In 1970, Peterson, assistant chairman of the Republican National
Committee (RNC), resigned in frustration after working on behalf of the Republican
Party in different capacities for over twelve years. She spent much of that time
trying to persuade the party to welcome women and minorities as equal
participants, but she could never get past the discriminatory attitudes of the men
who led the party. Faced with their intransigence, she realized that she would have
to change her approach. While “she ha[d] always thought that the best way to deal
with discrimination against women was not to complain, but to endure it and work
around it [she was no longer] sure.” 1 She added, “I’m getting awfully weary of
maintaining that attitude. I’m getting weary at the discrimination against women
in all kinds of political life. . . . I say, if men keep working at it, we’ll be wiped out in
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10 years.”2 Peterson’s recognition that she was going to have to become more of
an activist for women’s rights led her to the sensible center of feminism.
Peterson’s story is but one example of the road traveled by many Republican
women during the 1960s. Beebe and Burnett were as frustrated as Peterson–Beebe
by a discriminatory political system and Burnett by a patriarchal society that limited
her personal life and career. All three women believed that they could best
effectuate change by working within the political system, specifically the
Republican Party. But they had little success breaking through the gender barriers
erected by the men in charge. Second wave feminism provided these women with
the language that they needed to understand and articulate their frustration and a
framework through which they could promote their common interests as women.
Although their paths to feminism were different, Republicans Peterson,
Beebe, and Burnett developed similar understandings of and commitments to
feminism.3 They agreed that the women’s movement was polarized. On one end of
the spectrum, apathetic women dismissed feminism because they were satisfied
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with their lives as wives and mothers and saw no need to change the status quo.
On the opposite end, radical feminists believed that true gender equity could only
be achieved by restructuring the system through revolutionary change. As
Republican feminists, Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett searched for what Peterson
characterized as “the sensible” center between these two extremes4 because, from
this position, they could best reconcile their feminism with their partisanship. In
order to understand the complexities and richness of the feminist movement
within Michigan Republican Party politics, it is important to examine how and why
these three very different Republican women became feminists.
Peterson, one of the Michigan Republican Party’s most prominent feminists,
was neither a Republican nor a feminist when she became a member of the
Republican Party. She admitted that she joined a political party because that was
what young girls did. She chose the Republican Party because it was “more fun”
and “had by far the nicest parties.”5 Peterson later wrote that “we wouldn’t have
known an issue if we met one face to face and we were never asked to meet the
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candidates, or hear what they had to say.” 6 Exhibiting her wry sense of humor,
Peterson quipped that “like prostitutes, women politicians are often asked, ‘What’s
a nice girl like you doing in this business?’ And, like prostitutes, the answer is often,
‘MEN.’”7
Peterson, however, met her husband on a blind date set up by her friend
(although he was not the date), not through the Republican Party. Married in 1935,
she and her husband divorced eight years later after he enlisted in the Air Force
during World War II. Never one to be constrained by society’s gender norms, the
bored divorcee volunteered for the Red Cross and was sent overseas to Britain,
France and Germany.8 She and her ex-husband remarried in 1948 and bought a
farm in Charlotte, Michigan.9
While her husband traveled with the National Guard, Peterson returned to
Republican Party politics. 10 In retrospect, she noted, “My political activism just
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happened,” 11 but her success was attributable to hard work and dedication. By
1957, despite her inauspicious beginnings and purported lack of interest in
anything political, Peterson became a valuable employee of the Michigan
Republican Party, organizing voters throughout the state.12 In 1961 the state party
elected Peterson as its vice-chairman, which was, as a practical matter, the highest
position that a woman could attain in the party at that time.13 Romney’s election
in 1962 galvanized Peterson’s political career. She worked on his successful
campaign managing his wife, Lenore Romney and, in the process, gained a mentor.
After the election, she was reelected vice-chairman of the Michigan Republican
Party, but quickly left that position to become the Executive Director of the
Women’s Division of the RNC. Shortly thereafter, she became the assistant
chairman of the RNC, the highest position available to women in the national
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Republican Party. After the 1964 Republican national convention, Peterson came
home to Michigan to run for political office.14
As the first female candidate for the United States Senate from Michigan,
Peterson was something of an aberration, which meant that she had to deal with
her gender on the campaign trail.15 She tried to use the fact that she was a woman
to her advantage. Her campaign materials characterized her as a “woman of action,”
and posed her traditionally feminine characteristics, such as her “interest in people,”
as positive reasons to vote for her. Even though she had no children, political
advertisements equated the fact that she lived on a farm with being a mother.
Invoking this false equivalency, her interest in foreign policy was attributed to “the
hopes and aspirations farm women, like mothers everywhere, have for their
children.”16 Campaign brochures made a crude pitch for gender equality, noting,
“Elly Peterson believes ‘it’s a man’s world–and a woman’s world,’ and there should
be equal opportunities for both, equal chances for present and future generations
to be educated, to pursue happiness, to exercise talent, without prejudice because
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of sex, race, creed or color.”17 At the same time, it was made clear that she was “a
working member of the Republican team”18 so that voters connected her to the
group of Republican men running for state office. They did not want her to appear
too independent. Peterson’s gender also became an issue among some of the
voters. She noted that on one campaign stop, “an old, filth-covered man
approached. I was dreading touching his hand but was prepared to do so. I put out
my hand and introduced myself, whereupon he glowered and brushed it aside and
said, ‘I ain’t votin’ for no woman–or niggers.’” 19 Although she defeated her
conservative and other primary opponents, Peterson lost the general election.
In 1965, Peterson became the first female chairman of the Michigan
Republican Party. She held that position for two consecutive two-year terms. 20
Although she considered joining the Nixon administration to work for Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development Romney, in April 1969 she chose instead to once
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again become assistant chairman of the RNC. In 1970, she agreed to serve as the
campaign manager for Lenore Romney, who ran for the United States Senate from
Michigan. Romney won the Republican primary, but lost the general election.
As a Republican Party leader, Peterson believed that women and other
underrepresented groups would benefit from participating in Republican Party
politics. Thus, she established party organizations through which women could
volunteer to help people, such as African Americans, Jewish, and other ethnic
women, who did not traditionally feel welcomed by the party. 21 However, her
recruitment program had another purpose. She never lost sight of her commitment
to the party which, she believed, would remain viable only if it welcomed all people
as participants and provided all volunteers, employees, and candidates with equal
opportunities.
As both an elected and appointed official within the party’s bureaucracy, and
also a Republican candidate for public office, Peterson experienced first-hand how
badly the party treated women. Despite her leadership positions, Peterson found
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that the men who ran the party did not treat her like they would have treated
another man. The same Republican leaders who convinced her to run for office
minimized and ultimately refused to recognize the legitimacy of her candidacy.
They asked her to run for the United States Senate as a “gimmick candidate . . .
someone who would be different, yet credible.”22 When party leaders urged her to
enter the campaign, Max Fisher, one of the party’s chief financiers and fundraisers,
assured her that money would not become an issue. Despite these promises, the
party was reluctant to provide her with the funding she needed to run her
campaign, requiring her to plead for every dollar.23
Peterson experienced discrimination even as the leader of the Michigan
Republican Party. She later recognized that her responsibilities were defined and
her abilities were measured by her gender.24 For example, she was paid less than
her male predecessor because she was a woman.25 When Peterson became party
chairman, she insisted on attending financial meetings, even though her male
colleagues controlled party finances and convened their meetings at a club that did
22
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not admit women. Fisher offered to send her “to lunch in the basement with his
secretary.”26 Peterson refused. “I quietly replied that I would walk out and go home
if I wasn’t to be a full and equal participant.”27 Although the party elected her as
chairman, the men who led the party expected her to serve on their terms and
conditions. To the extent she could, she refused to yield to their discrimination.
While Peterson believed that the Republican Party would not survive if it did
not become more inclusive, she was also convinced that the conservative
movement threatened the future of the party. As a long-time moderate Republican,
she worked to stop the infiltration of conservatives into her party. In 1964, Romney
was running for reelection for governor, and Goldwater led the Republican ticket
for president. One of the reasons that Peterson agreed to run for the Senate was
because of the threat posed by the schism between moderates and conservatives
in that year’s elections. Although Michigan was not strongly conservative, there
were pockets of conservatism within the state. Romney was not going to win the
governorship on Goldwater’s coattails and Goldwater was not going to win the
state of Michigan by virtue of Romney’s voters. Democrats hoped to take
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advantage of the split in the party to defeat Romney. 28 Peterson later admitted that
she knew she would not win the senatorial race,29 but nevertheless agreed to run
so that she could mediate the disputes between the conservative and moderate
wings of the party to insure that Romney was reelected as governor.30
It was almost impossible to split the campaigns away from each other.
If I would say I was campaigning just for Peterson, that I knew my own
road was rough and rocky and I would do my thing and let Goldwater
and Romney do theirs, I satisfied no one. As the national election
picked up, more and more hate was generated. I grew so discouraged
at times. I had been a working Republican too long to leave the party
in such a hassle as that election grew to be. I was a Republican, and I
wanted to remain a Republican. I believe the Romneys felt the same
way. I perceived my job of the moment not being elected but keeping
the party together coming out of the election with a Republican
Governor and the troops to rebuild.31
Romney won the election, but many downstream candidates were hurt by
Goldwater’s loss.
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In 1965, as chairman of the Michigan Republican Party, Peterson’s support
for Romney and her distaste for conservatives aligned when she masterminded a
moderate takeover of Republican Women’s Federation of Michigan (RWFM). The
RWFM was a federation of Republican women’s clubs throughout the state created
to educate voters about politics, to encourage women to participate in politics, and
to support the Republican Party, the national and state women’s federations, and
Republican candidates.32 In March 1965, months before the next election of RWFM
leadership, Peterson indicated that she wanted a slate of Romney moderates to
replace Goldwater’s conservative women who operated the RWFM independently
of Romney’s moderate Michigan Republican Party.33
As expected, the nominating committee of the RWFM selected a
conservative slate of candidates for the federation’s leadership. Under normal
circumstances, these nominees would have been automatically elected. However,
in order to thwart this result, Peterson inserted herself into the nominating and
voting process. She selected a moderate slate of candidates and openly
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campaigned for them. Through her machinations and over the strong objections of
the federation’s conservative leaders, federation members elected all of Peterson’s
candidates. 34 Peterson’s efforts insured that the RWFM and the Michigan
Republican Party worked together to advance their moderate goals, and that party
conservatives would not be able to use the RWFM to promote their conservative
agenda.35 According to at least one political observer, the RWFM takeover saved
Romney, who intended to run for president in 1968, from the embarrassment of
having a rogue conservative women’s federation within his state, and reinvigorated
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the state Republican Party with an infusion of enthusiastic moderate women as
both volunteers and candidates.36
Peterson’s description of the actual RWFM vote provided insight into the
animosity and festering ideological divisions between moderate and conservative
members of the RWFM and the Michigan Republican Party. She wrote that “the
battle was vicious with the opposition slate [the conservatives] standing in the
lobby of the hotel with two cries—‘All liberal Republicans are Communists so all on
the Hobbs [referring to Ruth Hobbs, the woman who Peterson had selected to run
for chairwoman of the RWFM] slate are Communists’ and ‘this is your opportunity
to beat George Romney.’”37 She added that “the part that struck terror in my heart
was the obvious hatred on the faces of about twenty women.” 38 She later
analogized the conflict between the two wings of the party to a war. Moderates
engaged in short term political battles, but then returned to their everyday lives.
Peterson wrote that “the moderates just don’t care enough to fight constantly to
win. . . . When the battle is over they want to go on to other things. It doesn’t seem
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to matter that much to them. Life goes on.”39 Conservatives, on the other hand,
never stopped fighting and refused to compromise their principles. They were
dangerous because of the intensity of their commitment to their conservative
ideals and goals. She noted that “they will make NO concessions to moderates, or
liberals, but they expect to have concessions made to them.”40 While in the 1960s
moderates and conservatives disagreed about the future direction of the party,
their debates also foreshadowed the fault line that erupted between conservative
and moderate Republican women during the 1970s over ideologically based issues
that directly impacted them, such as the ERA and abortion.
In 1970, a discouraged Peterson left the RNC. Although she believed that she
had introduced some women to politics, her efforts to persuade party leadership
to treat women as equals had largely failed. 41 The party still assigned them
secondary roles and supportive tasks, which precluded them from developing the
skills necessary to assume the party’s leadership positions and to run for elective
office. 42 Despite her best efforts, the party continued to discriminate against
39
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women.43 She had been a party woman for almost twenty years, and had hoped
that in exchange for her loyal partisanship and hard work, the party’s leaders would
ultimately accept her and other Republican women as equals.44 By the end of the
1960s, however, she recognized the fallacy of the grand bargain that framed the
rules under which she and other women chose to participate in the party. Women
helped men get elected and then men refused to provide them with equal
opportunities in the party or access to the government offices that they controlled.
Moreover, officeholders did not reward women with meaningful political
appointments and the number of women in elective national and state offices had
dropped.45
In 1970, Peterson noted with frustration that “women are regressing in
politics.”46 In retrospect, she attributed the beginnings of the gender gap in the
Republican Party to this period. She wrote, “How blind these men were. At a time
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when women were becoming more and more disenchanted with government, at a
time when almost all of the well known women’s national organizations were
beginning their fight for equality, there was a blindness in the resistance in the
White House. I believe they felt the women would continue to do their volunteer
work regardless. They felt women would continue to take orders and perform, but
it ain’t necessarily so!”47 She later noted, “Surely, it is reasonable to say that the
events that took place in my life in the sixties and early seventies prepared me for
my strong feelings about being IN and a PART of the women’s movement.”48 It was
this disillusionment that caused her to become a feminist.
While close in age, Beebe and Peterson followed different paths to feminism.
Beebe was only the third woman elected to the Michigan Senate, and, during her
tenure, was the only women to serve in that legislative body. 49 A graduate of
Western Michigan University, she eventually moved to Dearborn, Michigan, where
she met her husband, a Ford Motor Company executive. By the time she took the
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oath of office in 1967 as a Republican representative from Dearborn, she was in her
fifties, divorced and her children were nearly grown.50 Her campaign emphasized
that she was “not just another ‘professional politician.’ She is first and foremost a
homemaker who has raised two children.”51 Politics, she noted, fit naturally with
her long-term interest in children. 52 As an educator and parent, she brought
strengths and skills to the table that differentiated her from other candidates. She
cared about how the issues addressed in Lansing, including taxes, the cost of food,
raising a family, education, and mental health, impacted families and influenced
communities.53 A self-identified “Romney Republican,” Beebe acknowledged that
voters were aware of her gender, but argued that it did not make a difference in
her first campaign.54
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She attributed her feminism to the experiences of her youth, although she
never thought of herself as a feminist until she became a state senator. As a child,
her grandmother advised her that girls should always “be passive, nonaggressive
and supportive of the male.”55 After she graduated from high school, she heard,
like most girls her age, that married women did not need to be college educated.
She believed that “‘we’ve been conditioned to be passive and submissive
throughout the entire framework of society.’” 56 Yet her experiences belied the
messages she received. As a child, she played with the boys without regard to her
gender. An engaged, successful college student who wanted to get married, but
also have a career, she refused to accept subordination as a second class citizen.57
In the Michigan Senate, her male colleagues disparaged the intelligence of women
who, they argued, could not make sound decisions because they were incapable of
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separating logic from emotion. While her life experiences paved the way, these
comments finally inspired her to become a feminist.58
Beebe recognized the special challenges that she faced as the only woman in
the Michigan Senate and accepted that she needed “to work twice as hard and try
to be twice as alert” to gain the respect of her male colleagues.59 One told her “that
he expected I’d take my hat and purse and go shopping the day after I took the oath
of office.”60 She quickly defied these expectations. Because of her singular status,
she believed that she had assumed “a great responsibility for women and feel I am
their special advocate.” 61 Her male colleagues were not motivated to fight for
equality for women. Moreover, they did not understand and, therefore, could not
adequately address and resolve the peculiar and pressing issues that women faced.
Beebe became chairman of the Health and Welfare Committee and vice-chairman
of the Labor Committee of the Senate (later the Senate Health, Social Services and
Retirement Committee) so that she could focus primarily on issues that involved
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women and children. She sought to create an administrative agency within the
state to address the problems of children. After she left the Senate, Beebe fought
to establish screening for mental retardation for young children, because she
believed that the high crime rate among teenagers was partially attributable to a
failure to identify these health issues earlier. Male-dominated legislatures, she
noted, were not interested in and would not tackle problems related to the
family.62
Beebe, like many of her Republican feminist colleagues, worked in a public
sphere dominated by men who were not quite sure how to judge or react to
political women. Journalists seemed particularly confused and frequently
emphasized her physical appearance over the substance of her work. For example,
one writer observed that she “does not look like the popular conception of a
woman politician.”63 Another described her as “neat, soft spoken, not perceptibly
aggressive. Her hair is light red and occasionally her blue eyes crinkle in sudden
warm humor.” 64 In a grudging acknowledgement of her career, the author
62
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conceded, “nevertheless there is a professional façade which suggests careful
discipline.”65 Even female journalists emphasized her femininity. One Detroit Free
Press reporter wrote the following, ridiculously irrelevant, description: “Sen Beebe
folded her coral tipped fingers in her lap. Her lips matched her nail polish. And her
dress matched her house, green, a soft green shade darker than the walls, a shade
lighter than the upholstery.”66 It is unclear how a “woman politician” should look
or why any observations about her makeup, dress or decor were relevant to her
work in the Michigan Senate. Certainly, newspapers did not provide these types of
superficial descriptions for her male colleagues. Yet journalists regularly offered
these highly feminized assessments of Beebe to their readers. Perhaps their
characterizations, which seemed to delegitimize her credibility as a politician and
legislator, fueled her commitment to the feminist cause.
Beebe’s greatest passion was the liberalization of Michigan’s abortion laws,
which was why, after twenty years, she publicly revisited with her Senate
colleagues the circumstances surrounding her therapeutic abortion. She recalled
that her testimony brought back all the trauma of that time. Although her doctor
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advised her that she probably could not have children, she sought a medical
resolution for her problem. After one miscarriage, she had a baby boy, and five
miscarriages later, she was pregnant again. Doctors told her the baby was stillborn
and that she needed a therapeutic abortion. She went through a period of denial,
hoping that the doctors were wrong about the baby. She admitted, “I realize now
that the fetus was dead, but I was clinging to that one hope–one positive test. Some
might say I was emotionally disturbed but I think any woman would be under the
same circumstances, and having to make that decision.”67 She tried to explain to
her colleagues the anguish surrounding the decision about whether to have an
abortion, but also “that it can happen under the best of circumstances.” 68 She
hoped to impress on them that “you are trying to impose your will on a woman’s
decision. You cannot do this.” 69 Abortion was a difficult choice, but it was the
pregnant woman’s decision to make.
She received a tremendous amount of both positive and negative feedback
about her testimony. Many people praised her courage and shared their own
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experiences. Others sent hate mail that “accused [her] of being without a God–of
being a murderer.”70 While her controversial confession jeopardized her position
in the Michigan Senate, Beebe was not willing “to sell out my ideas for political
office.” 71 Her disclosure made a difference because it forced her colleagues to
confront the notion that it was time for the legislature to address issues that
heretofore had been considered off limits because they belonged within the private
sphere of the home. She exemplified what would soon become a basic tenet of
second wave feminism. By virtue of her public admission, she made the personal
political.72
Two years later, Beebe narrowly lost her bid for reelection to David Plawecki,
a relatively unknown twenty-two-year-old Democrat who was supported by both
the United Auto Workers and the Catholic Church. In an example of how all politics
are local, Catholics turned out to vote in large numbers because they opposed a
proposed constitutional amendment on the state ballot prohibiting the transfer of
state money to private schools. A large Catholic turnout did not bode well for Beebe
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because the Catholic Church had mobilized against her due to her stand on abortion.
Her opponents argued that she wanted to “legaliz[e] murder” and that she had
“‘denounced the Catholic Church.’”73 Since it was unclear when a fetus became a
human being, Plawecki argued, all abortion was potentially murder. He noted that
“if this is true, I don’t see how hardship on parents could justify it.”74 After her
defeat, Beebe characterized her loss as “a slap against all women,” and she vowed
to continue her efforts to liberalize Michigan’s abortion laws after her Senate
tenure ended.75 She later noted that she made a mistake because she “was trying
to be a ‘lady’” and urged female politicians “not to ‘fight like ladies’” in their
campaigns.76 While in 1966 she said she did not believe that the fact she was a
woman made a difference in her election, by 1970 she had changed her mind.
Burnett’s perspective on women’s rights differed from that of both Peterson
and Beebe. Burnett spent most of the 1960s focusing on her family and career, not
politics. She came from a middle class background, although her fortunes changed
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in her teen years when her wealthy grandfather decided to forgive Hill’s mother
(his daughter) for divorcing her husband and shared his wealth with them. With his
money and connections, she attended finishing school, came out as a debutante,
and became what her mother wanted: an “American geisha.”77 A successful model
and beauty queen, she won the Miss Michigan pageant in 1942 and served as a
runner up to Miss America. She studied art at different universities, including
Wayne State University, and became a famous portrait painter. From an early age,
Burnett realized that money was the key to independence and throughout her life
remained unapologetic about her wealth and the cars, furs, and trips that her
money provided.78
In her autobiography, entitled True Colors: An Artist’s Journey from Beauty
Queen to Feminism, Burnett explored the personal and professional experiences
that led her to the women’s movement. For many years, she was dissatisfied with
her personal life. In retrospect, it is apparent she that suffered from Betty Friedan’s
“problem that has no name.” 79 After a short failed marriage to a domineering
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doctor, she married a bully who also dominated and demeaned her.80 An unfulfilled
wife and mother, she recognized that those roles were not necessarily sufficient to
make her happy and wanted more in life than to live through her husband and
children. A therapist advised her that she would be happy if she “concentrate[d] on
giving. That should be a woman’s satisfaction.”81 While she wanted the freedom to
forge her own path in life, she realized that her “career was piece-mealed around
[her] hard and fast duties as a housewife–cemented by custom, family expectation
and guilt.”82 Ironically, the familial role that society had deemed appropriate and
satisfying for women had become a trap from which she could not escape. She
argued that “we must turn men around to recognize that we are persons before
we are women.”83

80

Burnett, True Colors, 37-41, 44-48.

81

“Global Feminism,” Fort Lauderdale News, n.d., box 3, folder: Misc. Women’s
Organizations, Conferences, Issues (Clippings), Burnett Papers.
82

Cobey Black, “Patricia Hill Burnett,” Honolulu Advertiser, n.d., box 3, folder: Misc.
Women’s Organizations, Conferences, Issues (Clippings), Burnett Papers.
83

Speech, Patricia Hill Burnett, [prior to August 26, 1970?], box 5, folder: TALKS NOW
(1970), Burnett Papers.

66

Burnett described feminism as “true equality between the sexes”84 “in the
economic world, the social world, and the private home world.” 85 Gender
discrimination, in her opinion, started at a young age. She noted that when asked
hypothetical questions about careers, boys and girls reacted differently. Boys who
were told to assume they were girls did not know how to answer a question about
what career they would choose, although one responded that he would “be
nothing.”86 The answers of girls varied depending on whether they assumed they
were girls or boys. As girls, they said they would be nurses, secretaries and mothers.
As boys, these girls said they would choose to be doctors and lawyers. Such
attitudes continued into adulthood when husbands routinely made decisions for
their wives. Personal relationships between men and women were political
because they involved power. Like Beebe, Burnett saw the personal as political
when it came to the women’s movement.87
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Burnett argued that feminism could take many forms “and any so-called
feminists who try to impose a particular political or cultural straitjacket on others
can only hurt our cause.”88 Thus, it was counterproductive for women to argue with
each other over the ways in which they, as individuals, chose to exercise their
feminism. Perhaps she was particularly conscious of this because, as a wealthy
former beauty queen who loved to dress extravagantly and flaunt her femininity,
other feminists often judged her for her lifestyle choices and questioned her
commitment to feminism.
Burnett claimed that one particular professional experience contributed to
her development as a feminist. A prominent Detroit doctor commissioned her to
paint a portrait of his wife. When she finished, he asked her to sign the painting
using only her last name. He told her that a female artist would reduce the value of
the portrait. She signed it with her full name.89
In 1969, however, she finally assigned a label to her dissatisfaction. While
driving to a funeral, Burnett and her friend, Marjorie Levin, a Democrat, complained
to each other about how badly men treated them. Their husbands expected them
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to care for their homes and assume primary responsibility for raising their children
even though they had full time jobs. Burnett suggested to Levin that they form a
chapter of NOW. When they called Betty Friedan, she encouraged them to create
a Michigan chapter.90
Burnett gathered forty professional women, both Democrats and
Republicans, for a NOW organizational luncheon. All success stories in a maledominated world, the women she contacted shared a belief that they had been
discriminated against, and achieved their goals in spite of men. At the meeting,
they identified three objectives. They wanted “to recruit at least a thousand
members across the state, who would then work for the repeal of Michigan’s
abortion laws . . . and to establish day care centers for those mothers who wanted
to put their talents to work . . . (ellipses in original) or needed to work to support
their children.”91 They targeted as potential members “‘the untouched woman–the
silent majority–the middle class woman who [was] afraid to speak out because it
[wasn’t] feminine.’”92 In retrospect, it was a very successful meeting.93
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Through NOW, Burnett hoped to destroy a number of myths about women.
In particular, the Michigan chapter sought to refute the outdated and inaccurate
notion that women could only be wives and mothers. Members believed that
women could be productive long after their children left home. Anatomy should
not dictate opportunity and was never determinative of accomplishment. The
media and advertising industries, they argued, contributed to the subordination of
women by treating them as “‘sex objects or mothers, NEVER as individuals.’” 94
Burnett analogized the plight of women to that of slaves, stating that “‘home is our
cotton field,’” and characterized women’s “current home-bound status as that of
‘house servants.’”95
Burnett quickly realized, however, that although NOW was created largely
by, it was not an organization created solely for, middle class women.96 After this
initial meeting, she visited Friedan’s New York apartment, where NOW members
were preparing for a meeting with the press. Burnett described these supporters
as “a huge black woman named Beulah Sanders, leader of a welfare rights
94
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organization, and a nineteen-year-old from a socialist group called the Red
Stockings, who was there in a ragged T-shirt and jeans, nursing her baby.”97 The
woman who answered the door introduced Burnett as a “woman in a chinchilla hat
down here who says she is a lifelong Republican and claims to be a chapter
president of NOW.”98 Friedan happily characterized her at the press conference as
“the other end of the spectrum.” 99 Yet despite their differences, Burnett felt a
kinship with these different women who all suffered because of discrimination.
When it became obvious that many women could not afford the dues that NOW
charged, Burnett’s chapter organized free “rap sessions” that allowed women from
all backgrounds to share their experiences. She was shocked by the stories women
told at these meetings about physical abuse. She believed, however that when she
told of her experiences with her mentally abusive husband, these women learned
that even wealthy women were subject to mistreatment by men.100
As Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett each developed a feminist consciousness,
they all arrived at what Peterson called “the sensible” center of the women’s
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movement, the mid-point between the “polarized” extremes of compliant
femininity and angry radicalism. Peterson described the continuum as follows:
On the one hand, we had the ultra-feminist, a complacent house-frau,
content to be beckoned by the will of man, who, when she had free
time would use it to follow the TV traumas of ‘As the World Turns.’ On
the other hand, you have the militant, who seems not to be so much
FOR women as AGAINST men and, with her rudeness, her absurd
demands, and talk of ‘take over,’ antagonizes the very women who
she seeks to help. Somewhere, between the saccharine [“1001 ways
to camouflage hamburger way”] and the strident, [“bra burning,
radical Liberation”] lies the sensible.101
Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett urged women to reject both extremes and to look
for the middle ground, a place where each woman could assume her responsibility
to live up to her full potential.102
Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett believed that women chose not to participate
in politics for two primary reasons. Society constructed expectations for women
that kept them “passive and submissive” within their homes.103 Only wives and
mothers could be considered successful women and a working mother could never
be a good mother. Thus, a successful woman had to devote herself to her husband
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and children and forgo a career.104 The natural life cycle reinforced these attitudes.
Women felt meaningful and productive only when they were raising children. After
their children left home, when they should have had more time to engage in
activities that were important to them, they withdrew even further because they
felt irrelevant. Beebe described this phenomenon as follows: “Once a mother no
longer acts as a mother, as such, she loses her incentive to be important in life. She
renders herself helpless in a lot of cases where her personal efforts would bring a
mountain of personal satisfaction.”105 Society dictated that women should be wives
and mothers, and thus created pressures that precluded them from trying to do
anything else to reach their full potential.106
Peterson and Beebe believed that women were their own worst enemies.
Beebe noted that while “there is discrimination in jobs, pay and promotions . . .
women sit back and take it. But I say it’s as much our fault as anyone else’s.”107
Peterson argued that many women chose to remain “passive and submissive”108

104

Peterson, Memoirs, 121-22.

105

Feminine Focus Magazine, n.d., 4, box 2, Folder: Miscellaneous, Beebe Papers.

106

Pollack, “Women Are Not Born Losers.”

107

Holliday, “The Lady Said ‘Abortion,’” August 3, 1969.

108

Pollack, “Women Are Not Born Losers.”

73

because of their “pure apathy.” 109 They happily assumed the roles that society
assigned to them as wives and mothers, and were unwilling to leave the comfort of
their own homes. To make matters worse, career women and full time wives and
mothers sniped at each other, unable or unwilling or organize around a common
cause.110 Peterson stated that “we’ll have to stop the jealousies and ill feelings that
seem to turn women against women when a competitive situation arises. We have
to be together in this.”111 Equal rights were within reach and worth the fight, but
men were not interested and many women were not willing to become activists.112
External pressures created guilt which, when combined with the internal pull
of the comforts of home, made it difficult for women to break out of their apathy.
Feminist Betty Friedan, who was familiar with this phenomenon, struggled to deal
with it. Feminist politician and scholar Harriet Woods, and Friedan, described the
latter’s plight as follows:
When Friedan was fired from her writing job in the 1950s because she
was pregnant again she says she almost felt relief in seeking security
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within four walls in suburbia: [Friedan wrote] “I had begun to feel so
guilty working, and I really wasn’t getting anywhere in that job. I was
more than ready to embrace the feminine mystique [centering one’s
life on husband, children, and home.] (brackets in original) . . . There
was a comfortable small world you could really do something about,
politically: the children’s homework, even the new math, compared to
the atomic bomb.113
Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett all realized that they had to discredit longstanding,
deeply ingrained, and powerful cultural norms in order to convince women to
become activists.
Radical feminism, on the other end of the spectrum, was just as threatening
to women. Beebe asserted, “I’m not militant, nor belligerent, but let’s be
determined.”114 Burnett believed that radical feminism would alienate women. She
made it clear at NOW’s initial meeting that it was not a militant group, and that it
would engage in traditional tactics, such as lobbying, to change the existing social
system. In fact, Beebe promised to endorse the organization only if it was not too
militant.115 To convey the organization’s moderation, Burnett instructed attendees
to wear dresses to the meeting so that they would appear professional, yet
113
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feminine. Burnett told the women that “if you want to picket or burn your bra,
you’d better join a more radical women’s organization, like the Women’s Liberation
Movement. We love men and by gaining equal rights within the existing structure,
we think we’ll make men happier.”116 Although she later recognized the naivety of
these initial assertions, she envisioned NOW as an organization that would
promote equal rights feminism, and she was never totally comfortable with the
more radical elements of the women’s movement.117
Radical feminism created artificial choices, pitting careers against families
and women against men.118 Peterson asserted that extreme feminism “opens the
doors to certain male critics who blanketly brand all feminists as lesbians,
frustrated old maids, or living examples of Freudian philosophy. Too many feminists
seem not so much for women as against men.”119 Burnett made it clear that at the
sensible center of feminism, women did not reject men. In fact, she believed that
feminism would be good for men and families because fulfilled women were
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happier and more satisfied with their lives. 120 Men would not be trapped in
marriages with women who remained with them only for financial benefits.
Moreover, working women who contributed to the family income would help
alleviate the economic burdens on men.121 Finally, according to Burnett, women
who pursued their own goals would have more independent children.122
Radical feminism also undermined the goal of politicizing women because it
scared them and convinced the men who led the Republican Party that feminists
could not be loyal and effective partisans. Peterson did not believe that average
women could relate to radical feminism or that it would help them. She was careful
about the language she used to describe her activism, “sh[ying] away from such
terms as ‘woman’s liberation’ because . . . people like Betty Friedan, president of
the National Organization of Women (NOW) ‘come on too strong and do more to
hurt the movement than help it.’” 123 Beebe noted that “our tactics should be

120

Speech, Burnett, [Prior to August 26, 1970?]; Hitsky, “Detroit Feminists Map
Strategy,” January 9, 1970.
121

“Motor City Lions Hear Women’s Lib President,” n.p., n.d., box 4, folder: NOWPrinted, Burnett Papers.
122

Hitsky, “Detroit Feminists Map Strategy,” January 9, 1970.

123

Ryan, “Elly Peterson Is Retiring,” Grand Rapids Press, December 28, 1970.

77

politics, not protests.” 124 Extremism, they believed, was abrasive, assertive and
alienating to both men and women.
Peterson, Beebe and Burnett occupied this middle ground of the women’s
movement as equal rights feminists. They were committed to feminist activism and
believed that women became self-aware, conscious of the women around them,
and pragmatically optimistic about what they could collectively accomplish through
their involvement in the women’s movement, with its emphasis on inclusiveness
and equality. 125 Yet they were not radical. They merely sought the same
opportunities as men. 126 As Burnett noted, “We advocate staying within the
present marriage laws and the present government but we want free access to the
good jobs and better pay for the bad ones. We want to get off the plantation, out
of the cotton fields, and live freely and equally in the world.”127 Burnett argued that
women could achieve equality “by infiltrating the ‘system’ . . . by becoming active
in a viable Party, searching out men sympathetic to the women’s movement, and
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passing and enforcing legislation that will equalize society.”128 Republican feminists
were committed to working within the Republican Party to achieve their feminist
goals. They realized that they would be able to find a middle ground where
feminists and Republicans could coexist and effectuate change only if they
operated from the sensible center of the women’s movement.129
In 1970, Peterson, Beebe, and Burnett came together when Peterson and
Burnett served on the committee to reelect Beebe as state senator. 130 These
women had all reached transition points in their political and personal lives. Beebe
lost her bid for reelection and, at the age of sixty, it appeared that her political
career had ended. She asserted, however, that despite her loss she would continue
to fight for women’s rights even if she could not do so from elective office. At fifty,
Burnett, who developed a feminist consciousness after she became dissatisfied
with the life society expected of her as a wife and mother, appeared to be launching
into a new phase of activism.
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At the end of 1970, after leading the unsuccessful campaign of Lenore
Romney, which the fifty-six-year-old Peterson called “one of the saddest
experiences in my career in politics,” 131 Peterson announced her retirement.
Despite her years of hard work and loyalty, her influence within the party remained
limited. Party leaders refused to recognize women as equal participants with the
same opportunities as men. Moreover, they rejected her argument that the base
of the Republican Party would expand, and the party would benefit, by treating
women as valued colleagues rather than secondary helpmates. Her retirement,
however, was temporary. Like Beebe and Burnett, during the 1970s she devoted
her energies to the women’s movement and to empowering women through
political participation.
Over the next decade, these three women became involved in a feminist
movement that they would try to integrate with their long-standing Republicanism
from the sensible center. Their activism would bring them together with each other
and other Republican feminists in Michigan to promote the causes that were
important to them–political participation for women, the Equal Rights Amendment,
and abortion rights. At the same time, their feminism would ultimately put them at
odds with an increasingly conservative Republican Party.
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CHAPTER 3 GENDER AND PARTISANSHIP IN POLITICAL COALITIONS: 1970 TO 1980
As women, we have more that unites us on feminist grounds than divides us on
partisan ones.
–Audrey Rowe Colom, Republican Women’s Task Force Newsletter

As the 1960s transitioned into the 1970s, Republican women agreed that
women needed to become more involved in politics to fight for laws and policies
that would establish and protect their equality. But the politicization of women was
not merely a Republican concern. 1 In 1971, cognizant that female political
participation was a multipartisan problem, Republican and Democratic feminists
decided to form a coalition, the National Woman’s Political Caucus (NWPC), to
address their concerns. Realizing that their success depended on grassroots
participation, they created affiliated state and local political caucuses, including the
Michigan Woman’s Political Caucus (MWPC). NOW and other feminist
organizations used the NWPC, which was characterized “as the ‘political arm’ of the
women’s movement,”2 to introduce issues into the political arena for resolution.3
1
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This network of political caucuses brought together feminists from all political
parties in an arrangement that Republican feminists believed would be positive for
both the women’s movement and the Republican Party.
Republican feminists, however, soon recognized the difficulties inherent in
promoting their interests through this multitiered organization of multipartisan
coalitions. The founding members of the NWPC were motivated by their collective
sense of empowerment as women. But its members were so diverse and its goals
so radical that they sometimes struggled to come together in common cause.
Republican and Democratic feminist women disagreed about feminist goals and
strategies. These differences, along with their divergent political constituencies,
underlying partisan objectives, and the NWPC’s multitiered organization,
oftentimes undermined their ability to act with one voice.
To better address their partisan concerns, Republican feminists followed the
lead of the feminists within the Democratic Party and formed the Republican
Women’s Task Force (RWTF), followed by the Michigan Republican Women’s Task
Force (MRWTF). Through these task forces, Republican feminists attempted “to
maintain . . . a feminist presence in the Republican Party and a Republican Presence
in the feminist movement.” 4 Partisan task forces were a concession to the
4
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difficulties faced by the multipartisan caucuses when they unsuccessfully
attempted to paper over their political differences. They indicated that Republican
feminists were not necessarily willing to set aside their partisanship for the
women’s movement. Partisan coalitions allowed Republican feminists to position
themselves at the sensible center of the women’s movement, from which they
could, at least temporarily, reconcile their Republicanism and their feminism.
On July 10 and 11, 1971, approximately three hundred political women from
twenty-seven different states met in Washington D.C. to organize a national
coalition intended to increase the number of women who participated in politics.
They decided to act because women were largely absent from the 1968 Democratic
and Republican national conventions and elective and appointed government
offices, despite the fact that they made up at least half of the nation’s voting
population. The women who assembled in Washington D.C. that weekend agreed
that they sought “power, political power,”5 by building a broad based organization
of women from all backgrounds, political parties, and ages. The group characterized
itself as a multipartisan, rather than a bipartisan, organization. Most of the
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attendees at this organizational meeting identified themselves as Democrats or
politically unaffiliated. Republicans made up only about 6 percent of the
participants.6
At this initial meeting of the NWPC, the participants created a Statement of
Purpose that delineated its mission, identified its intended audience, and listed the
issues of critical importance to women. NWPC organizers adopted a broad, and
what some have called radical, 7 mission to fight “sexism, racism, institutional
violence and poverty.”8 The organization sought to empower all women, including
those who were traditionally ignored because they were on welfare, and “every
minority woman who has endured the stigma of being twice-different from the
white male ruling class.”9 Based on their shared interests, women hoped that they
could become a powerful voting constituency that would hold political parties and
elected and appointed government officials accountable. Specifically, they sought
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political parity by increasing the number of women in elective and appointed
national, state, and local political offices. They also wanted to place women in
positions of authority in political parties and throughout the political process, and
to educate them about how to lobby on behalf of important issues, laws, and
regulations. 10 They agreed that they would encourage female candidates, but
support any candidate, regardless of gender, who advocated on behalf of
“women’s issues.”11
The NWPC identified a broad range of domestic and foreign policy issues that
were important to women. Participants sought to ratify the ERA and to guarantee
reproductive rights for all women. They believed that guaranteed income and
universal health care programs would alleviate poverty. To address discrimination
in the workplace and in education, they advocated free child care programs,
maternity leave and changes in the tax and social security laws. The women who
joined the NWPC also wanted the United States to protect the environment, end
war, stop “the use of physical violence as a traditional ‘masculine’ way of resolving
conflict,” and respect the rights of other sovereign countries.12
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Conference attendees elected twenty-two women to the Policy Council, the
governing body of the NWPC. Their interests reflected the broadly humanistic goals
of the organization. Policy Council members included union leaders, such as United
Auto Workers’ officials Mildred Jeffrey and Olga Madar; civil rights and welfare
activists, like Fannie Lou Hamer, Myrlie Evers (widow of civil rights activist Medgar
Evers), Beulah Sanders, and Shirley Chisholm; liberation feminists, including Gloria
Steinem and Bella Abzug; and at least one peace activist, Mary Clarke.13 The Policy
Council also included political office holders and activists, including Midge Miller, a
Democratic legislator from Wisconsin, and Joan Cashin, a member of the Alabama
Democratic Party; and Betty Friedan, Virginia Allan, and Shana Alexander, who
were all women’s rights activists. Seven members identified as Democrats and
three claimed to be Republicans. The remainder did not acknowledge any partisan
affiliation. 14 Between them, they represented all of the diverse constituencies
whose interests were reflected in the Statement of Purpose.
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The NWPC realized that it could only achieve its goals through grassroots
political activism, so it immediately called for the creation of state caucuses, and
local caucuses based on congressional districts. The organization defined a state
caucus as “a coalition of women from various backgrounds, economic levels and
political affiliations who have joined together for political action. These women
from a variety of political parties—and also no political party—unite, crossing party
lines, in the interest of all women.”15 In order to pursue their interests in the ways
that best met their specific needs, the national organization provided these state
and local caucuses with tremendous organizational and operational latitude. The
only real restriction placed on them was that their objectives and strategies had to
be broadly consistent with and ultimately serve the general purposes of the
national organization. 16 Although not binding, the NWPC recommended that its
members avoid candidate endorsements and issues, such as abortion, that might
prove divisive.17 National leaders also stressed the importance of compromise, and
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they advised state and local leaders to eschew “purists,” who were “women who
seem[ed] to be unwilling to compromise on issues and methods.”18 Women had to
learn how to use the political system for their benefit and purists undermined these
efforts.19
Approximately two hundred and fifty people attended the organizational
meeting of the MWPC on November 6, 1971 in East Lansing, Michigan. Organizers,
disappointed about what they considered a low turnout, nevertheless celebrated
the diversity of attendees. While the women came from different socioeconomic
classes, races, age groups, and political parties, they emphasized their shared
concerns as women and the theme of female solidarity predominated. Jeffrey and
Peterson served as the chairperson and secretary of the new MWPC, respectively.
Beebe, who chaired the meeting, announced that local organizations would be
formed on the congressional district level. 20 Thus, leaders emphasized the
importance of grassroots participation. They urged attendees to vote as women,
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regardless of party affiliation, because partisanship undermined the cohesiveness
women needed to create a politically powerful voting bloc. Despite the enthusiasm
with which they left this first meeting, however, it took almost two years of
organizing for the MWPC to come together for its first state convention in May
1973.21
The exhilaration that the national leaders experienced when they met in
Washington D.C. soon gave way to the pragmatics of trying to accomplish their
objectives. One organizer, Rona Feit, noted that “the Caucus quickly became heir
to the major problem of all coalitions, how to satisfy diverse interests without
compromising conviction, coherence and force.” 22 NWPC guidelines established
loose connections between the national, state and local organizations, mandated
membership diversity, and defined feminist issues and strategies in ways that were
both vague and inclusive. However, it became apparent that these attributes made
it difficult to exert any discipline or create any coherence among either the
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members or their organizations. Since members had the discretion to define their
objectives, identify their priorities, and resolve the problems created by these
intentional ambiguities, the different organizations within the political caucus
network adopted strategies that sometimes worked at cross-purposes. Moreover,
the diversity of individual members made it difficult for them to work together.
As intended, the decentralized nature of the caucus structure allowed for
maximum flexibility. Local organizations were more responsive and accountable to
their constituents because they were able to identify the concerns that were of
particular importance to them. But the focus on local issues meant that individual
organizations established different priorities and tactics, which made it difficult to
coordinate their efforts, particularly on state-wide issues and candidates. A 1972
report by the Planning Committee of the MWPC proved this point. It described the
different priorities and strategies of Michigan’s local organizations. Ann Arbor’s
caucus focused on abortion reform. Caucus members in Grand Rapids emphasized
grassroots organization and identified women to run for precinct delegates.
Detroit’s caucus dealt with diversity issues, making sure that its leadership included
both white and minority members. It struggled to attract Republicans to the caucus.
A downriver group could not attract politically active women because it was
considered a women’s “lib” organization. Members of local political caucuses
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discouraged the state organization from developing a position statement on
women’s issues because “if they tried to come up with an issue statement on some
of the current topics of the day, the organization would be split and many members
would be lost.”23 The different groups disagreed on strategies as well as priorities
and issues. The MWPC’s leadership criticized the tactics adopted by the Lansing
area organization because it focused on big issues and was not willing to address
tangible grassroots problems, such as elections and candidates.24 How could such
different organizations identify and work towards common goals?
Disputes also developed between the national, state and local organizations
as they worked at cross-purposes. For example, the NWPC became involved in a
local issue that undermined a collaborative effort between the MWPC and NOW.
In June 1973, the MWPC and NOW tried to change the negative characterizations
of women by local television and radio stations. They wrote letters to local media
leaders and the Federal Communications Commission to object to the stations’
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“programming and hiring practices concerning women.”25 The campaign was timed
to influence the pending federal relicensing of these television stations.26
However, two months later, Lavon Bliesener, a Michigan Republican who
was a member of the NWPC Board, sent a letter to the manager of Detroit’s WJBK,
Channel 2, on NWPC letterhead. She responded to the questions raised about the
station’s application to renew its broadcasting license by endorsing and supporting
the work of the channel’s chief political reporter. In seeming contradiction to the
MWPC, she wrote that “he has an appreciation for the causes women and
minorities are involved in and has been responsive in bringing these vital topics to
the attention of the general public via the media.”27 The MWPC, embarrassed by
the inconsistent message of the NWPC, contacted NOW to make it clear that the
MWPC disagreed with and did not endorse Bliesener’s letter.28 Thus, the MWPC
prioritized its temporary alliance with NOW over its affiliation with the NWPC.
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Likewise, abortion emerged as a divisive issue within the political caucus
network, despite instructions from the national organization to avoid it. In 1974, a
disagreement occurred between the national and state political caucuses over their
inconsistent positions on a proposed Michigan abortion law. The NWPC
recommended that Senate Bill 345 be moved out of legislative committee for full
consideration by the state Senate. The proposed legislation, which legalized
abortion in the first and second trimesters, but required that the procedure be
performed in a hospital by doctors in the second trimester, clarified Michigan’s
abortion laws.29
Contrary to the NWPC, the MWPC did not support Senate Bill 345 because
of changes sought by the Democrats, who were trying to amend it to “protect the
‘unborn child in the womb of its mother,’”30 and to criminalize violations of the
statute. These modifications would have effectively recharacterized certain
abortions as crimes and undermined the efforts of the MWPC to create a new
legislative framework for abortion in Michigan. The MWPC supported Senate Bill
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888, which prioritized the health of pregnant women by characterizing “abortion
[as] a medical procedure, the provision of which should be subject to the same
standards that govern all such care.”31 The MWPC was angry about the NWPC’s
interference in the state’s legislative proceedings, especially because the NWPC’s
recommendation was based on inaccurate and incomplete information about the
intricacies and nuances of Michigan state politics and a misunderstanding of the
statutory objectives of the MWPC. 32 The NWPC ultimately retreated from its
endorsement of Senate Bill 345.33
The organizers of these political caucuses wanted women to become political
activists because political participation facilitated change. Women could advance
feminist interests by working through their respective political parties to promote
the interests that they, as women, presumably shared. It was difficult, however, for
these activists to prioritize their feminism over their partisan loyalties because
partisanship was such an important part of their identities. For example, the
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founding members of the MWPC included Democrats Madar and Jeffrey, and
Republican Peterson. Madar and Jeffrey were both leaders of and employed by the
United Auto Workers, which was essentially an arm of the state Democratic Party
in Michigan. Similarly, Peterson worked for many years as a paid employee of the
Republican Party. It could not have been easy for any of these women to
deemphasize their partisanship when it was so inextricably tied to their careers. In
another context, Peterson made it clear that “I am a partisan Republican. I do not
put my sex above my party.”34 These were the challenges that the political caucuses
faced when they asked women to prioritize their gender over their partisanship.
Founders structured the caucuses to provide women with spaces where they
could move beyond their political differences and interact with their colleagues as
women who faced common gender-based problems. On a very personal level, this
happened. Peterson, for example, wrote to her fellow Michigan Republican
feminists about national Democratic leaders Abzug and Liz Carpenter. She noted
“Bella Abzug is funny as a crutch but so is Liz Carpenter so I hope sometime you
two get to see them in action. I didn’t find any died in the wool–hope to die
Democrats–they are pretty much disgusted with the picture of their leadership and
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I think we can help adding to that by attending–and keeping on top of
everything.”35 Peterson later became good friends with Carpenter when they put
aside their partisan differences to jointly lead ERAmerica, an organization created
to persuade hold-out states to ratify the ERA. Nevertheless, her comments
indicated that she could not totally relinquish her partisanship. Instead, she hoped
to exacerbate her Democratic colleagues’ problems with Democratic Party
leadership by actively participating in the NWPC.
Because partisanship was so important to these activists, they constantly
looked for ways to protect their partisan interests within the multipartisanship of
the political caucuses. From its inception, Democrats outnumbered Republicans in
the NWPC.36 Thus, Peterson faced an uphill battle as she tried to make sure that
caucus leadership would not favor the Democrats over the Republicans. She
warned attendees at the second Policy Council meeting in September 1971 that
many state activists viewed the NWPC as a Democratic organization. To avoid the
taint of partisanship, she asked that Council membership be structured to include
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similar numbers of Democrats and Republicans. A Council subcommittee
recommended that Peterson, Beebe, and moderate Republican Bobbie Kilberg be
appointed to the Council immediately, and that the Republican Party be given the
opportunity to nominate four additional women at a later date. The Council made
it clear that one of its functions was to select new members. Therefore, it refused
to assign this responsibility to special interest groups, such as the Republican Party.
It appointed the three Republican women nominated at the meeting, but left four
openings (not necessarily Republican) to be filled at a later date. However, at the
same time that they declined to retain specific openings on the Policy Council for
Republicans, Council leaders appointed one Chicana woman and left a position
open for a second. 37 Their unwillingness to do the same for the Republicans
suggests that they intended to populate their organization with particular types of
people.
In a subsequent report to Anne Armstrong, cochairperson of the RNC, and
Gladys O’Donnell, president of the NFRW, Peterson indicated that the organization
was “disorganized,” and “not so much Democratic per se as heading towards their

37

National Policy Council Meeting, minutes, September 10 and 11, 1971, 3, 6, box 4,
folder: NWPC 3, Allan Papers.

97

own goals whether it be day care centers or helping Chicanos.”38 Peterson wanted
Republican women to become involved in the organization because it was gaining
legitimacy through the participation of credible Democratic politicians like Martha
Griffiths, who sponsored the ERA in the United States Congress in 1971. Without
Republican participants, Democrats would fill the void and the Republican Party
would lose an opportunity to appeal to nontraditional women voters.39 Peterson
wanted to prevent the NWPC from giving the Democrats a political edge over the
Republicans with women.
In October 1971, when Policy Council members gathered in Detroit for their
third meeting, Peterson was finally convinced that Republicans, Democrats, and
independents were evenly represented. However, she saw intra-party conflicts
between both the Republicans and Democrats on the Policy Council. She told
Armstrong that “the most unified group you might say were the New York Jewish
crusaders except even here Bella Abzug and Betty Friedan do not see eye to eye.”40
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Peterson’s efforts insured that the Policy Council would protect the interests of the
Republican Party, or at least not provide an advantage to the Democratic Party.
Peterson and Madar also struggled to make sure the MWPC was
multipartisan. Madar’s attempt to convene the planning meeting in Michigan on
an inconvenient date caused Republican women to worry that “this direct action
by Olga would end the chance of the Women’s Caucus in Michigan. It would turn
into a Democratic Caucus.” 41 Before the meeting, the Planning Committee
concluded that the “prime objective [of the new organization] is to involve women
in politics and help women to organize politically where their interests lies [sic].”42
Organizers recognized, but downplayed, partisanship. By the time of the founding
meeting of the MWPC on November 6, 1971, Peterson was satisfied that both
parties would be adequately represented.
The partisan loyalties of NWPC and MWPC members became relevant during
every election when they had to cast votes for candidates who were affiliated with
a political party. In an effort to persuade women to place their interests as women

41

Allan to Peterson, memorandum, Sept. 7, 1971, box 20, folder: Women’s Political
Caucus 1971, Peterson Papers.
42

Agenda Committee Meeting, minutes, September 14, 1971, box 20, folder: Women’s
Political Caucus 1971, Peterson Papers.

99

above their partisanship, participants at the NWPC’s organizational meeting agreed
to try to reform their political parties, but also to “confront our own party
structures, and, when necessary, cross party lines or work outside formal political
parties in support of such women candidates [who fight for women and
minorities].”43 At the state organizational meeting, Madar reiterated the Statement
of Purpose when she announced that “we have to compromise on some of our
individual beliefs, but we won’t compromise our dedication to peace, ending
racism, sexism and poverty, and to greater democratization of our society.”44
However, as Republican Carol MacIntosh, Michigan’s representative on the
National Steering Committee of the NWPC, recognized, not all women could
relinquish their partisanship on specific issues or in the voting booth. She noted
that “there are some women involved who are very partisan, and are loyal
Republicans or Democrats. They are, as a rule, older, and they can not [sic] vote for
anyone of the opposite party, even if the candidate is a woman that they agree
with in everything except her party identity.”45 One activist succinctly summed up
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the difficulties involved when a caucus from Michigan’s upper peninsula tried to
engage in local activism. She stated that “no more has been done on nonpartisan
activities–most of us are too partisan!”46 MacIntosh believed that each woman had
to personally decide who and what she could support within the organization.
When gender and partisanship became potentially inconsistent, each woman
would have to individually identify, prioritize and reconcile her interests. MacIntosh
worried that it would be difficult to retain members if the organization failed to
recognize and address their personal concerns.47 Women questioned whether they
should support all women who were running for office, or only those who
supported the objectives of the MWPC. 48 The MWPC ultimately decided that it
would not support all female candidates indiscriminately, but only those who
endorsed the goals of the MWPC.49 However, this did little to address the concerns
of women who did not want to vote across party lines.
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Despite their avowed multipartisanship, the leaders of the MWPC never
really forgot their political affiliations and continuously worked to populate the
organization with their own constituents. From the start, Madar encouraged union
members to join the MWPC and its local affiliates.50 Within two years, however,
Madar concluded that MWPC members did not adequately reflect the interests of
working class women. In a letter to Jeffrey, she called the MWPC “a paper
organization with little constituency in the districts. At the Convention [the state
convention of the MWPC], the participation will be from middle income white
professional females, most of whom have not been involved at the district level. I
don’t know how we can get enough women to vote out the Republican group and
the Jean King [an attorney who was a leader in the Democratic Women’s Caucus]
types.” 51 She specifically stated that she did not share these concerns with
MacIntosh, who was a Republican.52
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MacIntosh, however, had similar concerns. On January 18, 1973, she gave a
speech to the Livingston County Republican Women’s Club in which she quoted Lee
Kefauver, who lamented the lack of Republican women activists.
The Republican Party began as a civil rights group. Why is it taken for
granted that because I am working for a cause that I must be a
Democrat? I feel very strange at meetings when a speaker says, “I
assume that everyone here is a Democrat,” and I and a few other
members raise our hands with a gulp to say, “No, we are Republicans!”
The looks of astonishment annoy me considerably: But what has
happened in the public mind to change this view of our party?53
Leaders of the political caucuses never lost sight of political affiliations and tried to
manipulate the membership of their organizations to protect their political
interests.
At times, the caucuses worked together on projects where their
multipartisanship gave them credibility and legitimacy. For example, the Michigan
coalition effectively developed bipartisan legislative analyses that would have
lacked credibility if authored or issued by either party separately.54 In 1972 and
1973, the MWPC issued detailed reports on the voting records of Michigan
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representatives and senators, respectively, on women’s issues. Beebe emphasized
that this type of information was crucial to women when they made voting
decisions because it allowed them to intelligently participate in the campaign
process and to hold their representatives accountable for their decisions. 55 Yet
even these types of allegedly nonpartisan projects gave rise to partisan responses.
Based on its study, the MWPC concluded that Republicans in both the House and
Senate had a better voting record than the Democrats. Republican leaders in
Michigan immediately used the results for partisan purposes, encouraging people
to vote for Republican candidates because they were more responsive to the
interests of women.56
As members of an organization created to promote the political priorities of
women, caucus participants should have been able to find common ground as
feminists. Republican Audrey Rowe Colom, chairwoman of the NWPC from 1975 to
1977, wrote that “as women, we have more that unites us on feminist grounds than
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divides us on partisan ones.” 57 However, Colom’s optimism was misplaced.
Members of the political caucuses oftentimes struggled to find common ground,
even as feminists.
One reason for this was because their feminism was linked to their
partisanship. While at least one scholar concluded that the NWPC brought together
equal rights and liberation feminists,58 the organizational framework of the NWPC
clearly reflected the latter. With its emphasis on rectifying social ills ranging from
racial inequality to poverty to war, its agenda far exceeded the legalistic rhetoric of
rights-based political and social equality that was the core of the equal rights
feminist agenda. 59 In fact, at its first national organizational meeting, radical
feminists established and attendees endorsed a special interest caucus and
adopted a resolution that “women’s liberation is at least as important as women’s
election.”60
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Rymph argued that the Democratic and Republican women sought to
incorporate feminist ideology into their respective parties for different reasons.
Democrats believed that feminism was integral to their party’s larger, social justice
and empowerment agenda. Republican women, on the other hand, engaged in
feminist outreach to expand their base of support. Republicans feared that they
were playing a zero-sum game in which the women that they failed to attract or
welcome to their party would become Democrats.

61
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Peterson was motivated to participate in the NWPC for this very reason.62 In reality,
however, women from the two parties embraced a different type of feminism,
which ultimately undermined their ability to act with one voice. Because the NWPC
adopted the more expansive (and some would say radical) type of feminism
promoted by Democrats, Republican women, in particular, found it especially
difficult to prioritize their gender over their partisanship within the coalition.
In fact, many Republican feminists found the liberation feminism espoused
by their Democratic cohorts in the NWPC too radical for party leadership and off-

61

Rymph, Republican Women, 202.

62

Elly to Anne and Gladys, memorandum, 1, September 17, 1971.

106

putting to those women they wanted to attract to Republican Party politics. 63
Republican Mary Coleman, a Michigan Supreme Court justice from 1973 to 1982,
was disturbed by the radicalism of many of the women at the first NWPC
conference in 1973, particularly those represented by “the Radical Women’s
Caucus, the Lesbian Caucus, etc. etc.” 64 The attacks on Republicans, particularly
President Nixon, caused her to question the motives of the organization and its
leaders.
When Helen Bentley read a very fine message of greeting from
President Nixon, it was met with some boo’s and hisses and very
discourteous behavior. I begin to think it was only a platform for the
women’s militant demonstrators, especially after Bella Abzug very
heatedly attacked the President for just about everything imaginable.
Frankly, I felt that the Republicans were mere window dressing. There
were only about 100 out of the 1500 women present. It is possible,
however, the Republicans may be more active. . . . Only time will tell
what effectiveness the Republican women can have in directing the
attention of the Caucus to women rather than to partisan politics.65
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Even those women who embraced liberation feminism did not necessarily
agree on the appropriate strategy to politicize women. Friedan wanted to bring all
women, regardless of their partisanship or views on the women’s movement, into
the political process because she believed that together they would form a
powerful and influential constituency that could achieve political equality. Abzug
and Steinem believed that Friedan’s strategy was not radical enough. Incorporating
women into the existing political system would only perpetuate the very power
structure that Abzug and Steinem hoped to eliminate. Instead, they wanted to build
a larger constituency of all of the groups, including minorities and the poor, who
were systemically excluded from the current system dominated by rich, white men.
Collectively this new coalition would have the legitimacy and the power to destroy
the current system.
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important concepts ambiguous but succeeded in setting a direction without
creating a line item orthodoxy.” 67 As a compromise between Friedan’s goal to
organize women for political power and Abzug and Steinem’s strategy to
incorporate women into a larger constituency focused on progressive social
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change,68 this ambiguity, they hoped, would attract the largest number of women
to the organization.
Another reason why it was so difficult for political caucus members to agree
on what they meant by women’s issues was because the organization tried to
appeal to the full range of its members’ interests. The MWPC defined women’s
issues broadly to encompass all “laws that restrict or deny opportunities for women
to make decisions about their own lives.”69 This more expansive definition included
legislation on issues such as abortion and maternal medical care, birth control for
minors, discrimination in education and school sports, child care facilities for
working women and the ERA.70 As the NWPC guidelines suggested, however, some
of theses issues were divisive and made consensus unlikely. Differences among
members became apparent at the MWPC convention. A Catholic woman who
belonged to the John Birch Society believed that sex education was the
responsibility of the family and the church, not the schools. She attended the
meeting alongside a woman who argued that a parental permission requirement
68
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for sex education in the schools undermined efforts to provide this information to
students. Similarly, while one woman wanted to have the father of her children in
the delivery room, another worried that a rule providing such access could be
extrapolated to require a biological father’s permission for an abortion. 71 While
caucus members agreed that they wanted to politicize women, they did not
necessarily agree on how to do so or what positions they should promote once they
were politicized.
In light of the competing and sometimes conflicting interests of the members
of the political caucuses, it is not surprising that they initially formed women’s
organizations that were affiliated with their own parties, rather than the NWPC and
the MWPC. The Michigan Democratic Women’s Caucus was established in 1970,
but Republican women did not create their own Republican Women’s Caucus until
1975.72 Peterson attributed the delay to a longstanding, but familiar, problem. The
party was not receptive to female political participation. It did not select inspiring
candidates or causes that appealed to women and did not make volunteers feel like
71
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they were a part of a team. Women were apathetic and not interested in
participating in party politics. In a 1973 speech that is believed to have been given
by Peterson, she observed that the average woman “views the National Women’s
Political Caucus with disdain. . . . She is happy in her socio-economic superiority and
she is not especially interested in change.”73 In a somewhat pessimistic assertion,
she added that “the possibilities of a dramatic advance in the ‘70’s are just not
there–unless they overcome their lack of interest, indicate a willingness to
participate beyond the brief encounter–and have a fighting desire to go beyond
their present role.” 74 She concluded “that the appointment of women is good
personally for them–and for the general story–but doesn’t particularly attract other
women. This is probably due to the feeling now it is every man for himself.”75
Another Republican feminist shared Peterson’s concerns that the Michigan
Republican Party did not welcome women. Kefauver, a transplanted east coast,
liberal Republican, always seemed a little uncomfortable trying to reconcile her
feminism with Michigan Republicanism. While she never held elective office, she
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believed that the Michigan Republican Party was not liberal enough. She set out to
convince its leaders to refashion it after the more “progressive” Massachusetts
state party that focused on “human rights and issues that affect people in their
daily lives.”76 She stated, “I was raised on that old Puritan ethic that your life isn’t
worth living unless you try and make the world a little better.”77 Highly critical of
the Michigan Republican Party, she said “its the pits! . . . Here I see a party that
wishes (for the most part) to return to the 1890’s. There is little realization of where
the American people are today, what they want, and how a political party can meet
that need.”78 She did not believe that it had the grassroots organization needed to
support political candidates. Romney’s much touted strategy of encouraging voters
to split their ticket to get Republicans elected to the highest state offices resulted
in a lack of organization at the local levels and a total disregard for local positions.
Thus, the party ignored average voters and special interest groups, such as women,
and their concerns. Because the party was not receptive to women, Kefauver
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contended, they increasingly turned to the Democratic Party, which they believed
would better serve their interests.79
Perhaps it was difficult to convince feminists to create a women’s caucus in
the Michigan Republican Party because it did not endorse feminist goals. In fact,
the political parties in Michigan had very different views of feminism. The
Democratic Women’s Caucus of Michigan embraced feminism and the broader
humanistic goals of liberation feminists, such as livable wages, access to medical
care, a pollution-free environment, and legislative limits on the president to declare
war. At the same time, it realized that it needed to look out for women through
“the enactment of legislation essential to women’s needs and the election and
appointment of feminists [emphasis added] to policy making positions both within
the Democratic Party and at all levels of government. A feminist is here defined as
any person who pursues the goal of full equality for women.”80 Thus, Democrats
were not afraid to use the word “feminism,” which encompassed not only equality
for women, but also an end to racism, limitations on war and, in general, “a more
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humanistic society.”81 Apparently, Democratic feminists were not concerned that
feminist extremism would undermine their efforts to bring more women into the
political process.
Some of the founders of the Michigan Republican Women’s Caucus (MRWC),
including Burnett and Kefauver, believed that the organization should be
“committed to encourage women to become active feminist Republicans.” 82
Ultimately, the organization’s statement of purpose did not emphasize feminism
because it was too controversial. Instead, the MRWC was structured to focus on
legislation that supported all women and to “unite Republican women with a
variety of views and talents,” including those who were not feminists. 83 The party
worried that any connection with feminism might be deemed too radical and
discourage women from becoming involved in Republican Party politics.
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The NWPC and MWPC tended to break down into partisan women’s groups
because the organizations were not sure how to best pursue their political goals.
These tensions surfaced as early as 1972 when members of the Policy Council of
the NWPC, faced with a presidential election, could not decide on the best way to
proceed. Some of them wanted to split the organization into two partisan groups
so that women from each group would return to and work within their respective
parties for the election in order to accomplish their partisan goals. Others believed
that the organization would be more powerful if it acted in a multipartisan
fashion. 84 While they decided on the latter approach, it became apparent that
every four years they would have to serve as the feminist representatives to each
party’s national convention. This meant that they would have to address questions
about the number of female representatives at the convention and the inclusion of
planks supporting women’s rights in party platforms.
Women from the NWPC first participated in the Democratic and Republican
national conventions in 1972. Jill Ruckelshaus spoke at the Republican Convention,
where she asked that the goals of the NWPC be included in the Republican Party
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platform. 85 Similarly, Burnett testified on behalf of the MWPC, the Michigan
Women’s Commission, and NOW at the same convention.

86

Republican

representatives from the political caucuses had some success because, after an
eight-year hiatus, Republicans once again agreed to endorse the ERA with a
platform plank, and the number of women delegates at the convention increased
to 30 percent from 17 percent in 1968.87 Republican feminists also convinced party
leaders to amend Rule 32, through which the party had agreed to broaden the
diversity of convention delegates by prohibiting discrimination based on race,
ethnicity, and religion. Through 1972, states were not prohibited from
discriminating against potential delegates based on sex.88 Because of the work of
Republican feminists in 1972, however, the Republican Party expanded Rule 32 for
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the 1976 convention to prohibit sex discrimination in the selection of delegates and
issued a new directive providing that “each state shall endeavor to have equal
representation of men and women in its delegation to the Republican National
Convention.” 89 The Michigan Republican Party incorporated these changes into
their delegate selection process for the 1976 national convention.90 These rules
continued to be suggestions rather than mandates, however, and included no
enforcement mechanism.91
In 1975, a group of Republican women who believed that the creation of a
partisan feminist organization would help them to convince the Republican Party
to be more inclusive of women and cognizant of feminist issues created the RWTF.
They also hoped it would enable them to politicize more women, thereby serving
the purposes of the NWPC, and bring them into the Republican Party.92 Ironically,
89
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they intended to use the self-described multipartisan organization to increase
female political participation, in the process making them partisan. Retrospectively,
the establishment of partisan task forces has been called a “chance development”
that “brilliantly answered the need for the Caucus to be effective within both major
party structures without sacrificing the leverage party women gain by their unity
across party lines.”93 It can also be characterized, however, as a concession to the
ongoing importance of partisanship within this feminist coalition and a safety valve
that permitted the NWPC and its state affiliates to continue their work while taking
into account the political differences among their members and the political parties
to which they belonged. By 1976, “the NWPC was ‘overwhelmingly Democratic.’”94
Partisan task forces, such as the RWTF, enabled Republican feminists to continue
to be both Republicans and feminists within a largely Democratic organization.
They did not have to chose between the more radical and primarily Democratic
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feminists who drove the agenda of the NWPC and the men who ran their political
party.
The RWTF quickly focused on the number of female delegates selected to
attend the 1976 Republican National Convention in Kansas City. Despite the
changes to the delegate selection rules that became effective in 1976, the number
of female delegates was projected to drop below the 1972 level of 30 percent.95
Apparently, the nonbinding nature of the new rule rendered it ineffectual. However,
it must have provided some leverage because when Republican leaders of the
NWPC and the RWTF complained, convention organizers managed to increase the
numbers of women selected as delegates to 31.5 percent through at large
nominations by state party officials.96
Before the fact, RWTF leaders also complained that women at the 1976
Republican convention had been relegated to token appearances, whereas the
Democratic Party had assigned women prominent roles at its convention. In
response, RNC Chairwomen Mary Louise Smith agreed to make women more
95
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visible, but only after she castigated Pat Goldman, chairwoman of the RWTF.
Goldman wrote that “the public perception of the role of women in the Republican
Party will not only be important in terms of convention delegates, but it will be
important as the image that sticks in the mind of the general voting public that
watches the convention proceedings.”97 In her surprising response, Smith seemed
to reprimand Goldman for the failure of women to participate in Republican Party
politics, indicating that such involvement would put them “in positions of influence
and leadership at crucial times. Women must come to recognize that these goals
and objectives are not most readily and effectively accomplished in the emotionally
charged atmosphere of an election year. Perhaps we have all failed to make this
point emphatically enough.” 98 The RWTF later touted that its letter to Smith
resulted in greater female exposure at the convention.99
While members of MRWC first inquired about the RWTF in 1975, it took four
years for Michigan’s Republican feminists to establish the MRWTF. 100 This new
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organization was “committed to maintaining a feminist presence in the Republican
Party and a Republican presence in the feminist movement.” 101 It focused on
placing Republican women into elective and appointive political and government
positions, and supporting male and female candidates and issues that benefitted
women.102
The NWPC and MWPC exemplified the role that one network of feminist
organizations played in trying to connect the burgeoning feminist movement to
politics. They also illustrated the difficulties associated with multiple interest
coalitions. The founders of the NWPC recognized that these competing interests
would eventually make it difficult for this large group of women to identify and
work together towards common goals. Their intentional ambiguity in the founding
documents and the establishment of partisan caucuses in 1975 served as safety
valves that gave the women room to pursue their different interests as feminists
and partisans without undermining the integrity of the organization.103 Moreover,
the flexibility that they built into both the substantive focus and structure of the

101

Position Statement, Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force, n.d.; Fireman, “Angry
GOP Women Disown Task Force,” June 26, 1983.
102

Position Statement, Michigan Republican Women’s Task Force, n.d.

103

Feit, “Organizing for Political Power,” 195-97.

121

organization, the space they created in terms of defining what they meant by a
“woman’s issue,” and the ability of state and local organizations to pursue their
own interests so long as they did not conflict with the goals of the national
organization, were positive developments that allowed the members to act as a
group without being in total agreement with each other.104
However, the multiple layers of loosely connected organizations created
difficulties as participating groups struggled to coordinate with each other.
Moreover, women had a difficult time even temporarily relinquishing their
partisanship in the interest of feminism. They shared the feminist goal of
politicizing women, but then tried to recruit these newly politicized women to
participate in their own respective political parties. Ultimately, Republican
feminists found it challenging to integrate their feminism with Democratic
feminists who operated within a different political structure. Even when
confronted by male-dominated political parties, the purportedly shared feminism
of the women who participated in these organizations did not allow them to
overcome their partisanship. For some women, it was difficult to separate their
feminism from their partisanship because their feminism was integrated with their
partisanship.
104
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The Republican task forces addressed this by provided Republican feminists
with a space where they could combine their moderate Republicanism with
moderate feminism while they worked on behalf of the Republican Party. Over time
however, Republican feminists found that while they might have been at odds with
Democratic feminists, they were being squeezed within their own political party by
its conservative wing. The next three chapters illustrate how Republican feminists
dealt with these divisive issues within their own party. They did not yet realize that
conservatism would ultimately threaten the multipartisanship of these political
caucuses as well.
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CHAPTER 4 REPUBLICAN FEMINISTS FIGHT FOR THE ERA: 1972 TO 1979
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any state on account of sex.
–Equal Rights Amendment
Inequality hurts. ERA ends inequality.

–Laura Callow, WJR Point of View, July 25, 1977

The time is here for women to enter directly into the world as both architects of the
society in which we wish to live and as direct beneficiaries of the rewards.
–Ruth McNamee, Speech, “The Women’s Movement: Change and Future Challenges”

On March 22, 1972, almost fifty years after it was first proposed in 1923, the
United States Congress passed the ERA. Once adopted by Congress, thirty-eight
states had to ratify it by March 22, 1979 in order for it to become a constitutional
amendment. Twenty-two states ratified it that same year. Thereafter, the pace of
ratification slowed considerably. By 1975, only twelve more states had ratified the
amendment, and one final state approved it in 1977. Once proponents realized that
they would not have the requisite number of approvals within the allotted time
period, they asked Congress for an extension of the deadline. At the same time,
they worried that they were going to lose some the ratifications that they had
already obtained. Some ratification states considered rescinding their ratifications
and others argued that their ratifications expired when the original ratification
period ended. The deadline for ratification was extended until June 22, 1982, but
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ERA advocates never obtained another state approval. The effort died in 1982,
three states short of the number needed to enact the amendment.1
Michigan’s Republican feminists actively participated in the battle over the
ERA. As feminists, they supported a constitutional amendment that they believed
would guarantee them social, political, and economic equality. As Republicans,
they were convinced that the ERA was consistent with the basic tenets of the
Republican Party and could only be enacted with Republican support. In the space
where their gendered and political interests overlapped, Republican feminists tried
to carefully craft their arguments on behalf of the ERA in ways that were consistent
with the broad principles of the Republican Party. In doing so, they were forced to
distinguish themselves from radical feminists who argued that the ERA did not go
far enough to secure gender equality, and to discredit the extremism of
conservative Republicans who feared that the ERA would destroy the traditional
family and fundamentally change American society. As the Republican Party
became more conservative and its opposition to the ERA more pronounced,
Republican feminists deliberately aligned with the party’s moderate leaders and
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distinguished themselves from conservative women so that they could be
identified as the legitimate representatives of the party’s women. This enabled
them, at least temporarily, to remain both Republicans and feminists.
Less than three months after it was enacted by the United States Congress,
the Michigan Legislature adopted the ERA on May 22, 1972.2 The Michigan Senate,
which was equally divided between Republicans and Democrats, adopted the ERA
by voice vote. Democrats held a six seat majority in the 110 member Michigan
House. In a bipartisan vote, forty-six of the fifty-eight Democrats and forty-four of
the fifty-two Republicans voted for the ERA. Similarly, ten Democrats and eight
Republicans opposed it.3
Despite its quick ratification, however, the fight over the ERA in Michigan and
throughout the country was just beginning. Two organizations, STOP ERA and
Happiness of Womanhood (HOW), led the national opposition to the ERA. Drawing
on her grassroots conservative network, Schlafly founded STOP ERA in 1972. 4
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Livonia, Michigan native, Elaine Donnelly, was only in her mid-twenties when she
founded Michigan STOP ERA, the state affiliate of STOP ERA. Ironically, she was a
Democrat when she was young, but became disenchanted with the party as it
became more liberal and she started working with Schlafly. Like Schlafly, she
initially supported the ERA but changed her mind once she realized that women
would be disadvantaged by its breadth.5 “As a mother of two daughters,” Donnelly
said, “it was my responsibility to see to it that ERA did not pass.”6
While STOP ERA and Michigan STOP ERA focused exclusively on defeating
the ERA, HOW adopted a broader perspective. In 1971 Jacquie Davison, an
Arizonian initially concerned about how the ERA would affect women, founded
HOW. The organization adopted a patriotic, religious, pro-life agenda to defeat the
ERA, but also worked to preserve the rights of parents and the traditional family.
Davison stated that “like many good American women, I ignored the women’s
liberationists while they were growing hair on their legs and burning their bras. But
now America is under attack. The family is being attacked and the family is the
5
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backbone of America.” 7 Conservative Republican Patt Barbour, from Dearborn
Heights, led the Michigan chapter of HOW before she became its national leader in
1975. She argued “that the ERA amendment ‘will do nothing for women but put a
federal noose around their neck.’”8 In 1975 she gave voice to the opinion of many
conservative Republican women when she wrote to Governor Milliken, “I am a
Republican, but the Republican Party has left me.”9 While they did not specifically
characterize themselves as Republican or partisan organizations, women who were
connected to the conservative movement in the Republican Party led both STOP
ERA and HOW.
NOW was one of the first organizations to support the ERA. It was a melting
pot of women with different priorities, strategies and political loyalties. Its leaders
recognized that they needed to carefully balance the conflicting interests and
objectives of all of its members to maintain its focus on feminism. Therefore, NOW
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was structured as a nonpartisan organization to avoid the difficulties that might
develop from partisan alliances. 10 At the same time, NOW recognized the
importance of convincing women to become involved in politics, and worked
closely with the NWPC and its local affiliates. Many women who participated in the
women’s movement were members of both organizations.11 In 1967, one of NOW’s
primary goals became the ratification of the ERA.12
In 1976, proponents of the ERA finally created an umbrella organization,
ERAmerica, to bring together the various groups that were specifically focused on
ratification of the ERA. A Michigan affiliate of ERAmerica, Michigan ERAmerica, was
created on June 10, 1976 to coordinate different groups of people in the pursuit of
their common goals of “preserving Michigan’s ratification of the ERA ‘educating the
public about the need to guarantee equal protection under the law’ [and]
promoting the ratification of the ERA nationally.”13 The leaders of ERAmerica and
its Michigan affiliate seemed surprised that they needed to organize to promote
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the ERA because congressional approval was so easy that supporters did not
believe they needed to do anything “to insure people understanding it.”14 But over
time, as Peterson witnessed extremists from both ideological extremes hijacking
the ratification process, it became clear to her that ERAmerica and its local affiliates
should serve as the educational ambassadors for the ERA.15
Like NOW, ERAmerica and its Michigan affiliate understood that partisanship
could undermine the fragile coalition that they had created to engage in
collaborative work on behalf of the ERA. Thus, Michigan ERAmerica instructed its
members to avoid connections to any other issues that might link the ERA to
partisan politics. These organizations were careful to maintain the delicate balance
that Republican and Democratic women had achieved in their efforts to gain
ratification. Organizational materials instructed members that “both Democrats
and Republicans are very sensitive. Sometimes it’s necessary to criticize
representatives from one party or the other. Try to follow with articles of praise for
someone else in same party.”16 In order to work effectively together to promote
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the ERA, women from both political parties needed to overcome the political
differences that might have otherwise undermined their efforts to achieve their
common goal.
Ironically, in order to solidify its nonpartisanship, two partisan women led
ERAmerica. From its inception until 1979, Republican Peterson and Democrat Liz
Carpenter chaired the organization. They were both moderate feminists who were
political veterans, and brought their political experience to the fight over ERA,
indicating that “their major strategy . . . is a nationwide campaign, run along the
lines of a political campaign, only this time the candidate isn’t a human being but
24 words.”17 They intended to utilize their partisanship to lobby their respective
party leaders, promote candidates in targeted states and influence their party’s
platforms. The two women “denied . . . that this emphasis on partisan politics
meant that they would, in effect, be snubbing feminist organizations that in the
past had led the fragmented fight for the equal rights amendment. ‘Oh, we’ll work
with women’s organizations, because that’s what gave us birth.’ . . . ‘We’ll work
with anybody who gives us assistance. We both consider ourselves strong
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feminists.’”18 They were critical of Schlafly, who used typically female tactics, such
as providing legislatures with baked goods, to influence their votes. Carpenter said
“man does not live by bread alone. . . . I’ll give legislators the dignity of voting with
their brains.”19 In 1976, Helen Milliken, along with Democrat Martha Griffiths, were
named the honorary chairpersons of Michigan ERAmerica. In 1979, the leadership
roles in the national organization were passed on to two wives of prominent
governors, Helen Milliken and Sharon Percy Rockefeller, wife of Democrat
Governor Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia.
Milliken was a relative latecomer to the women’s movement.20 While she did
not become a feminist until the mid-1970s, once converted, she became one of the
state’s leading feminists from either party. Milliken was from a very conservative
Republican family. Later noting, “I was raised in an era when women were
supposed to be educated, literate, find a good husband, and provide a good
home,” 21 she followed that dictate. A graduate of Smith College, she married

18

Ibid.

19

“Political Savvy Joins the Battle over Equal Rights,” Grand Rapids Press, April 11, 1976,
box 23, folder: Clippings, ERAmerica & Other Women’s Rights Involvement (1964, 1969-79),
Peterson Papers.
20

For a discussion of Helen Milliken, see Dempsey, William G. Milliken, 130-45.

21

Ibid., 130-31.

132

Milliken in 1945 at the end of World War II. When her husband finished college at
Yale, they moved back to his hometown of Traverse City, Michigan. They had two
nearly grown children by the time her husband was elected first to the Michigan
Senate in 1960, and then as lieutenant governor under George Romney in 1964.
During this time, she balanced her duties as the wife of the lieutenant governor
with her life as a student of landscape architecture at Michigan State University.22
Milliken became governor of Michigan when Romney accepted a position in the
Nixon cabinet in 1969.
In her early years as first lady, she recognized the importance of women in
the political process and credited the MWPC for educating women about politics,
but she only reluctantly offered any support for the burgeoning women’s
movement. She supported the ERA and when asked, she noted, “‘I’m for equal pay
for equal work,’ . . . ‘but I’m not really sure about women’s liberation, when it
comes to disrupting the family.’”23 She defended women who were not interested
in the women’s movement because “equality . . . should be an individual right . . .
22
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to have full equality or not to claim it if you really do not feel the need of it.”24
Despite her somewhat traditional ideas about women, she and her husband
provided each other with the space to be independent. She did not feel that she
always had to agree with him and he let her be her own person. At this point in her
career as Michigan’s first lady, her real interests were conservation and making art
accessible to the people of Michigan.25
According to the Oakland Press, “it wasn’t until 1975 that she assumed an
active part in the struggle for equal rights for women.”26 She acknowledged she
was a latecomer to the women’s movement because “‘I’d never had to work. I’d
worked for a couple of years (at J.W. Milliken, Inc.). It was an enjoyable outlet, a
pin money job and I was working part time . . . a very different situation from
women today.’” 27 She attributed her feminist consciousness to her daughter, a
lawyer, who chastised her for not having an opinion on the ERA. Her daughter told
her, “‘Mother, you must become informed about women’s issues. You are in a
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wonderful position now to help women.’ And the lights went on and I embarked
on learning.” 28 Milliken asserted that “once the window gets open, it’s never
closed.” 29 Braithwaite later stated that Helen Milliken is “the purest feminist I
know, . . . so many of us are divorced and widowed so we, out of necessity, are
feminists. She’s not in that position, yet her concerns and efforts have been 100
percent.”30 For the next eight years, Milliken devoted most of her energy to the the
ratification of the ERA, not as a figurehead for ERAmerica, but as a passionate
activist.
Republican feminist Ruth McNamee emerged in Michigan during the 1970s
to work closely with Helen Milliken on the ERA. 31 McNamee graduated with a
bachelor’s degree in political science and English from Bucknell University. Married
with two children, she began her political career locally, as a member of the
Birmingham City Commission from 1965 to 1974, and as mayor of Birmingham in
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1970 and 1971. In 1974, she was elected to the Michigan House of Representatives,
where she remained until 1984, when she decided to retire.
McNamee started to develop her feminist consciousness when she became
aware of the disadvantages she faced as a female volunteer in her Episcopal Church.
Much like women in the Republican Party, she and other women did most of the
work but had no power or authority. Frustrated but energized, her church activism
led her to become involved in the community and local politics.32 She was initially
ambivalent about the women’s movement, arguing that some of its goals, such as
gender neutral clubs, were not important to her. But she eventually came to credit
it with effectuating important societal changes, “such as recognition at last that a
woman has her own right to enter directly into the world, be both an architect of
it and a direct beneficiary of its rewards.”33 Thus, she argued that “women should
have equal opportunities in education and jobs, and that their work performance
[should] be recognized in the same manner as a man’s.”34 Women and men were
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different from each other, but such differences were enriching, not limiting.35 She
laughingly complained that while she was the only woman on the Birmingham City
Commission, the men frequently questioned the intellectual abilities of the
“confused housewife” or “confused woman driver.” She noted “before I retire, I
hope the ‘confused driver’ is the male–just once.”36
Despite her commitment to gender equality, McNamee had some very
traditional ideas about the family. She was a stay-at-home mother while her
children were young, and did not resent or regret that time with her children. She
believed that as a wife and mother, a woman was responsible for the family home
and if that was in order, a woman could work outside the home.37 Even after her
children were grown, she said that she preferred “Saturday morning meetings. ‘I
refuse to have my husband eat TV dinners. Even though I am mayor now, he is still
my husband and deserves to have the best I can give him.’”38 While her husband,
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she believed, was not responsible for cooking or cleaning, he was still obliged to
participate in raising the children. “I don’t expect my husband to help at home, but
it is important that he be a good father to the kids.”39
Like Beebe, McNamee’s femininity was often stressed in the press. She was
once described as “probably the prettiest of the mayors of metropolitan Detroit.”40
One author noted that “her favorite household appliance is her dishwasher. . . .The
mayor is an avid antique collector and favors glass and china. Her glass collection
pattern is the old ‘buzz-saw’ design.”41 Another female journalist commented “that
her dimpled smile makes her no less formidable than her six male associates when
it comes to handling city affairs.”42 Certainly journalists would never compare the
looks of male officeholders or comment on their dimples. Moreover, no one cared
about a male politician’s “favorite household appliance.” This journalistic double
standard made it difficult for female politicians to be taken seriously.
Despite the challenges she faced as a politician and member of the state
legislature, McNamee became a representative for women within the Michigan
39
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Republican Party. She consistently identified herself as a moderate Republican and
a fiscal conservative. When asked why she did not become a Democrat instead of
remaining in an increasingly conservative Republican Party, she noted that she was
a Republican because she believed in the party’s commitment to limited
government and its tenet that people’s problems were best solved by the private
sector.43
Once the Michigan legislature ratified the ERA, the battle over the proposed
constitutional amendment entered a new phase. Michigan’s ERA opponents,
especially Donnelly and Michigan STOP ERA, began to try to rescind Michigan’s
ratification of the amendment. While Donnelly saw rescission as a potentially viable
strategy, she recognized that Governor Milliken created a political environment
that made rescission difficult. Thus, to undermine his influence, her organization
pushed back on his involvement. Michigan STOP ERA objected to his “use [of] the
funds, power, and prestige of his office to interfere in the Amendment process, or
to financially subsidize one side in the national debate at the expense of the
other.” 44 Donnelly reminded the governor that the executive branch of the
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Michigan state government did not have a role in amending the United States
Constitution. Unlike legislation, which only becomes law when the governor signs
it, state legislatures ratify federal constitutional amendments without a governor’s
participation. As a result, she asserted, he could not legally participate in the
ratification/rescission process. Donnelly wrote, “To put it bluntly, the ratification of
the ERA, or a rescission of that ratification, is none of your official business.” 45
Donnelly made it clear to the governor that he should not use his office to take any
position on the ERA or to try to protect the legislature’s earlier ratification vote.46
Donnelly shared with her feminist opponents a belief in the power of
politicized women. But since Michigan STOP ERA members were not politicized, she
had to teach them to become active voters and effective lobbyists so that they
could meaningfully engage in the rescission process. She asked them to send hand
written “rescindograms” and, if possible, to visit legislators to convince them that
their constituents favored rescission. 47 She encouraged them to campaign for
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legislators who supported rescission. While Donnelly suggested that they
participate through bumper stickers, phone calls and lawn signs, she urged them to
more proactively “invite your neighbors and friends in the District over for coffee
or an evening social event. Better yet, organize a whole day of coffees in the homes
of friends who are willing to invite their friends into their homes to meet the
Candidate.”48 In order to raise the money to engage in these grassroots efforts,
Michigan STOP ERA held bake sales, luncheons and boutiques throughout the
state.49 Donnelly’s efforts to teach other women to engage in grassroots politics
were a part of the conservative playbook and replicated what was happening all
around the nation as conservative leaders were bringing formerly nonpoliticized
women into the political process and empowering them to take charge of their lives.
Michigan’s attorney general made Donnelly’s task a little more difficult when
he ruled that rescission of the ratification by the state legislature was probably
illegal.50 Despite this setback, Donnelly and other ERA opponents did not abandon
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their rescission efforts. They argued that the will of the people had been ignored
when the state legislature originally ratified the ERA, and that politicians continued
to ignore their constituents as the ratification was being reconsidered. In an “Open
Letter to all Michigan Legislators,” Donnelly and Barbour argued that “right from
the start of the Equal Rights Amendment controversy, the opinions of the wives
and mothers who do not choose to join a large organization have been screened
out, ignored, or ridiculed.”

51

Significantly, these ERA opponents publicly

characterized themselves as “wives and mothers,” not women, indicating they
believed that they derived their legitimacy and would be able to exert the most
influence through these familial roles.
With Donnelly’s assistance, the Michigan House of Representatives
proposed joint resolutions to rescind the ERA in March 1974 and March 1976, but
both languished in the Committee on Constitutional Revision and Women’s Rights.
In 1974 House Joint Resolution FF, which had five Democratic sponsors, sought “to
rescind and nullify” the ratification of the ERA by the Michigan legislature.52 The

51

“Open Letter to All Michigan Legislators,” Elaine Donnelly and Patt Barbour, May 13,
1974, box 6, folder: 14th Cong. District Republican Party Chronological Files Miscellaneous
Material Women’s Rights, 14th Congressional District Papers.
52

Michigan House Joint Resolution FF, March 21, 1974.

142

Committee’s vote on the resolution was equally divided along party lines. Four
Democrats opposed moving the resolution out of committee and four Republicans
favored allowing the resolution to be voted on by the full House. As a result, the
Democrat members of the Committee overruled their Republican colleagues and
stopped the Democrat sponsored resolution, which died in Committee. 53 The
number of sponsors for House Joint Resolution TT, introduced on March 2, 1976,
had increased to twenty-two, indicating that support for rescission was growing. Of
these sponsors, sixteen were Democrats and six were Republicans. Despite the
additional support, the resolution met the same fate as the 1974 resolution and
never got out of the Committee.54
While the move to rescind Michigan’s ratification of the ERA lost much of its
energy after the 1976 vote for rescission, the debate over the ERA continued,
especially as efforts towards ratification in other states seemed to stall. For
Michigan’s Republican feminists, the 1976 Republican national convention
intensified the debate. In 1972, the Republican Party included a plank in its
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platform that reiterated the party’s longstanding support for the ERA.55 In 1976,
Republican feminists, led by the NRWTF, retained a pro-ERA plank in the platform,
which emphasized “that the Republican Party ‘fully endorses the principle of equal
rights, equal opportunities and equal responsibilities for women.’ The Equal Rights
Amendment is the embodiment of this principle and therefore we support its swift
ratification.”56 However, conservative Republicans, led by Schlafly, came close to
convincing the party to abandon its endorsement.
The convention served as a wakeup call to Michigan’s Republican feminists.
They had already defeated bipartisan attempts to rescind Michigan’s ratification of
the ERA and that effort seemed over. Republican feminists had persuaded the
national Republican Party, at least temporarily, to continue its support for the ERA.
Yet all of their hard work would be wasted if they could not convince other states
to ratify the ERA. Moderate Republicans still controlled the Republican Party, as
evidenced by Milliken’s reelection as governor in 1974 and Gerald Ford’s defeat of
conservative Ronald Reagan for the presidential nomination in 1976. Realizing that
they needed the party’s support to ratify the ERA, Michigan’s Republican feminists
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aligned with party moderates. Their strategy had a dual purpose, however. They
understood that feminists would support a party that supported them, which
would strengthen the moderate wing of the party. While Republican feminists had
a temporary advantage in the Michigan Republican Party, they knew that the fight
for control of the party was far from over. The battle between Republican feminists
and conservative women over the ERA became a part of the much larger war for
control of the Republican Party.
The first task of Republican feminists was to counter the narrative that
conservative women had constructed about the ERA. Schlafly and STOP ERAmerica,
argued that the ERA endangered American society. Schlafly explained that
conservative opposition to the ERA was based on two interrelated notions: the
primacy of the traditional family and the biological differences between men and
women.57 Because of the importance of the family, women enjoyed a unique status,
which justified their special privileges as wives and mothers. Schlafly contended
that the women’s movement arrogantly presumed to speak for all women with its
assertion that women were treated unfairly. Instead, she argued, “Women’s lib is
a total assault on the role of the American woman as wife and mother, and on the
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family as the basic unit of society.”58 She queried, “Why should we lower ourselves
to ‘equal rights’ when we already have the status of special privilege?”59 Donnelly
agreed “that the feminists ‘reject the values that the majority of women hold . . .
they have a very negative attitude toward the family and I don’t think they
understand the nature of commitment to the family.’”60
For Schlafly and her supporters, men and women were biologically different,
which meant that they had different functions in life. Women were meant to be
wives and mothers and could fulfill those functions only in a traditional family with
a husband and children. Schlafly believed that abortion would eliminate women’s
primary role in society. She tied the ERA to both abortion rights and homosexuality
when she stated that “the ultimate goal of women’s liberation is independence
from men and the avoidance of pregnancy and its consequences . . . [so] lesbianism
is logically the highest form in the ritual of women’s liberation.”61
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ERA’s opponents claimed that they did not oppose equality, but worried
about what women would lose in the process of attaining it. STOP ERA emphasized
that the “ERA forbids any legal distinction on the basis of sex, no matter how
reasonable and beneficial those distinctions may be.”62 They believed that the ERA
created the potential for dangerous overreaching by the government, which
threatened the special privileges enjoyed by women, including protective
legislation.63 Barbour emphasized that “to treat women exactly like men is to treat
women unfairly.”64 A constitutional amendment could not abrogate the differences
between men and women, but would invalidate the protective laws that
ameliorated some of the disadvantages that women suffered as a result of those
differences. It did not add any value for women, but it did “take away rights and
privileges that American women have achieved that make our life here the best in
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the world.”65 The ERA “would sacrifice a large measure of personal and political
freedom, plus justice for women, on the altar of inflexible equality.”66 Donnelly
clearly intended to scare wives and mothers when she argued that the financial
impact of the ERA on families would eliminate a husband’s obligation to provide
financial support for his wife. She noted that the laws requiring such support “were
not written to penalize men, or to give women something they don’t deserve. They
were written to protect the rights of women who make a good faith, long-term
commitment to marriage and motherhood. All of society has an interest in the
stability of families, because families are responsible for the care of children.”67
Donnelly asserted that “if ERA is ratified . . . ‘motherhood would become a high risk
occupation.’” 68 Thus, according to Michigan STOP ERA, the passage of the ERA
would eliminate government protections that enabled women to act as wives and
mothers and, in the process, destroy families.
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Building on Schlafly’s opposition to the ERA, HOW and Michigan STOP ERA
conservatives emphasized the radicalism of the groups that supported the ERA to
make them more threatening to women. In 1975, Donnelly referenced the
campaign slogan of the president of NOW, Karen DeCrow, “Out of the Mainstream,
Into the Revolution,” to argue that “all attempts to paper over the simmering
radicalism of N.O.W. are sure to fail.”69 They warned that radical feminists would
take advantage of the law’s ambiguity to undermine the integrity of the traditional
family in a variety of unanticipated ways. Donnelly called proponents of the ERA
“militant feminists” who wanted to create a “‘gender-free’ society” 70 in which
abortion, homosexual marriage and unisex bathrooms would be legal. If women
were no different than men, young girls would have to be drafted and sent into
combat alongside young men. The education system would have to be modified to
eliminate sexism in teaching by downplaying concepts of masculinity and
femininity for children. Donnelly objected to this because “there is no set standard
to determine what is sexist. ‘The definition of sexism is as wide as the feminist mind
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is narrow.’”71 According to Donnelly, feminists were trying to “have the boys put
on make-up and discuss how it affects their self-perception,” and to persuade boys
“to suppress their aggressive tendencies and masculinity is referred to as a
disease.”72 HOW also argued that ERA’s proponents wanted to use schools to teach
children about a broad array of sexual preferences and that heterosexual sex was
not the only acceptable option.73
One major objection to the ERA was that it would change the traditional
configuration of government power. The provision that granted the federal courts
the right to enforce the constitutional amendment effectively shifted power from
state and local governments to the federal government.74 The ERA would also alter
power allocations within the federal government. For example, Schlafly cited a
statement made by ERA proponent, Democrat Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder,
in which she addressed federal funding for medical research in the context of the
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ERA. Schroeder asserted that women have “as much right to claim an equal portion
for diseases that women are concerned about as men do.”75 Schlafly interpreted
that “to mean that ERA would compel the United States Congress to spend 50% of
health care money on ‘women’s diseases’ (whatever that means) and 50% on
‘men’s diseases’ (whatever they are).”

76

Thus, the ERA would eliminate

Congressional discretion for medical spending.
In response to the arguments of conservative women, Republican feminists
focused on what the ERA would provide for women, rather than what it would take
away from them. Peterson called it “a simple statement of principle—a principle of
equal justice under the law—a guarantee of legal rights, free of sex bias.”77 Helen
Milliken emphasized that the ERA “will remove sex as a factor in determining the
legal rights of men and women.”78 Unlike their opponents, however, Republican
feminists also seemed to spend much of their time on the defensive, responding to
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the arguments made by HOW and STOP ERA about the ERA’s dire and unanticipated
consequences. As Peterson later noted, “In retrospect, I can see we spent too much
time trying to defend our stand from the Schlafly Eagles and other right-wing
organizations or fundamentalist churches and too little time on the attack.”79 They
allowed their conservative opponents to create the narrative, which put them at a
disadvantage.
Proponents tried to narrow the scope of the ERA by separating it from other
controversial issues, such as homosexual marriage and abortion, in order to make
it more palatable to voters and the Republican Party. Laura Callow, a Michigan
feminist who Helen Milliken called “our Susan B. Anthony” because of her more
than thirty years of activism on behalf of the ERA, was a regular pro-ERA contributor
to the WJR Radio Show “Point of View.” 80 She argued that “the Equal Rights
Amendment was concerned with discrimination on account of gender, being male
or female, not sexual preference.”81 NOW and Michigan ERAmerica emphasized
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that the ERA did not impact abortion because it applied only to rights and
obligations that applied to both men and women. Since men could not give birth
to children, they argued, the ERA was not relevant to abortion rights.82 Peterson
noted that she did not understand “how you can equate abortion with equality of
rights and privileges [unless those who converged the fights over the ERA and
abortion] found a way for men to conceive.” 83 To bolster her position on the
divisibility of the ERA and abortion, Callow noted that in 1976 the Republican Party
supported the ERA but opposed abortion. Opponents, they argued, inaccurately
conflated the two issues to radicalize the ERA and confuse the American people.84
The efforts of ERA supporters to isolate the ERA from other controversial
issues sometimes missed the mark, indicating that they did not always understand
the concerns of ERA’s opponents and undecided voters. One of Donnelly’s primary
arguments against the ERA was that it would require women to serve in the military
under the same terms and conditions as men. ERA proponents responded that
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“excluding women from the draft denies them their equal right to resist war.”85
Then, instead of separating the ERA from the draft, they affirmed the concerns of
the ERA’s opponents with their legalistic responses. In defense of the ERA, they first
emphasized that federal law already authorized the government to draft women
into combat. Perhaps realizing that this concession would neither persuade nor
reassure women, they then tried to minimize the likelihood that women would be
sent into combat by arguing that combat readiness was largely dependent upon
physical fitness and women would be asked to do only that which they could do.
Callow also tried to disassociate the ERA from combat readiness by arguing that
“war is wrong not the ERA. War arguments should not be used in peacetime to
deter women from seeking a constitutional guarantee against discrimination on
account of sex.”86 Moreover, she argued, “It is manhating to oppose the drafting of
women but not the drafting of men. Male lives are not less valuable than female
lives.”87 These logical, but nonresponsive rejoinders and fits of pacifism did little to
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reassure Americans who did not want their female relatives to be sent into battle,
or to refute the arguments of radical feminists that men and women were identical.
For the most part, ERA supporters responded to the dire predictions of ERA’s
opponents by arguing that the ERA would not significantly change the American
way of life or radically restructure American society. They likened it to “‘insurance’
to guarantee that laws applied to men and women equally without interference by
state and local governments.”88 However, it is easy to see how the opponents of
the ERA were able to take advantage of the amendment’s ambiguity or at least
emphasize its uncertainty. Even its proponents did not understand its impact on
current law. Helen Milliken, for example, suggested that laws would change as a
result of the ERA, but it was not necessarily clear how they would change. She
noted that “if a law restricts rights, it will no longer be valid; if it protects rights, it
will probably [emphasis added] be extended to men.”89 It was difficult to downplay
the impact of the proposed constitutional amendment when its leading supporters
could not even explain how it would relate to the laws already on the books.
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When Republican feminists described the benefits of the ERA, they
frequently shifted the focus and discussion away from more intangible notions
about family and, instead, addressed the economic consequences of the ERA–a
topic that was much more comfortable for moderate members of the Republican
Party. They emphasized the fact that “marriage is an economic as well as social and
emotional partnership” 90 in order to argue that the ERA protected women as
economic actors. Peterson described the ERA as follows: “There has been a lot of
rhetoric about the partnership of marriage and the importance of the role of
homemaking and the rewards of mothering but there has been precious little
action to make it an economically secure and dignified role. The ERA will raise the
legal status of the homemaker and strengthen the family unit. In an age of
instability, uncertainty and deteriorating family life, it is needed now more than
ever.”91
The ERA would, proponents argued, eliminate many of the laws that made
women, especially stay-at home mothers, economically dependent on men. For
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example, insurance companies would be required to provide health, disability, and
life insurance to women on the same terms that they were offered to men. A
woman could then purchase insurance on the life of her husband, the proceeds of
which could be used to support their children in the event of his death. Women
were typically charged more for disability or health insurance because they were
considered “‘clunkers and losers’” due to potential “problems with their
reproductive systems.” 92 This practice, in effect, constituted “discrimination on
account of motherhood,” 93 an argument that enabled Republican feminists to
usurp the oftentimes conservative position that they were protecting mothers
through the ERA.
The debate over working wives and mothers became particularly intense in
the context of discussions about social security laws. Callow emphasized that
society security benefits were based on employment, which left unemployed wives
and mothers dependent on their spouses for derivative benefits. Divorce and
premature death left homemakers who had not participated in the workplace and
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accrued benefits of their own particularly vulnerable. Callow argued that “there is
a lack of fairness in Social Security for homemakers because under the
‘breadwinner/dependents’ assumption, women are penalized for motherhood.”94
The ERA, she contended, would protect the family as an economic unit, a status
that was not adequately accounted for under the derivative benefit scheme
established by social security laws.95 Conversely, Donnelly responded, changes in
the Social Security laws to bring about gender equality would eliminate the
derivative social security benefits that wives and mothers were able to claim based
on their husbands’ working lives. Instead, women would be treated as workers in
their homes and the family would be required to pay social security on their behalf,
resulting in a tax increase that would force more women to work outside of the
home.96
Some feminists were critical of the ERA because it failed to address the
double burden faced by working women. These activists contended that the ERA
should have provided relief for women who had jobs and had to care for their
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homes and families. Such assistance could have included government provided
childcare, paid maternity leave, or other arrangements which divided childcare and
homemaking responsibilities between men and women. One woman from the
northern peninsula of Michigan explained to Milliken that she hoped that the ERA
would be ratified because working women in her community who were paid the
legal minimum wage earned eighty dollars each week, but had to pay forty dollars
for child care services. 97 Until this issue was resolved, many believed, men and
women would not be truly equal.
Because these fixes for the double burden all increased government
spending and required that the government interfere with the family, many
Republican feminists were comfortable with this omission. The ERA was less
controversial because it did not significantly alter the lives of working women.
When she testified before the Michigan legislature in support of ratification of the
ERA, Ranny Riecker, the Republican National Committeewoman from Michigan,
argued that Republicans could support the ERA precisely because it benefitted
families by leaving the double burden intact. Facing the challenges associated with
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employment and homemaking, women would not choose to work outside of the
home. She said that “it [the ERA] will not affect the social relationships between
men and women. It will not mean that women will automatically desert their
homes and families for the ‘fun and excitement’ of the job market, but rather will
confirm that they are legally equal. The status of traditional women’s occupations
will be enhanced and the role of women’s occupations will be broadened.” 98
McNamee also disagreed with the notion that families should be restructured so
that men could assume some of the double burden. Women, she believed, should
care for the home. Men had the responsibility to be good fathers, but not good
homemakers.99
Republican feminists emphasized that the ERA would create gender equality
by incrementally changing the law. As a result, they could assert that it did not
change the roles of men and women in society or undermine the sanctity of the
traditional family. Peterson made it clear that the ERA had no impact on “the
personal relationships between man and wife–whether he supports her or not,
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whether she works or not is a personal relation–and will not be covered in the
ERA.”100 McNamee asserted that the “ERA will not alter family life. Women are the
heart of the family and the family is the cornerstone of America. If you help
American women, [you] strengthen the family and [the] total social fabric of this
nation.” 101 By emphasizing the ways in which the ERA’s economic changes
benefited the family, Republican feminists mediated between radical feminists
who wanted the government to address the structural inequities that resulted in
the double burden faced by working class women, and Republican conservatives
who argued that the ERA would destroy families. From the sensible center,
Michigan’s Republican feminists could argue that the ERA did not systemically
change American society. It did, however, provide economic support and
protections to families and mothers in ways that did not undermine the familial
structure. Moreover, stripped of any connection to abortion and homosexual rights,
it became less of a moral threat to the family.
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Michigan’s Republican feminists believed that moderate Republicans would
be more likely to support the ERA if they could connect it to longstanding party
ideology. Thus, they framed the ERA as the latest attempt of Republicans to seek
equality for all Americans, consistent with the party’s long-term commitment to
“individual freedoms and human rights for the common man and woman.”102 The
ERA was merely an extension of or follow up to the emancipation of the slaves and
the fight for women’s suffrage. This historical tie legitimized the connections
between the Republican Party, as the party of equal rights, and feminism, as the
social movement established to promote equality for women. In fact, in 1976,
Jeanne Holm, the first woman to become an Air Force general, and an advisor to
President Ford on women’s issues, asserted that “it is imperative, I feel, that a
Republican President deal with this phenomenon [the women’s movement]
because the major gains women have made throughout our history have been
made under Republican leadership.” 103 The Republican Party, as the party that
freed the slaves, was the natural party to lead the fight for the ERA.
102
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In order to legitimize themselves as the representatives for women in the
Republican Party, Republican feminists appropriated the sensible center of the
women’s movement. In this middle ground they distinguished themselves from
both radical feminists and anti-feminist conservative Republicans. Ideologically, it
was comfortable place for them to reside. Substantively, most Republican feminists
did not agree with the radicalism of liberation feminists. In an April 1974 speech in
Lansing, Michigan, on behalf of a Democratic candidate for the state Senate,
feminist Steinem indicated that she would support any woman for office,
regardless of party affiliation, because “‘there is no such thing as a larger struggle
than women.’”104 During that same speech, she argued “‘overthrowing capitalism
is too small for us. We want to overthrow the whole fucking patriarchy!’” 105
Expressing her disapproval in a marginal notation to Steinem’s quote, Milliken
wrote, “what a shame.”106
At the same time, they realized that if they associated with feminist
extremists, they would not have the legitimacy to promote the ERA within a
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moderate Republican Party. For example, in 1976 the Detroit Coalition to Defend
ERA asked Callow for her support. She quickly realized, however, that the
organization was an affiliate of the Young Socialist Workers Party, not a coalition of
Wayne State University student groups who supported the ERA, as she was led to
believe. She refused to affiliate with the group because she believed that it
intended to connect the ERA to abortion and lesbian rights, and otherwise
appropriate the ERA for its own purposes. She also worried that such associations
might undermine her personal legitimacy and credibility as a spokeswoman for the
ERA, and her reputation with respectable organizations like the League of Women
Voters.107
From this middle ground, Michigan’s Republican feminists also actively
disengaged from the conservative women in their party. On the positive side, they
hoped to maximize the effectiveness of their own message by identifying one
unimpeachable public representative to articulate their positions with both the
Michigan legislature and the Republican Party. They decided that Helen Milliken
was the perfect women “to serve as the spokesperson for Republican women in
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Michigan.”108 Because she was more well known and respected than Donnelly, she
was best positioned to fight efforts to rescind the ratification of the ERA in Michigan
and to negate the influence of Donnelly and other conservative women within the
Republican Party.109 It is not apparent how these women felt when Milliken was
subsequently named co-chairperson of the nonpartisan ERAmerica, where she
assumed responsibility for a nationally focused effort to ratify the ERA. In
retrospect, however, not even Milliken could have healed the intensifying rifts
within the Michigan Republican Party over the women’s movement.
At the same time, Michigan’s Republican feminists went on the offensive to
delegitimize their conservative opponents and attack their motives. They argued
that “Elaine Donnelly does not speak for us, that she does not represent us, and
that she is, in fact, a minority of a minority, who, while welcome to their opinions,
should not influence decisions in the Michigan Legislature.”
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Michigan’s

Republican feminists characterized Donnelly and Barbour as bad Republicans.
Because they worked with both Republican and Democratic members of the
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Michigan legislature to rescind the ERA, Republican feminists argued that they put
“their own special concerns--whatever they may be,” above those of the party,
“caus[ing] strife, confusion, and divisiveness.”111 Republican feminists, on the other
hand, argued that they put their partisanship above their feminism and were loyal
to the Republican Party.112
ERA advocates refused to engage with their opponents, hoping to send the
message that their positions were not even worthy of consideration. As a result,
NOW and Michigan ERAmerica did not participate in ERA debates. The League of
Women Voters noted that “all too often debates degenerate into ‘sideshows’ for
proponents and opponents, with the press picking up the most sensational aspects
of the debate with headlines like ‘ERA--Integrated bathrooms and homosexual
marriages?’ regardless of the truth.”113 Thus, supporters argued, opponents used
debates to set forth their unsubstantiated emotional objections to the amendment,
which only diverted attention from the real issues and “create[d] doubt. We must
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overcome any remaining doubt--let’s not help them create it.”114 In one instance,
Michigan ERAmerica refused to participate in a proposed debate over the ERA
sponsored by the Women’s Studies Department at the University of Michigan.
Callow argued that it made no sense to argue about whether the ERA was necessary.
“The very existence of a Women and the Law class indicates women are treated
differently under the law.”

115

A debate legitimized alternatives to gender

equality.116
Not only did proponents dismiss the need to debate the ERA, they also
delegitimized their opponents by questioning their credentials to participate in
such debates. While the Women’s Studies Department suggested that Donnelly
represent the opposition to the ERA, Callow argued that her prior debates with
Donnelly “were ‘media events’ that were neither legal nor scholarly.” 117 She
characterized Donnelly as an entertainer, not someone with real knowledge about
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the ERA. 118 The Director of the Women’s Studies Program at the University of
Michigan responded that the decision to present information about the ERA in a
debate format which included arguments against the ERA was “a matter of
pedagogic discretion,” and that the university’s professors have the ability to sift
through and prepare their students for information which might be inaccurate or
inappropriate.119 Thus, they did not agree with Callow that arguments against the
ERA should be dismissed. Since Donnelly was unavailable on the suggested date,
the university instead brought in a lawyer to speak about the ERA, including
arguments on both sides of the ratification question.120
When Peterson, at the request of Michigan ERAmerica, withdrew from a
scheduled debate with Schlafly, Schlafly argued that ERA’s proponents were scared
to debate the issues surrounding the ERA.121 While this might have been a popular
position for Schlafly to take to generate support from her base constituents, it was
not truthful. ERA supporters in Michigan realized they had nothing to gain from
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debates because ERA ratification was a fait accompli in the Michigan.122 Michigan
ERAmerica’s motives were not based on fear, but were strategic and consistent
with the belief of ERA proponents that there were no legitimate issues that needed
to be discussed relative to the amendment. This strategy, however, did not help
their cause. The refusal of ERA’s proponents to acknowledge or address the
arguments of their opponents meant that the two sides failed to engage, which
offered no reassurance to those who heard, but did not know how to process, the
allegedly outlandish allegations of the opponents of the ERA.
By the second half of the 1970s, Michigan’s Republican feminists added
personal attacks to their substantive arguments about the ERA. Peterson never
made a secret of her contempt for conservatives. She wrote that “it is a strange
new life for me--I never fought the Democrats hating them--nor did I feel they
hated me. Now I find myself with the right wingers filled with vicious propaganda
which I can’t simply say ‘HOW can people believe that?’”123 Republican feminists
invoked gender, class and race to attack the character, motives and message of
their opponents who, they argued, were the hapless, powerless pawns of rich,
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white men with a broadly nefarious political agenda. They contended that the
movement against the ERA was a part of a larger conspiracy led by anti-progressive,
radical right-wing hypocrites who invoked nationalism and religion to justify their
attempts to impose their ideological agenda on the country. 124 In an atypically
alarmist assertion, Peterson identified them as “bigger, more terrifying, more
destructive than a small band of Southern bigots or a handful of vindictive women
using their powers against their own sex.” They were “wealthy white ‘superpatriots and super-Christians,” who sought “to give the New Right control of the
U.S.” 125 They relied on religion to justify their opposition to the ERA but, according
to Peterson, their piety was false. They merely invoked religion to raise money, and
then used the money for political power, not to further their religious beliefs.126
To accomplish their goals, Republican feminists argued, the New Right
opposed anyone who did not look, think, or act like them. Peterson believed that
they dismissed the concerns of “welfare mothers, . . . the poor, the blacks, foreign-
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borns, Jews, women.”127 According to Helen Milliken, “the New Right appears to
wrap itself in a mantle of self-righteous infallibility . . . to pursue . . . [its] politics of
intimidation” against minorities, women, and the poor.128 Callow wrote that she
“found opponents of ERA to be a curious lot; the Communist Party, Ku Klux Klan,
John Birch Society, some anti-feminist groups with names like HOTDOG, HOW and
Stop-ERA.”129 Republican feminists agreed that conservative women provided the
cover for a group of powerful, wealthy, white men who worked through a network
of organizations and fundamentalist churches to promote an intolerant, broadbased agenda that was intended to change the country.130
Michigan’s Republican feminists adopted the sensible center of the women’s
movement with respect to the ERA. They disagreed with radical feminists who
hoped that the ERA would help to eliminate patriarchy and create gender equality
through a restructured society. At the same time, they opposed conservative
women who believed that the ERA would destroy the traditional family, expand the
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federal government, and interfere with their goal of unfettered capitalism. From
this middle ground, they contended that the ERA helped women by creating
economic equality, which protected and promoted families because these women
were often also wives and mothers. They argued that the ERA was not as radical as
the more extreme feminists wanted or conservative Republicans feared. However,
anti-ERA conservative women were mostly Republicans, which made the battle
over the ERA a part of the larger, ongoing struggle for control of the Republican
Party. Michigan’s Republican feminists offered their party’s moderate leadership a
compromised interpretation of the ERA. As Republicans and representatives of the
“sensible center” of the women’s movement, they linked their gendered and their
partisan interests, which enabled them to argue on behalf of the ERA, and to
reconcile, at least temporarily, these two, potentially conflicting, identities.
However, as the following chapters indicate, this middle road was slowly narrowing.
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CHAPTER FIVE REPUBLICAN FEMINISTS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: 1970 TO
1980
The right to control one’s own body is a basic human and democratic right.
–Flier, “Abortion-A Woman’s Right to Choose”

Abortion was made illegal in Michigan in 1848, except to protect the life of
the mother. Starting in the late 1960s, pro-choice activists, including Republican
feminists, NOW, and the MWPC, unsuccessfully tried to convince the Michigan
legislature to liberalize the state’s abortion laws. It was only in 1973, with the
United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, that Michigan’s longstanding
prohibition against abortion was finally invalidated.1 Roe made it unconstitutional
for a state to interfere with a woman’s right to privacy, including her right to have
an abortion, although the court concluded that a state could place limitations on
access to abortion after the first trimester.2
Despite the Supreme Court decision, abortion remained a highly contested
political issue in Michigan as activists continued to fight over meaningful access to
legal abortions and birth control, especially for poor women and minors.
Proponents and opponents of reproductive rights in Michigan did not divide neatly
along partisan lines. During much of the 1970s, the Democratic Party, with its large
1
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Catholic constituency, was often the most outspoken opponent of liberalized
abortion rights. Although opposition to abortion steadily increased in the national
Republican Party throughout the 1970s, Governor Milliken remained a staunch
supporter not only of abortion, but also government funding for abortions for poor
women. Thus, in Michigan he temporarily slowed the partisan realignment that was
occurring elsewhere in the country. Milliken’s position became an issue during the
the 1978 Michigan gubernatorial election between him and William Fitzgerald, a
Catholic, pro-life Democrat who opposed abortion. Although Milliken won the
election, the fight over taxpayer funded abortions continued.
Republican feminists actively participated in the politicization of abortion in
Michigan. Two of them led the state’s pro-choice movement and fought to protect
the right to legal, safe, and affordable abortions for all women. Their activism
developed in two stages and on multiple fronts. Until Roe, they used the legislature,
the judiciary, and the voters to try to legalize abortion in Michigan. Once the Roe
Court recognized that women had the right to terminate their pregnancies, prochoice Republican feminists shifted their attention to the legislature, and directed
their efforts at blocking encroachments on abortion rights and making abortion
accessible to all women, regardless of their ability to pay.

175

By the end of the 1970s, pro-choice Republican feminists, with the support
of Governor Milliken, had managed to protect a woman’s right to abortion in
Michigan. Contrary to most states, Michigan even paid for abortions for women
who could not otherwise afford them. However, they faced growing opposition to
their pro-choice position from women within their own party when, in 1976, the
Republican Party officially dropped support for abortion rights from its national
party platform. Surprisingly, Michigan’s Republican feminists also faced opposition
from one of their own. In 1974, Binsfeld, who was a pro-life Republican feminist,
was elected to the Michigan legislature. As pressures mounted on them from all
sides, it became more difficult, but not yet impossible, for them to sustain their
pro-choice position within the Michigan Republican Party. Moreover, while
Binsfeld opposed them on abortion, she also provided the possibility for
compromise on some of the less controversial reproductive issues that faced the
state.
Members of the Michigan legislature unsuccessfully tried to amend the
state’s virtually blanket prohibition of abortion from 1967 until 1972. (The only
exception was to save the life of the mother.) While Michigan voters did not
consistently divide along partisan lines on the question of abortion, opposition to
abortion reform in these early years was more likely to come from the Democratic
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Party, due primarily to its large constituency of union members, who were mostly
Catholic immigrants.3 Not surprisingly, then, in 1970 the Michigan Republican Party
endorsed the notion of abortion reform.4 That same year, Governor Milliken, citing
legislative upheaval and the fact that women who wanted abortions obtained them
illegally, stated, “I believe that women, under appropriate conditions, should be
permitted to make an individual judgment, [concerning abortion] and that the
result of this judgment should be respected and protected by law.”5 He argued that
because the people of Michigan could not agree on the abortion issue, and neither
side was necessarily incorrect, abortion laws needed to be reformed to make the
procedure available to all women, which would then permit each woman to
determine whether to have an abortion based on her individual value system and
religious beliefs.6
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At the same time, he established specific parameters for an abortion reform
law that would be acceptable to him. He endorsed a three-month, first trimester
limitation on abortion, along with a requirement that the procedure take place in
a licensed medical facility. He believed that a pregnant woman had the sole right
to decide whether to have an abortion in consultation with her doctor and, if the
pregnant girl was an unmarried minor, with the consent of her parents. He also
required a conscience clause in any legislation to protect medical personnel from
being required to participate in an objectionable abortion medical procedure.
Previewing the abortion debate that he engaged in for much of his tenure as
governor, he argued that safe abortions should be made available to poor women
who could not otherwise afford the procedure. Finally, Governor Milliken
reiterated that he “believe[d] very deeply in the strength of the family as the basic
unit of our society.”7 He concluded that a family was most likely to remain intact if,
when faced with an unwanted pregnancy, a woman was given the option to have
an abortion.8
Supported by the governor and the endorsement of the Michigan Republican
Party, Michigan’s Republican feminists worked for abortion reform, initially
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through legislative changes and, when they realized the futility of their efforts,
through other means. As a member of the Michigan Senate in 1969 and 1970,
Beebe led the effort to decriminalize abortion. She hoped to redefine it as a legal
medical procedure to be performed in a licensed facility based on a decision made
between a woman and her doctor. 9 Beebe exemplified the feminist strategy of
making the personal political when she came to the Senate floor during the 1968
debates over the abortion bill and admitted to her colleagues that she had had a
therapeutic abortion. She had been advised that it was virtually impossible for her
to have children, but after numerous medical procedures and miscarriages, she
ultimately had a son and a daughter. During the fourth month of one of her
unsuccessful pregnancies, however, doctors discovered that the fetus was dead
and had to be medically removed.
Her admission was heralded as heroic by many of her male colleagues, but
she was disappointed by the demeaning comments made by others on the
legislative floor. These men could not understand the positions of the women on
whose behalf they were making vital decisions. Thus, she felt compelled to tell her
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story. In that chamber, she alone was able to convey the female perspective from
someone who had agonized over the termination of a pregnancy. 10 From the
Senate floor she asked her fellow senators whether they could “say ‘I am pregnant:
I am happy’ or ‘I am desperate?’” and then reminded them, “No, you can’t begin to
imagine the feeling that a woman has.”11 She found that many of these men were
also judgmental, suggesting that women who sought abortions were immoral both
for both engaging in the sexual act through which the fetus was conceived and
killing an unborn child.12
Beebe’s heartfelt testimony did not convince a majority of senators to vote
to liberalize Michigan’s restrictive abortion laws in 1969, 1970, or 1971, when bills
to reform such laws were all defeated. While most state legislators indicated that
they supported abortion reform, they could not agree among themselves in either
legislative branch or between the House and the Senate on the nature and scope
of that reform. 13 According to Beebe, abortion reform was undermined by the
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organized efforts of the Catholic Church.14 In fact, Beebe lost her reelection bid in
1970 to her Catholic, Democratic opponent, David Plawecki, who made abortion a
primary issue in the campaign. One of his campaign brochures, featuring three
pictures of cherubic babies, emphasized the ambiguity over when life begins, and
suggested that legalized abortion might constitute murder.15 Despite her electoral
defeat, Beebe continued her efforts to legalize abortion after she left the Michigan
legislature.
Republican feminist Kefauver joined Beebe in her 1970 reelection campaign
for state senator and in her ongoing fight to legalize abortion in Michigan. A
committed political activist, Kefauver was a legislative expert who lobbied on
behalf of a number of organizations, including WEAL and NOW, in support of
women’s issues, particularly abortion rights for women. 16 Like Beebe, she was
angered by the fact that a mostly male legislature made laws on behalf of women.
She argued “‘that collectively they [the male legislature] hate you as a woman
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because they are insecure as men.’ . . . ‘If you are black, they can deal with you and
go home to a segregated neighborhood. But most of these white, male legislators
go home to a woman--a wife, daughter or whatever. And they’ll be damned if
they’ll give up any power to a woman.’” 17 Like other Republican feminists, she
recognized that the largely male legislature did not understand women, and
actually prevented them from trying to promote their interests. In such a restrictive
environment, women had to empower themselves through the strategic use of
their voting power.18
By 1971 Beebe and Kefauver recognized that although members of the
Michigan legislature continued to try to liberalize abortion laws, they were not
likely to succeed. Thus, they identified different strategies to accomplish their goal
of repealing or reforming Michigan’s prohibition on abortion–a judicial challenge
and a grassroots voter referendum. In 1971 Kefauver and Beebe were a part of the
Michigan Women’s Abortion Suit, an organized class action lawsuit in which over
one thousand plaintiffs argued that Michigan’s law criminalizing abortion was
unconstitutional. Beebe was the named plaintiff in the lawsuit filed in Wayne
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County Circuit Court on August 31, 1971. Plaintiffs claimed to speak on behalf of all
of the women in Michigan who believed that a woman who wanted an abortion
should not be forced to chose between an out-of-state legal abortion, an illegal
abortion in Michigan, or a self-induced abortion. The goal of the lawsuit was to
convince the judge to recognize a constitutional right to abortion, which would
effectively repeal all of Michigan’s laws that prohibited abortion.19
However, the lawsuit’s plaintiffs were much like the women who joined
together to form political caucuses. Although they all agreed that abortion should
be made legal, their personal and ideological diversity led to significant
disagreements. By 1972 politics divided the plaintiffs. Leaders of the lawsuit were
members of the Detroit Abortion Action Coalition, a local subsidiary of the
Women’s National Abortion Action Coalition. 20 Some plaintiffs, including Beebe,
19
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objected to the involvement of this organization because it was created by the
Socialist Workers Party. They were concerned that the organization’s socialist ties
might undermine the lawsuit’s singular focus on repealing Michigan’s abortion laws
by introducing politics into the conflict. 21
In addition to the lawsuit, another group of abortion activists, led by the
Michigan Abortion Referendum Committee (MARC), (initially the Michigan
Coordinating Committee for Abortion Law Reform), obtained over three hundred
thousand signatures to place on the November 1972 statewide ballot a referendum
proposing a statute that, if approved by the voters, would become law without
being adopted by the legislature.22 The referendum provided that “all other laws to
the contrary notwithstanding, a licensed medical or osteopathic physician may
perform an abortion at the request of a patient if the period of gestation has not
exceeded 20 weeks. The procedure shall be performed in a licensed hospital or
other facility approved by the Department of Public Health.” 23 Referendum
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supporters hoped that the citizens of Michigan would be willing to take a position
that the legislature refused to adopt. While both Beebe and Kefauver supported
the ballot referendum, relations between the two groups, one supporting repeal
and the other backing reform, were not necessarily harmonious. For example,
proponents of the ballot referendum criticized participants in the lawsuit for failing
to support the referendum effort.24
The public seemed to support the referendum and preelection polling
indicated that it would easily pass. Noting that the Michigan legislature was unlikely
to meaningfully address abortion reform, and that the Michigan Republican Party
supported such reform, the Michigan Republican State Central Committee, the
governing body of the state party, unanimously endorsed this referendum.
Moreover, the Michigan Republican Party directed its representatives to promote
a platform plank at the 1972 national convention advocating the legalization of
abortion during the first twenty weeks of pregnancy. Helen Milliken publicly
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supported the referendum, but the governor, despite his support for liberalized
abortion laws, refused to specifically endorse the ballot proposal.25
On October 5, 1972, the Wayne County Circuit Court issued a ruling
invalidating Michigan’s laws criminalizing abortion. Judge Charles Kaufman
concluded that the law “violated a woman’s right to privacy and ‘control over her
own body.’” 26 He added that at whatever stage of her pregnancy, a woman’s
abortion decision was to be made solely by her and her doctor. The order
prohibited both the Wayne County Prosecutor and the Michigan Attorney General
from enforcing the state’s abortion laws. 27 The decision was stayed, however,
pending appeal, and on October 20, 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to
bypass the Court of Appeals and hear the case.28 Once they received this favorable
ruling, Kefauver encouraged plaintiffs to support the referendum because it filled
25
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the void in state abortion laws with a law that governed licensing of abortion
facilities, thus preventing abuse by prohibiting unsavory abortionists from
practicing in Michigan.29
One month after Judge Kaufman’s decision, despite polling results to the
contrary, the abortion ballot initiative was overwhelmingly defeated, “because
[according to one scholar] anti-abortionists were more organized, used more
sophisticated advertising, and ably articulated the moral issue.”30 He argued that
voters’ early support for abortion reform in Michigan was based on a theoretic,
sanitized notion of abortion. When the procedure was humanized through graphic
pictures of twenty-week aborted fetuses, support evaporated.
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characterization of access to abortion as an equal rights issue was more appealing
to a judge than to Michigan’s voters who were persuaded by the anti-abortion
movement that liberalized abortion rights destroyed human life.
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Before the appeal of Judge Kaufman’s decision could be considered, the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Roe and the Michigan Supreme
Court shifted its consideration to a review of the circuit court ruling in light of the
United States Supreme Court decision. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded
that Judge Kaufman correctly invalidated Michigan’s abortion prohibition, but
under Roe, decriminalization was limited to the first trimester of pregnancy.
Thereafter, once the fetus became viable, the issue of whether abortion was a
crime depended on the facts of the case.32
Beebe, Kefauver, Burnett, and Helen Milliken all believed that “the right to
control one’s own body is a basic human and democratic right,” and that true
equality would be achieved only when women had the ability to control their own
reproductive lives. 33 They tried to debunk the notion that most women sought
32
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abortions because they were raped or abused by family members, or feared that
they would give birth to a child with birth defects. Instead, abortion proponents
concluded that “the overwhelming number of women seek abortions because they
do not want to give birth to an unwelcome or unexpected child.”34 As the primary
caregivers of children, women, they believed, should be empowered to decide
whether they wanted to take on that responsibility. “We want to determine the
number of children we have on the basis of our ability to care for them.”35 Abortion
restrictions “have the effect of legally sanctioning compulsory pregnancy”36 and
made pregnant women helpless victims.37
Beebe distinguished between the right to have an abortion and the decision
about whether to have an abortion. The government was properly involved in
granting the right to have an abortion because it was a political issue involving the
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health and welfare of women and children. On the other hand, she argued, the
questions of when life begins and whether to have an abortion were both moral or
religious decisions best left to the discretion of the individuals who faced unwanted
pregnancies. By prohibiting abortion, the government deprived women of the right
to make this personal decision and imposed the religious or moral beliefs of some
of its citizens on others.38 The law, she argued, needed to grant all women access
to abortion and to provide them with the information necessary to make this
important decision. Proponents of abortion law reform argued that they were not
pro-abortion, but rather pro-choice. The law would not force anyone to have an
abortion.39
Activists like Beebe who favored abortion reform found that they had to
avoid the thorny issue of when life begins because, at that point, the protections
afforded to a pregnant woman had to be balanced against those of the unborn child.
Beebe dealt with this problem by declaring it a personal decision that was irrelevant
to the public debate. Perhaps trying to head off the problems that they would face
if forced to answer the question of when life began, they also argued that if
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abortions were legal, pregnant women would seek abortions earlier in the
pregnancy, and justified the twenty-week window because it allowed for testing
that would reveal birth defects. Late-term abortions were not the norm, nor the
desired outcome. Even doctors who supported abortion reform were opposed to
these types of abortions, abortion proponents claimed.40
Beebe and Kefauver stressed the dangers of illegal abortion, and argued that
if Michigan did not liberalize its abortion laws, those who could afford to do so
would travel to New York, where abortion was legal. Young and/or poor women
would seek dangerous illegal abortions in Michigan. Legalizing abortion in Michigan
would save these women from the risks associated with botched abortions
performed under less than sterile conditions by unqualified abortion providers.
One doctor suggested that “‘a girl would be safer to walk blindfolded across the
Ford Freeway than to have an abortion with contaminated, unsterilized
instruments.’” 41 This pipeline of illegal abortions could only be stopped, they
argued, by legalizing abortion in the state.
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Republican feminists also asserted that abortion protected unborn children
from the neglect, abuse, and poverty that they would experience if born into a
situation where they were not wanted, and saved the government from the
economic and intangible costs associated with caring for them. They cited one
study that concluded that children who were not wanted were “more likely than
others born at the same time to suffer from insecurity and instability in childhood.
The incidence of learning problems, psychiatric disorders, delinquency and crime
was about twice as high; and they were six times more likely to need public
assistance between the ages of 16 and 21.”42 These children struggled, and then
they became unproductive adults who burdened society. Moreover, they
replicated this pattern with their own children. 43 Every child should be wanted,
Beebe believed.44 She lamented, “It’s not the cries of the unborn I hear, but the
cries of the unborn unwanted.”45
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Michigan’s Republican feminists were surprised to find that they faced
opposition on abortion reform from an unlikely source, a feminist from their own
party. In 1974, Binsfeld began the first of four terms in the Michigan House of
Representatives. She identified herself as a feminist, but “not an extreme
feminist.”

46

The ERA had to be ratified, Binsfeld believed, because as a

constitutional amendment it would prevent a popularly elected legislature from
expunging laws that provided or protected equal rights for women.47
While Binsfeld identified as a feminist and supported the ERA, some of her
ideas were more consistent with her conservative colleagues in the Republican
Party. For example, she was committed to the primacy of the traditional family as
the basic unit of American society, and worried that government interference
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undermined the fundamental relationship between parents and their children. She
believed that parents were obligated to protect and preserve their families by
instilling in their children “the old fashioned principles and values of honesty, loving,
caring, sharing, hard work, trust and service.”48 In addition to the family, however,
parents needed to reinvigorate “the neighborhoods, the neighborhood schools,
small businesses, the P.T.A., church parishes and volunteer associations of every
sort . . . [because these organizations] “nourished strong individuals and protected
them from the state.” 49 According to Binsfeld, certain government policies
threatened the family. For example, welfare programs, which were intended to
assist families in times of economic need, made Americans dependent on the
government and perpetuated this dependence across generational lines. The
traditional American way of life, she insisted, had to be preserved because “society
will crumble if we fail.”50
Women played a critical role as mothers, but Binsfeld believed that they
could also make important contributions to society in other ways. Calling herself “a
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recycled human resource,” she argued that women needed to regularly reinvent
themselves as their familial responsibilities and priorities changed.51 She noted, “I
believe that people of talent and ability can be recycled just as effectively as pop
bottles or metals, by going into something else once they have achieved a certain
goal in other fields.”52 Once their children were grown, Binsfeld argued, women
needed to become involved in new projects outside of the home where they could
use their experiences to promote the family.53 They had a responsibility to use their
talents and skills to help others.
Binsfeld chose to recycle herself through government service. As one of the
few women in the Michigan House or Senate, Binsfeld, like Beebe, “felt a special
interest and obligation to promote the concerns of children and of women.”54 As a
legislator, she noted that “what more important province could a mother be
involved in than those vital government decisions that shape the very destiny of
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our children and our children’s children?”55 She felt that a part of her charge was
to empower women by convincing them that they had the responsibility, as well as
the unique ability, to rectify society’s problems. She called on women to assume
their responsibilities by becoming political. This involved study and reflection to
determine the best candidates for public office because “those you elect to political
office do effect your families by their daily decision making. Elect those who have
a sense of moral values in their personalities that can be applied to public life. Don’t
get hung up on one issue candidates. The family perspective is the most
encompassing cause.”56 She emphasized that “we must believe that by improving
the family, we can improve the world.” 57 Her belief in the overwhelming
importance of the family, her sense of mission in preserving it, and her almost
apocalyptic belief that society would otherwise collapse, were very representative
of one of the basic tenets of the pro-family faction of the conservative movement.
Binsfeld also differed from her fellow Republican feminists in her strident
opposition to abortion. A practicing Catholic, Binsfeld never waivered from her
conviction that life began at conception. She was adamant that “the worth of a life
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cannot be measured by its mother’s desire for it. The child has its right to life.”58 In
her opinion, regardless of its gestational development, an unborn child’s right to
life took precedence over a pregnant woman’s right to decide whether to give birth
to that child. Binsfeld believed that abortion was wrong and should only be
available to women whose lives were threatened by carrying or delivering their
babies.59 Binsfeld did not agree with her fellow Republican feminists that women
would have full equality only if they had full control of their bodies under all
circumstances, including pregnancy. Equating abortion to gender equality was, she
asserted, a rhetorical tool used to market legalized abortion and to protect the
profits of those involved in the abortion industry, under the guise of support for
the freedom of and concern for others. Abortion rights never made women equal
to men.60
Binsfeld worried about the virtue of a society that condoned abortion. She
asked whether “our resentment of the financial and emotional burden these
children can create [had] reached the point where we would rather kill a child than
58
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take any responsibility for it? Who are we that we feel qualified to make such a
decision?”61 Any society that endorsed abortion rights for women suffered from a
fundamental and ultimately disabling defect because “Abortion is much more than
a question of a woman’s right to control her own reproductive capacity. It is a
question of the value our society places on human life, and it is one of the worst
symptoms of this diminishing value.”62
Lieutenant Governor James Brickley, who disagreed with Governor Milliken,
but agreed with Binsfeld, about abortion, argued that society had a responsibility
to the women considering abortion and the children that they wanted to abort. “I
think this state should maintain a policy which advocates that every child is wanted
and that each new life presents a challenge for us to assure that each person is
properly cared for.”63 He placed the onus on the government to alleviate those
challenges which made it difficult to bear and raise children and, more broadly, to
imbue its citizens with respect for the importance of human life.64 Brickley’s views
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were echoed by the Catholic Church, which argued that “‘the abortion issue isn’t a
Catholic issue–it’s a human and social issue which the Church is involved in as part
of a wider view that all life should be cared for and protected.’”65 Abortion was not
an economic question or an issue of equality, but a reflection of society’s respect
for humanity.
As many scholars have concluded, the fundamental differences between
pro-choice and pro-life activists could never be settled through compromise. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe was the first step in resolving the matter, but it
also created new issues. Michigan’s pro-choice Republican feminists recognized
that the Roe Court did not establish an absolute right to an abortion. Therefore,
they tried to stop any attempts by the Michigan legislature, encouraged by
conservative activists, to limit access to what they characterized as a legal medical
procedure. Abortion remained an ongoing political issue in Michigan even after Roe.
Kefauver, for example, engaged in nonpartisan lobbying and educational
efforts to persuade voters not to vote for the mostly white male legislators who
opposed women’s rights. To further her goal, she was willing to publicly humiliate
Michigan House and Senate members who did not support feminist causes. In 1975,
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she founded the “Feminist Bureau of Investigation,” an organization that
categorized Michigan’s legislators based on their legislative records on abortion
and other issues that impacted women. Her findings were publicized on posters
that included a “feminist honor role” to identify legislators who promoted women’s
rights and a “Warning–These Men Hate Women” advertisement that made it clear
that women should not vote for legislators on the list. 66 One particular poster,
which looked like an old fashioned wanted poster for criminals, publicized a “KeepEm-Barefoot-&-Pregnant” Award for a Democratic legislator from Detroit,
Thaddeus Stopczynski. In these posters, Stopczynski’s head was perched on a very
pregnant body. He was singled out for trying to ban fetal research and to
legislatively limit a woman’s access to abortion in Michigan.67
The efforts of Michigan’s Republican feminists to protect a woman’s right to
have an abortion became more difficult when they began to face opposition from
within their party. At the 1976 Republican national convention, pressured by its
growing conservative wing, Republican leaders changed the party platform to
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declare that “the Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on
abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional
amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children.”68 The
national party undercut the argument of pro-choice Republicans that the
determination of when life began was a personal choice that was not relevant to
the legality of abortion when it endorsed a new human life amendment to the
constitution that recognized that life begins at conception. The NRWTF, which led
the efforts of Republican feminists to protect feminist interests in the Republican
Party platform, made a strategic decision to forego the abortion fight in order to
maintain support for ratification of the ERA.69
This platform position placed many Republican feminists in an untenable
position. They wanted to remain Republicans, but felt betrayed by a party that did
not support their interests as women. Unlike the more ambiguous ERA, which
provided Republican feminists with the space to moderate some of the more
extreme interpretations offered by their conservative opponents, pro-choice
Republican feminists were not able to reconcile the feminist and party positions on
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abortion. They could not change what it meant to have an abortion and could not
convince themselves that the human rights amendment supported by the more
conservative members of their party was in any way consistent with their feminist
goal of equality through control over their reproductive decisions.
After their victory in Roe, pro-choice Republican feminists turned their
attention to the next phase in their fight for abortion rights. Their opponents tried
to limit access to abortion by denying poor women government funding for the
procedure. In 1977, Congress adopted the Hyde Amendment, which provided that
federal funds could not be used to pay for abortions except in cases of rape, incest,
or to save the life of the mother.70 The Michigan legislature considered a similar
law to prohibit the state from using its funds to pay for abortions for indigent
women, but the legislators did not have much of a political appetite for the issue.
One Democrat member of the Michigan House noted, “‘I hate to vote on it. . . . We
try to help the poor whenever we can, and to have to continue this distinction
(between rich and poor) makes it tough. . . . If I have to vote, I will vote for (the
cutoff). There’s only one question: When does life begin? I think it begins at the
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point of conception. So after you say that, there isn’t much else to say.’” 71 No
matter how they voted, they were certain to offend some constituency.
Governor Milliken was able to take advantage of the ambivalence of the
state legislature on this question to preserve equal access to abortion for all of the
women in Michigan. When the federal government notified Michigan that it would
no longer reimburse the state for the cost of abortions for poor women on
Medicaid (except for certain enumerated exclusions), the governor picked up the
shortfall with state funds. In doing so, he emphasized, “I cannot support a policy,
the result of which is to discriminate against the poor by establishing a separate
standard of medical care.” 72 Thus, in the aftermath of the Hyde Amendment,
Michigan remained one of the few states to continue to fund abortions for indigent
women.
However, the question of government funding for abortions for poor women
reemerged in 1978. Not coincidentally, Democratic state Senator William Fitzgerald,
who opposed abortion, was running against Milliken in the 1978 gubernatorial
71
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election. Thus, when the Michigan legislature, both houses of which were
controlled by the Democrats, adopted a budget for the state’s Department of Social
Services, it allocated a total Medicaid reimbursement of only one dollar for all
nontherapeutic abortions. In contrast, Michigan had paid $2.5 million for Medicaid
abortions during the prior year, and the overall budget for the Department of Social
Services was $2.4 billion. Legislators who opposed Medicaid funding for abortion
believed that they had leverage because they tied the abortion limitation to
Medicaid funding in general. To veto the line item on abortion, Milliken would have
had to veto the entire Medicaid budget, leaving Michigan’s poor without access to
medical care. Support for and opposition to this legislation was bipartisan.73
The arguments to continue Medicaid funding for abortion tended to focus
on economics and class. Those who favored it were supported by a state analyst
who concluded that approximately twelve thousand abortions for poor women
cost Medicaid an estimated $2.5 million each year, whereas the cost of welfare for
mothers who gave birth to those unwanted children would reach approximately
$6.23 million. 74 They removed all humanity from the argument and instead
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reduced abortion to a simple cost-benefit analysis. They also invoked a class
struggle, pitting rich against poor. One Republican senator who wanted to fund
abortions for poor women argued that “there’s an old saying: ‘The rich get richer
and the poor get children.’ I think that’s what it boils down to here.”75 Poor women
were effectively, but unfairly, denied the right to an abortion if they could not
afford it.
Proponents of Medicaid abortions in Michigan disagreed on whether
Milliken should veto the bill to get to the objectionable line item, which would have
essentially eliminated all Medicaid funding for Michigan’s poor, or use the
ambiguity of the term “therapeutic” to work around the prohibition. Some abortion
advocates, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the Women’s Lawyer’s
Association, argued that Milliken should order the Department of Social Services to
adopt a very liberal view of “therapeutic” to cover all abortions necessary for a
woman’s physical or emotional health. 76 This interpretation placed the doctor
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squarely in the middle of the determination because he or she would have to agree
that the abortion was necessary because of health concerns. Abortion opponents
argued that this interpretation was contrary to legislative intent.77
Feminist groups, such as NOW and WEAL, represented by Kefauver, favored
a veto. The head of NOW believed that the veto provided an educational
opportunity for advocates to argue “that it is less expensive for the state to pay for
terminating a pregnancy than for bringing a child up on welfare.” 78 Kefauver
contended that any substitute bill could hardly be more burdensome for indigent
pregnant women and that a veto would not change votes. Moreover, she argued
that the alternative, limiting the impact of the budgetary legislation by adopting a
definition of “therapeutic” that was a mere regulatory slight of hand, would
undermine the legitimacy of legally recognized abortion rights. Lawmakers,
Kefauver argued, could no longer participate in “the despicable strategy of
attaching anti-abortion riders to otherwise good and necessary legislation, in order
to trap the pro-choice advocates into accepting this erosion of abortion rights.
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Liberals as well as conservatives in Lansing have looked upon these riders as
inconsequential, thus showing their contempt for the lives of the women directly
affected.” 79 She saw this proposed regulatory fix as a concession to the religious
right, who sought to incrementally eliminate the right to abortion in Michigan.
The women who favored an interpretive fix to the legislation referred to
those who wanted a veto, including Kefauver, as “radical feminist groups.” While
both sides shared the goal of protecting Medicaid abortions, and the interpretive
group tried to argue that the two positions were compatible, not everyone
agreed. 80 Ultimately, Milliken conferred with his Republican feminist wife and
decided to reject the call to interpret “therapeutic” broadly because it would result
in a legal challenge that would cause uncertainty during an inevitable court
challenge. Instead, he decided to veto the entire Medicaid budget in order to get
to the line item restricting funding for abortion for poor women. He noted that “I
cannot say to a woman who is pregnant, and who has after considering all the
alternatives with her physician reached the very difficult and personal decision she
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should seek an abortion, that she cannot have one solely because she is poor.” 81
WEAL supported his decision, noting that, “By his action he has joined that select
group of governors . . . who refuse to be intimidated by a group of legislators who
have no idea what it is like to be a woman and poor.”82
Milliken then urged the legislature to split Medicaid funding in general from
Medicaid funding for abortion so that the poor could get other needed medical
treatment. His position would have permitted the abortion funding question to be
debated separately.83 Since they could not gather enough votes to override his veto,
the legislature threatened to pass the same bill and put it before him again. This
second bill would come so close to the end of the fiscal year that it would put
Medicaid funding for the poor at risk when the budget expired. Milliken objected
to this tactic, indicating that if the legislature did not have enough votes to override
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his veto, they needed to draft different legislation. He told the legislature that he
would veto an identical bill for the second time.84
In September, a newly created Michigan chapter of the National Abortion
Rights Action League (NARAL) elected Lorraine Beebe as chairperson. The
organization was “‘dedicated to the elimination of all laws and practices that would
compel any woman to bear a child against her will.’”85 Beebe said that “the NARAL
purpose . . . is to recognize the basic human right of a woman to limit her own
reproduction.” 86 She characterized the legislature’s work as “an attempt by
religious groups to impose their belief that life begins at conception. . . . But all they
care about is the fertilized egg. They don’t care what happens to the women. They
don’t care what happens to the child.” 87 Familiar arguments about abortion
resurfaced in this debate as proponents of government funded abortions tried to
avoid the assertion of many of their opponents that life begins at conception.
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However, whereas advocates like Beebe had argued in the past that the state did
not care about the unwanted child, they now offered a contradictory economic
argument about how much more it cost the state to raise the child (that it did not
care about) than to pay for the mother to abort it.
The House Appropriations Committee struggled with how to respond to
Milliken’s veto. The legislature still did not divide along strictly party lines on the
question of abortion or government funding for abortion. However, when
legislators made the Medicaid budget contingent on accepting a prohibition on
Medicaid funding for abortion, votes became unpredictable, especially because the
governor risked being blamed for cutting off all Medicaid funding six weeks before
the gubernatorial election. Politics influenced the votes of some members of the
legislature, to the consternation of others. In the House Appropriations Committee,
where the second bill had to originate, Republican Mel Larson, who was running
for Michigan Secretary of State on Governor Milliken’s ticket, voted against
reissuing the same bill with the prohibition on abortion funding despite his
opposition to abortion. He stated “I am going to vote ‘no’ on this because the
Democrats are using this to embarrass the Governor. . . . I have a commitment to
the right-to-life, but when you use the right-to-life to defeat political candidates,
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you are misusing the right-to-life.”88 Republican Representative Melvin DeStiger,
who opposed Medicaid abortions, argued that “when you cut away all the rhetoric,
you get down to one thing: The use of the unborn child for political advantage.”89
As a result he, like Larson, voted against reissuing the bill with an abortion
prohibition. By cobbling together a strange coalition, the committee was able to
get the Medicaid funding bill, without any restrictions on abortion funding, back to
the full House. At that point, those who did not want the government to pay for
abortions hoped to insert their language back into the bill. Thus, the dispute was
moved back to the full House for debate.90
WEAL made an appeal to Michigan’s legislators to protect medical care for
the poor by refusing to hold it hostage to politics. Kefauver wrote to members of
the Michigan House of Representatives to indicate her disdain about how abortion
rights for the poor were being used by Democrats to garner support for their
Democratic candidate in the race for governor. She invoked the traditional support
of “the Democratic Party . . . [for] the disadvantaged sectors of our society. What
88
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this legislature does in the next two weeks either will prove that the sensitivity still
exists, or that the Michigan Democratic Party has begun to wage war on the
poor.”91 The next week she wrote to members of the state Senate rebuking them
for their political manipulation of the issue. This time, she made a nonpartisan
appeal to their consciences by arguing that “neither the Republican nor Democratic
parties has a history of ruthless insensitivity towards the disadvantaged members
of our society. What you do today and in the next two days will prove that the 79th
Legislature is either ready to put aside political expediency and see that Michigan’s
poor have needed services, or that this body has begun to wage war on the poor.”92
The House ultimately rejected the bill that came out of committee without a
restriction on abortion funding and, in a bipartisan vote, adopted a bill that was
identical to that the governor had vetoed two months earlier. In the process, things
got nasty as both sides jabbed at each other. Democratic Representative Dominic
Jacobetti, who chaired the House Appropriations Committee and was opposed to
state funding for abortion, took the position that he was “not going to sit here after
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taking my oath of office and be dictated to by the governor. If he wants to veto it
again, let him do so.”93 Jacobetti noted, “we should not take state money to snuff
out lives in this state.”94 According to Republican Larson, “We have moved to the
elective abortion as a method we are encouraging for birth control.”95 He noted
that “‘all these people are crying that its discrimination against the poor . . . . I think
the unborn child is one of the poor too.’”96 Similarly, support for Medicaid funded
abortions came from both political parties. Democrat Perry Bullard supported
Republican Governor Milliken when he asserted that “it is simply a question of
equal protection. We would be very selfish if we are to take the power we have to
take equal rights away from persons with lower incomes.”97
When the bill moved to the Senate, Senator Fitzgerald said he would vote for
it so long as it included a prohibition against Medicaid-funded abortions, even if it
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meant the governor would veto it and cut off all Medicaid funding. 98 The editorial
staffs of newspapers in the state could not help but note the strange political
alignments that had developed over this issue, starting with the candidates for
governor. The Grand Rapids Press noted, “The situation is not without irony: a
Republican governor, whose party increasingly is using the abortion issue in its bid
for votes, opposes state-imposed restrictions affecting only the poor, while Sen.
Fitzgerald, who has represented himself as a liberal and working man’s friend, now
says that insofar as Michigan is concerned, only those women who are fortunate
enough not to be on welfare can get abortions without increasing their financial
woes.”99 The positions of Michigan’s politicians ultimately rested on whether they
privileged the rights of the mother or the unborn child and this emphasis was not
necessarily dictated by partisanship.
Recognizing that they faced a political stalemate, members of the Senate
(despite Fitzgerald’s opposition) and House finally agreed to a temporary fix for the
problem that extended all Medicaid funding, including that for abortions, for four
months. This compromise bill delinked Medicaid funding in general from funding
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for abortion by giving Milliken the option to veto only the one dollar appropriated
for Medicaid funded abortions. As expected, he vetoed the abortion line item
restriction. Thus, Medicaid funding was temporarily restored, including that for
poor women who sought abortions. Beebe, speaking on behalf of Michigan NARAL,
noted that “it’s ironic that the legislators and gubernatorial candidates supporting
this bill call themselves ‘pro-life,’ when they were willing to cut off all funding for
health services to senior citizens, infant and child nutrition programs, and services
to the blind and disabled in order to gain a political ‘win.’”100
Fitzgerald’s stand on abortion caused an interesting political realignment
among women in Michigan. By 1978, politically active feminists on both sides of
the aisle questioned their party’s position on abortion. Many feminist Democrats
publicly supported Milliken for governor and, in fact, created an organization called
“Democratic Women for Milliken.” These women were not swayed when Fitzgerald
chose a pro-choice woman, Olivia Maynard, for his running mate. 101 Kefauver, on
the other hand, who had already supported Democrat Jimmy Carter for president
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in 1976, indicated that she wanted to vote for a Democrat for governor in 1978,
but could not bring herself to do so in light of the fact that the Democratic
candidate was opposed to abortion. She told reporters “I’ve been a lifelong
Republican. I was dying to vote for the Democratic ticket. I know that even if he
(Fitzgerald) had Jesus Christ as his running mate now, responsible Michigan women
won’t vote for the ticket.”102 Fitzgerald lost the election.
When Medicaid funding ran out at the end of 1978, both the House and the
Senate voted to provide Milliken with two separate bills, one for Medicaid funding
in general and one to oppose Medicaid funding for abortion. He signed the former
and vetoed the latter.103 By the time he retired from office on December 31, 1982,
he had successfully vetoed bills prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortion eleven
times.104
Michigan’s legislators were also grappling with other reproductive issues and
Binsfeld, as a pro-life feminist, found herself in a difficult, but potentially important,
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position. While she oftentimes sounded like a conservative, her feminism caused
her to moderate and even reject some of the conservative beliefs that typically
emanated from her commitment to the traditional family. Because of her stance as
a pro-life feminist, she was able to offer compromise positions on issues of
importance to Republican women on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Thus,
she tried to bring together in this middle ground moderate feminists and
conservative women on issues where their positions seemed irreconcilable.
For example, she tried to bridge this gap on the controversial issue of sex
education. Despite her opposition to abortion and all government funding for
abortion, Binsfeld was a proponent of legislation, HB 4425, that provided for sex
education in Michigan’s public schools.105 She noted that from 1962 to 1977, the
number of teenagers in the United States who had babies rose about 34 percent,
and almost half of all babies born to teenagers were born to single mothers.106
These young parents were more likely to live in poverty, less likely to graduate from
high school and, therefore, more likely to live in poverty as adults. It was a problem
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that had economic, psychological, and health implications for the teenaged father
and mother, as well as the child.
She attributed these statistics, at least in part, to the fact that high schoolers
were not inclined to use birth control when they had sex. In 1977 Michigan was one
of only two states that did not permit birth control education in the public schools.
(Louisiana was the other state.) 107 Therefore, teenagers often had to rely on
inaccurate information, especially when parents were not willing or able to provide
the information they needed. She noted that in 1968, the Michigan legislature
proposed that sex education, including birth control information, be provided in
Michigan’s schools. Romney, however, vetoed the portion dealing with
contraceptive information, believing that the people of Michigan were not ready
for it. She found it ironic that Michigan law allowed teachers to provide information
about sex, but not contraception. “As a result,” she concluded, “we now have sex
education classes in our public schools which in essence tell students the mechanics
of how people become pregnant, but which are not allowed to provide the answers
to the logical next question: How do you not become pregnant?”108
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All of Binsfeld’s positions on reproductive issues emanated from her belief
that life began at conception, and her position on sex education was no exception.
She believed that information about contraception would help prevent unwanted
pregnancies and, therefore, abortions, among teenage girls.109 Thus, she supported
legislation that permitted schools to teach about “family planning” and
“reproductive health,” both of which included methods of contraception that
would prevent pregnancy. The words “birth control” were not used because she
did not want students to be taught about abortion, which she distinguished from
contraception because it involved terminating a pregnancy, rather than preventing
it.110 Schools were prohibited from providing information on abortion, required to
offer opt out provisions at the request of the parents or the student, and prohibited
from distributing contraceptive devices, as parents needed to be involved in that
decision.
Binsfeld’s position on sex education was contrary to that of conservatives,
who agreed that schools should not provide any information to their students
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about sex. Schlafly wrote that “the major goal of nearly all sex education curricula
being taught in the schools is to teach teenagers (and sometimes children) how to
enjoy fornication without having a baby and without feeling guilty. This goal
explains why the courses promote an acceptance of sexual behavior that does not
produce a baby, such as homosexuality and masturbation. This goal explains why
they encourage abortions and all varieties of contraception.” 111 Binsfeld did not
even engage with conservatives on that objection, but she dismissed two other
arguments against the legislation, both favorites of conservatives. Once teenagers
learned about contraception, they argued, they were more likely to engage in
sexual activity. Also, it was best that parents teach their children about sex. Binsfeld
admitted that the former was not true and the latter was not happening. Teenagers
were sexually active whether or not they knew anything about contraception and
parents were not providing their children with the information they needed to
make good decisions.
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On the question of sex education, Binsfeld operated within Ziegler’s middle
ground, from which she helped to facilitate a compromise between feminists and
conservatives. The sex education legislation she supported was limited to
accommodate some conservative opposition to abortion. At the same time, it was
pragmatically designed to appeal to feminists who wanted to help minors make
sound reproductive decisions. Moreover, she personally compromised her belief in
the sanctity of the family by allowing the government into the privacy of the home
through the schools.
As the 1970s drew to a close, Michigan’s Republican feminists, with the
assistance of a sympathetic governor, had managed to stop pro-life activists from
imposing restrictions which, while constitutionally acceptable, would have
effectively limited a woman’s right to an abortion. Binsfeld made minimal progress
in her efforts to bridge the gap between moderate and conservative Republican
women on issues related to reproductive rights. However, her struggles were not
surprising. As Luker and others have concluded, the abortion debate centered on
opposing world views that did not facilitate compromise. All that Binsfeld could do
was tinker around the edges to try to find common ground on issues that were
tangentially connected to abortion and women’s rights more generally.
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Conservative opposition to abortion within the Republican Party made
reproductive rights a fundamental point of contention for Michigan’s Republican
feminists as they tried to reconcile their partisanship with their feminism. In fact,
abortion advocate Kefauver was slowly separating from the Republican Party over
this and other issues. As early as 1976, she chose to vote for Democratic candidates
who supported her position on abortion. Her partisan struggle was compounded
by the fact that she did not like Governor Milliken, despite his support for the ERA
and his continuation of government funding for abortions for indigent women in
Michigan. Kefauver argued that “I am an advocate for women’s rights. The
Governor has no one in his office who knows anything about women’s rights, so
they mess up any issue that has any ‘delicate connotations’ to it. This makes the
many organizations espousing women’s rights very angry with the Governor.
Where do they turn? To the Democratic Party for advocacy.” 113 In fact, she
eventually did just that, first through her vote and eventually with her party
affiliation. The sensible center no longer worked for her. Her struggles were a
preview of the challenges to come for Michigan’s other Republican feminists.
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CHAPTER 6 IWY CONFERENCE AND REPUBLICAN FEMINISTS: 1977
In numbers and most of all, in unity, is strength!

–Elly M. Peterson, “Report on Houston”

By the middle of the 1970s, Michigan’s Republican feminists actively
participated in both feminist organizations and the Michigan Republican Party.
They focused on increasing female political power, ratifying the ERA and protecting
abortion rights for all women. At the IWY Conference in Houston, Texas, in
November 1977, they consolidated, validated, and celebrated their work as
feminists. Many of Michigan’s Republican feminists represented the state at this
nonpartisan meeting. They were challenged, however, by a large contingent of
women, including some conservative Republicans from Michigan, who argued that
the conference did not represent the interests of all women. Conservatives
characterized it as a well planned and executed subterfuge intended to promote
feminist causes.
At the end of the conference, feminists and conservatives each claimed that
the conference was a success. 1 Peterson wrote that “it was in Houston the
women’s movement came of age-201 years after the founding of the country. 51%
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of the population will no longer accept the back of the bus.”2 Schlafly, on the other
hand, asserted that feminists finally lost the fight for the ERA at the convention.3
Regardless of their similarly upbeat assessments, the fundamental disagreements
between feminists and their conservative opponents were not resolved. In fact,
historian Marjorie Spruill argued that “the IWY conflict ushered in a new era in
American politics, the beginning rather than the end of a protracted struggle over
women’s rights.” 4 In one way, however, the IWY Conference gave conservative
Republican women a new advantage over Republican feminists in their battle to
take control of the Republican Party. The conference provided them with the
evidence to argue that Republican feminists had abandoned the sensible center.
After the United Nations declared 1975 “International Women’s Year,”
President Ford issued a presidential order creating a National Commission on the
Observance of International Women’s Year. The Commission, led by Ruckleshaus,
“was to adopt recommendations aimed at eliminating barriers to equality for
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women.”5 When the UN extended the year to a decade, Congress passed P.L. 94167, which mandated that all states and territories of the United States hold
meetings to adopt resolutions and elect delegates to a national conference. The
fifty-six state and territorial meetings and the follow-up national meeting were
intended “to assess the status of women in our country, to measure the progress
we have made, to identify the barriers that prevent us from participating fully and
equally in all aspects of national life, and to make recommendations to the
President and to the Congress for means by which such barriers can be removed.”6
The Commission was designated as the sponsor of these meetings and given five
million dollars to offset conference costs. The report of the Commission, “. . . To
Form a More Perfect Union . . . Justice for American Women,” served as the
instruction manual for conference leaders.7 Newly-elected President Jimmy Carter
replaced Chairperson Ruckleshaus with Abzug and, as one member of the
Commission noted, it became decidedly more Democratic in both its outlook and
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its membership.8 The law required that these conferences be broadly inclusive and
diverse to adequately represent all American women, including those who opposed
the women’s movement. After the national conference, leaders were expected to
produce a report for the president that contained recommendations for changes
by the federal government.9
Michigan’s conference, called Focus: Michigan Women, was held in Lansing
from June 10 to 11, 1977. The meeting, organized by an advisory committee that
included Helen Milliken and Burnett, was designed to accomplish two goals, as
required by Congress. 10 The almost fourteen hundred attendees were asked to
nominate a slate of delegates to represent them at the national convention and to
adopt a series of resolutions, including fifteen resolutions suggested by the national
conference committee, and additional resolutions approved at the state meeting,
for the delegates to take with them to Houston. Attendees endorsed all of the
national resolutions, formalizing their support for ratification of the ERA and
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abortion rights for all women, including funding for those who could not afford
them. They also adopted fourteen additional state resolutions. Delegates selected
many of Michigan’s Republican feminists, including Peterson, Milliken, Burnett,
McNamee, Beebe, and Kefauver’s seventeen-year-old daughter, Kari Lee Lavalli
(who, unlike her mother at that time, was a member of the Democratic Women’s
Caucus), to attend the national convention. Neither Kefauver nor Binsfeld
represented the state at the national meeting and there is no indication that either
one of them attended this state meeting.11
As in most states, the Michigan meeting generated controversy. Organizers
estimated that about three hundred attendees objected to the meeting,12 including
conservatives Donnelly, Barbour, and Bernice Zilly. Donnelly called it a “phony
festival for frustrated feminists, who have made no secret of their intention to use
these tax-funded Conferences to promote their own pet political ends, especially
the Equal Rights Amendment.” 13 Zilly had a long history as a conservative
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participant in the Michigan Republican Party. As a member of the Women’s
Republican Club of Grosse Pointe, Zilly was an activist in one of Michigan’s
conservative strongholds. She led the 1965 slate of conservative women
nominated to run the RWFM that was defeated when Peterson decided that she
wanted a moderate RWFM board.14 As the only conservative member of the state
advisory committee, Zilly claimed that committee leaders did not allow her to
meaningfully participate in planning the conference.15
The Final Report of the Focus: Michigan Women conference included
minority reports authored by women, including Zilly, who sought to formalize their
conclusions that the meeting was fundamentally unfair. They made a case that the
organizing committee had adopted processes and procedures intended to preclude
them from fully participating in the state meeting, contrary to the federal enabling
legislation. Moreover, they objected to the fixed, preselected, proposed slate of
delegates to the national convention. While delegates chose Barbour and Zilly
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along with two other conservatives, as alternate delegates, the roster of regular
delegates contained no conservative women. An alternate delegate was essentially
an observer who was allowed to participate only if needed to replace an original
delegate. Thus, conservatives believed, the slate of alternate delegates was
designed to satisfy the diversity requirements of the conference’s enabling
legislation, but to isolate those representatives from participating in the
conference. 16
Finally, conservative women asserted that the resolutions the Michigan
delegates carried to Houston did not reflect their substantive positions, including
opposition to the ERA and abortion, and support for traditional families. 17
According to Zilly, “many women were opposed to the Equal Rights Amendment
and to the Resolution on Abortion. They wished to have their views known. They
also opposed the Lesbian Resolution and the Child Care and many other of the
National Committee’s Resolutions. So when the Majority Report reports that these
Resolutions were approved, please keep in mind that they were vehemently
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opposed by a great number of Delegates.”18 One attendee commented that “their
(women’s) progress is all in the wrong direction. They refuse to have children–take
the pill–feel no special commitment to marriage and family. Without home,
marriage and family, nothing else counts.” 19 They feared the interests of the
Michigan women who thought like them would not be adequately represented at
the national conference.20
Despite the issues raised about the state conference, most of the attendees
were pleased with the conduct and outcomes of the meeting. The newly elected
delegates believed that they would become a part of history at the national
conference. Milliken noted that “this will be only the second national women’s
conference in our nation’s history. The first, of course, was held in Seneca Falls, N.Y.
in 1848 and marked the beginning of the struggle for the right to vote.” 21 The
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delegates to the national conference, including Michigan’s Republican feminists,
looked forward to their trip to Houston, but Michigan’s conservative Republicans,
angry and frustrated, did not share their anticipation.
Michigan’s conservative women were not the only women who felt that they
had been marginalized by the IWY Commission. Women from around the country
believed that the IWY Commission advocated a feminist agenda that it intended to
promote through the state meetings and the national conference. Critchlow noted
that Schlafly called it “a federally funded effort to rally support for ERA, publicly
proclaiming it ‘a front for radicals and lesbians.’” 22 Thus, conservative women
decided to fight back through the the National Citizens’ Review Committee (NCRC).
Established as “an educational coalition,” it sought to encourage and assist women
who opposed the feminist agenda to participate in the state and national
conferences.23 The NCRC reached out in particular to those who might have been
discouraged from participating because they were intimidated by the size and
scope of the series of events. It also tried to monitor the state meetings to make
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sure that they complied with the law.24 In fact, the concerns of these women were
justified. The Commission originally identified the passage of the ERA as one of its
goals. Moreover, it only included minimal, token representation from the
conservative movement. 25
Before the national conference, the NCRC accelerated its efforts to protect
the interests of conservative women. Donnelly, who was responsible for the
organization’s relationships with the media, issued a memorandum that updated
the press on the state conferences and previewed their concerns about the
national conference. She asserted that “in spite of promises made to Congress that
women of all viewpoints on the issues could be involved in the planning of
Conference activities, including workshops and the election of delegates to the
Houston Conference, women opposed to the Equal Rights Amendment and other
I.W.Y. goals have been treated with outrageous unfairness and discrimination at
every step of the way.”26 The pro-feminist bias of the delegates selected, which was
reflected in the resolutions adopted by the state conferences, meant that the
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findings and recommendations of the delegates at the national conference would
reflect a similar lack of ideological diversity. The NCRC attacked the Commission’s
argument that their membership was diversified. “In typically disingenuous fashion,
I.W.Y. Officials have pointed to ‘homemakers’ among their ranks, such as Ellie
Smeal, President of the National Organization for Women, who is hardly a woman
that most homemakers would identify with, or choose as a representative. It is an
insult to women to imply that one’s views on the issues can be assumed by one’s
religion, income, occupation, race, or similar characteristics.”27
Donnelly and other leaders of the NCRC alleged that some of the state
conferences adopted a plan, called the “Monitoring and Mobile Operation
Partnership Program,” (MMOPP), with the assistance of the NWPC. They believed
that there was a connection between the IWY Commission and the NWPC because
twelve leaders of the NWPC were at one time on the IWY Commission. This
program, “a systematic campaign of artifice and trickery,” was developed,
according to conservative women, “to rig the voting in workshops at the state and
national I.W.Y. Conferences.”28 The plan was relatively straightforward. A monitor

27
28

“The ‘Abzugate’ Scandal–Important Facts.”

Operation M.M.O.P.P.-A Blueprint for Fraud,” International Women’s Year Citizens’
Review Committee, September 14, 1977, box 1, folder: Donnelly, Elaine IWY Convention-19771978, Donnelly Papers.

233

attended every break-out workshop or meeting to read the room and identify the
positions of attendees. If the majority of attendees were opposed to the feminist
position on that topic, the monitor brought in additional women, called “floaters,”
to outvote those who opposed the feminists. 29 The Michigan Citizens’ Review
Committee, the Michigan affiliate of the NCRC, must have anticipated problems
like this when it recommended that Michigan’s conservative women tape record
their sessions and avoid congregating in large groups at their state meeting. 30
Conservative women believed that the feminists did not speak for most women,
were engaged in a coordinated effort to silence them, and had a similar plan for
the national conference.
Feminists who supported the MMOPP believed that they were the true
representatives of American women. They, like conservative women, saw these
meetings as individual battlegrounds for the future of the feminist movement,
which, in their opinion, justified the tactics they adopted. Peterson worried that
Schlafly would disrupt the IWY meetings. She lamented that “somehow it has got
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to be put across that Phyllis has trained her members in sabotage of a meeting,
disruption, etc.–and, instead of coming to these meetings and taking part, they are
coming for this purpose along [sic].”31 The MMOPP was intended to stop Schlafly
by “prevent[ing] a minority faction from taking over a committee or workshop and
passing out a resolution which did not represent the majority opinion of conference
women.”32 Feminists used the MMOPP successfully in Arizona against Schlafly who
tried to influence the outcome of the abortion and ERA workshops. As one leader
from Arizona wrote to the NWPC, “if the conservatives packed any workshop that
woman [the monitor] quietly left, went to a central location–word was quickly
passed and quietly people moved into the packed workshop–thus when a
resolution came to a vote, we had the majority.”33 While some feminists objected
to the MMOPP because “our tactics were too blunt and maybe even unfair,” others
argued “I’m tired of being a ‘good sport’ and losing. NEVER GIVE YOUR ENEMY AN
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EVEN BREAK. This philosophy still has difficulties for many good-hearted women.”34
Feminists rationalized their tactics because the ends justified the means. The future
of feminism depended on it.
The NCRC also used the courts and legislative hearings to argue that the IWY
Commission improperly allocated its appropriated budget to lobbying, contrary to
legislative intent. Conservative women filed a number of unsuccessful lawsuits
challenging the use of this federal money. The NCRC noted that “these complex
legal actions were filed for the plaintiffs by Attorney J. Fred Schlafly [Phyllis
Schlafly’s husband] on a volunteer basis. However, the I.W.Y. Commission has had
the benefit of extensive legal services from the U.S. Department of Justice. This is
just another example of how private citizens have been forced to compete with
huge amounts of government money being used to promote the interests of proERA forces.”35 Senator Jesse Helms presided over legislative hearings convened in
response to complaints from many women who argued that their state meetings
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did not comply with federal legislative requirements, but IWY Commission
members did not attend or respond to these allegations.36
To protect women, the imperial wizard of the KKK claimed that his
organization sent representatives from its female auxiliary, covertly if necessary, to
participate in state IWY meetings, and planned to do the same at the national
meeting. He attacked “the women’s movement as a haven for ‘all the misfits of
society, including self-admitted lesbians,’” and made it clear that the KKK would
send male members to the national IWY Conference to protect “decent” women
from these sexual predators.37 Anti-feminists who objected to the IWY conference,
including STOP ERA, HOW and the NCRC, denied that they had any ties to the KKK.
But their hatred of the lesbians who they claimed appropriated the IWY program
mirrored that of the KKK. Schlafly explained that the anti-feminist activists were not
very successful in putting more of their representatives on the Illinois delegation to
the conference in Houston because “our women didn’t want to leave their families
for an entire weekend and spend it with a groups [sic] of lesbians. They’re very
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offensive to us.” 38 The efforts by the various groups opposed to the IWY
Conference did nothing to bridge the gaping divide between the feminists and antifeminists and did not stop the national convention.
Almost fifteen hundred delegates and nineteen thousand nonparticipant
observers attended the IWY Conference in Houston from November 18 to 21,
1977.39 On Friday night, a party atmosphere prevailed as four thousand people,
including Roslyn Carter and Betty Ford, the wives of President Jimmy Carter and
former President Gerald Ford, and Coretta Scott King, the widow of slain civil rights
leader Martin Luther King, Jr., attended a cocktail party at which they raised
$100,000 to support efforts to ratify the ERA. The historic significance of the
meeting was apparent the next morning when three young girls delivered a torch
that had been carried from Seneca Falls, New York, to the conference in Houston.
Accompanied by an all girl drum and bugle corps, they passed the torch to Carter
and Ford, as well as Ladybird Johnson, wife of former president Lyndon Johnson,
and the head of the commission that organized the conference, Democrat Barbara
Jordon. Jean Stapleton was also present. An actress who played Edith Bunker, the
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wife and oftentimes target of the sexist and racist rants of her television husband,
Archie Bunker, on the hit sitcom All in the Family, Stapleton was an active and
visible proponent of equal rights for women.40 As an icon of American pop culture
at the time, she represented the diversity of the feminist movement and
symbolized its cultural immersion into the lives of average Americans.
On Saturday afternoon and Sunday, the real substance of the meeting began
as delegates debated and approved the twenty-five resolutions that were
ultimately combined into a National Plan of Action for America’s women. The
conference endorsed ratification of the ERA, affirmed support for reproductive
rights for all women, and recommended sex education for all students, even those
in elementary school. Conference attendees also approved government assistance
for battered women and abused children, asserting that “elimination of violence in
the home [should] be a national goal.”41 Peterson noted that with one exception,
some delegates opposed every resolution,42 which seemed to indicate to her that
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attendees considered the positions of all women and adopted a fair and balanced
decision-making process.
Perhaps the most controversial resolution called on women to support gay
rights. The conferees, moved by the activism of the lesbians in attendance,
endorsed the elimination of all discrimination based on sexual preference.43 At the
conference, it became apparent that some feminists had shifted their positions on
this issue. Betty Friedan, for example, had always argued that the ERA had to be
passed before feminists could focus on other, more potentially controversial issues,
such as sexual preference, that might be used to generate opposition to the ERA.
During the conference, however, she announced her support for lesbian rights.44
Burnett was pleased with the resolution and indicated that “those divisions
[between feminists based on sexual preference] ended forever in Houston, where
the entire body made it clear that lesbians are our sisters and should join us–
something that was a buoyant, uplifting, truly beautiful experience.”45 Alternate
delegate Zilly noted that while all of the representatives from Michigan voted for
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the other resolutions, “six or eight Michigan delegates did not approve this one
resolution [on sexual preference].”46 Barbour was surprised that both Milliken and
Burnett voted for the resolution supporting gay rights.47
The feminist delegates believed that, as required by law, the attendees and
the plan that they adopted reflected and represented the interests of all American
women. Most accounts of the meeting indicated that about 20 percent of the
attendees were conservatives who opposed feminist control of the meeting.48 The
majority of the delegates, including Peterson, viewed these women as
obstructionists, “led by State Sen. (Indiana) Joan Gubbins, who changed her outfits
so often she must have brought a dozen suitcases–and she was identified by her
hat: huge, with a bright orange long plume. She held at her seat two flags–one
yellow, one black, which she used to signal the delegates across the hall such as
Mississippi, how to vote, when to sit, etc.”49 Later Peterson joked that “in a suit of
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armor with that hat she could have ridden to war behind King Richard!” 50 By
focusing on her appearance, Peterson used the ploy of many of Michigan’s
journalists to delegitimize Gubbins and her message. How could she be taken
seriously if she was so flamboyant? Moreover, the suggestion that she directed
conservative women with two flags impugned their intelligence and independence
by implying that they were not able to think on their own.
A second, simultaneous conference, organized by conservative women and
endorsed by the Eagle Forum, was held at the Houston Astrodome on Saturday,
November 19. According to some attendees, there were approximately twenty
thousand women at this meeting.51 Many of them were also delegates or alternate
delegates to the IWY Conference who disagreed with most of the assessments of
their feminist counterparts about the national conference. Peterson indicated that
these conservative women met “to pray and to castigate those at the Conference.
Most had arrived by church busses from Texas and surrounding states. In direct
contrast to the Coliseum where there was no name calling or outward signs of
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disrespect, this group concentrated on calling the delegates and observers, ‘sick’
‘lesbians’ ‘unpatriotic’ ‘antiChrist.’”52
Michigan’s alternate delegates, with Schlafly at least in spirit at her
alternative meeting, remained convinced that conservative women had been
marginalized by those who were in charge of the conference. As alternate
delegates they witnessed, but could not speak against, the feminist agenda
adopted at the conference.53 As a result, both Zilly and Barbour wrote scathing
minority reports about the national conference. Zilly called the meeting “an
agonizing experience for me . . . the most highly ‘orchestrated’ gathering which I
had ever attended.”54 It was an event, she believed, constructed as a propaganda
tool for the feminists because “the primary effort of the whole Conference seemed
to be to impress upon the press, all media and the State Legislatures who have not
already approved the E.R.A. that ALL WOMEN OF THE UNITED STATES INSIST THAT
E.R.A. MUST BE PASSED. Anyone who disagreed with that thought was considered
‘The Enemy’ and was treated as such.”55 She disputed Peterson’s assertion that
52
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delegates were diverse and from all segments of society.56 According to Zilly, “only
about 5% of all delegates on the floor were the ‘Enemy’” who opposed the
conference’s feminist agenda. 57 She believed that the national conference was
operated much like the Michigan meeting. Those who opposed the Commission’s
agenda were effectively precluded from participating by the processes and
procedures adopted to control the sessions. Her conclusion to her Minority Report
reflected her frustration and anger. She wrote, “it was an orchestrated Conference
very effectively. I OBJECTED but I had no way to express my feelings except to tell
it to you.”58
Barbour believed that the national conference was as pro-feminist, which
meant pro-ERA, pro-abortion and anti-family, as the state meeting. She, in
particular, cast aspersions on the feminist participants as she stressed the
radicalism of the attendees, detailed their aggressive behavior, and generally
mocked the proceedings. The radical publications available at the conference that
not only endorsed radical feminism and abortion rights, but also lesbianism and the
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legalization of prostitution, offended Barbour. Pamphlets also promoted socialism,
communism, and union activism. In a particularly negative attack, Barbour noted
that the conservative delegates from Michigan chose a separate hotel from the
feminists because “the strong sexual preference (Gay Rights) resolution which the
feminists support caused us to feel hesitant about leaving to chance the picking out
of our roommates by the IWY Planning Commission.”59
According to Barbour, the pro-feminist majority began their efforts to
obstruct conservative women at the airport. She related that “under the bright
television lights the feminists began chanting, ‘ERA Now’ in loud raucous voices and
held clenched fists high. Members of HOW, Inc. then brought out a huge pink cloth
banner that read, ‘Stop ERA’. When the cameras seemed to focus on this banner,
the feminists tried to stand in front of it to hide it, but because of its size this was
impossible. Their disapproving faces showed their dismay.”60 Their obstructionism
became violent “when the torch was carried the last few yards to the Conference
Center [and] a lone man there [who] protested the IWY with a sign which read,
‘IWY Means Immoral Women’s Year’ was roughed up, his clothes torn by the
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feminists, and when we saw him he had an ugly red scratch on his cheek.” 61
According to Barbour, the feminists intended to block the message of their
opponents, using violence if necessary.
Barbour had a strongly negative reaction to the overall meeting, noting that
“when the 80% feminist delegation and the feminist guests began chanting ‘ERA
Now’ and as they began to get louder and louder, I could not help but be reminded
of film clips of vast crowds gathered in Nazi Germany when Hitler spoke and their
shout, ‘Seig Heil, Seig Heil’ with arms raised in the Nazi salute. I wonder how many
other spectators got the same flashback.”62 Ironically, while the feminists at the
conference connected the protesters to the Nazis, the protesters accused the
feminists of using Nazi techniques during the conference. Barbour also disagreed
with Peterson that the meeting was orderly. She wrote that “after the ERA
resolution passed, I was overwhelmed by the loud stamping, applauding and
shouting that was heard. A snake dance wound in a disorderly fashion around the
floor of the coliseum. Since 80% of the delegates were of like mind, I wondered
why they acted as if they had just won a tremendous victory. After all, they were
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holding all the aces, so who could stop them?” 63 She was disturbed that
“thunderous applause and shouting and cheering broke out” after conference
attendees endorsed expansive abortion rights for all women.64 She wrote that “it
was unreal to see this carnival atmosphere after the abortion rights issue passed. I
felt kind of sick about then.”65 After the vote on sexual preference, she noted that
“the Lesbians took over the IWY Conference.”66
The feminist attendees left Houston feeling unified and optimistic about the
future of the women’s movement, and they deemed it a success.67 Journalist Lucy
Komisar, who reported on the IWY Conference, wrote that “the significance of the
Houston Conference is that, under the neutral sponsorship of the government, and
through the elected delegates and delegates at large, it gathered the major
women’s organizations and made it possible for them to approve a comprehensive
national political program that belongs equally to all of them, because it was not
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proposed by any one of them.”68 Milliken called it a life-changing event. She wrote
that personally she felt “a unity among women has been forged and that it will be
an indestructible one. What an experience to be in the midst of women coming
together from all races and stations in life to ‘consider the barriers’ and set goals
to remove them. And the remarkable spirit in which this was done, the sharing and
the caring. It was one of the great experiences of my life.”69 The attendees felt
empowered by the fact that they were not alone, but had grievances and concerns
in common with women from around the country. Anything was possible when all
of these women chose to work together.
The meeting not only unified, but also politicized the feminists who
participated in the multiday event. They believed that they were a part of the
process and returned home excited to implement the National Plan of Action.
Peterson commented on the order and propriety with which the attendees
conducted themselves as “hundreds of the women for the first time were involved
in political decisions–and they took to the action in such a way that observers
68
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realized no more would they be content to make the coffee, stamp the envelopes
and clean the office” and, according to Peterson, it was all witnessed by over a
thousand journalists. 70 Milliken believed that it would change the women’s
movement because “women’s issues have not only been solidified and defined,
but . . . the political process at every level will begin to feel their impact, from
Congress down to the state and local level.”71 The meeting introduced women to
the political process in the ways that Michigan’s Republican feminists had long
advocated.72
The feminists who participated in the IWY conference eagerly embraced the
National Plan of Action. Ironically, however, the meeting also energized
conservative women. As Spruill observed, “the success of the feminist leaders in
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gaining this mandate from two presidents and from Congress to hold these IWY
conferences served to galvanize the opposition, to politicize social conservatives,
and to aid Phyllis Schlafly and her associates in expanding the single-issue
movement against the ERA into a more enduring, profoundly antifeminist, and–in
her words—‘Pro-Family movement.’” 73 These women left the conference more
committed and united than ever in their opposition to feminism, and they were
able to use the National Plan of Action to persuade others to join their cause.74
While the IWY conference helped conservative women organize against
feminism, it also provided them with support in their battle for control of the
Republican Party. Conference proceedings gave them the evidence that they
needed to characterize Republican feminists as radical. Attendees at the meeting,
including Michigan’s Republican feminists, adopted a feminist agenda that included
more than their traditional support for the ERA and abortion. They had expanded
their understanding of feminism to include a woman’s right to freely choose her
sexual partners. By endorsing homosexuality, Michigan’s Republican feminists
provided their conservative opposition with ammunition to argue that they were
no longer at the sensible center of the women’s movement. Once they abandoned
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this middle ground, it became more difficult for them to argue to their moderate
partisan colleagues that they were the reasonable representatives of women in the
party and the logical mediators between moderate Republicans and radical
feminists. They lost some of their legitimacy in the battle between conservative and
moderate Republicans.
One of those who used the IWY Conference against the feminists, including
Republican feminists, was long-time moderate Republican George Romney.
Feminists had always feared that ERA’s opponents would connect the ERA to other,
more controversial issues to bolster their arguments against the ERA. In December
1979 Romney, a leader in the Mormon church, validated their concerns by invoking
the proceedings at the IWY Conference to connect homosexuality to the ERA.75 He
objected to homosexuality because he believed that homosexuals were “morally
perverted.”76 He reiterated, “I said that and I meant it. The Bible makes perfectly
clear that adultery, fornication, homosexuality and lesbianism are immoral.” 77
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These relationships destroyed the traditional family. 78 Romney believed that
lesbians supported the ERA because “they hope[d] its adoption would legitimate
their immoral relationships and behavior.”79 As a result, the ERA had to be defeated.
He told Laura Callow that “Gloria Stienem [sic], Betty Friedan have made it
abundantly clear that their objective is to destroy marriage, family, parent raising
of children, conjugal love etc. O, now they are moderating these objectives to
secure the home-maker’s support.” 80 Thus, he argued, radical feminists were
engaged in a deliberate effort to ratify the ERA in order to use it to as cover to
accomplish their more radical causes.
Lenore Romney sided with her husband on the ERA. Adamant that the
Mormon Church believed in equality for women, she argued, nevertheless, that it
could not support the ERA. While she shared George Romney’s opposition to
homosexuality, she also tied the ERA to legalized abortion. In a letter to Peterson,
she wrote that “most feminists ERA supports approve abortion on demand, and
while I do not quarrel with the idea that a woman should be able to determine what
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she should do under certain conditions, still I abhor the attitude I find on the college
campuses I visit where abortion is used as a birth control method. I do know that
life is present in pregnancy and that destroying that life–which is against the very
ultimate function of nature [sic].” 81 Anticipating that Peterson would try to
delegitimize the Romneys by arguing that they were relying on the assertions and
positions of radical feminists to support their position, Lenore cited statements
recently made by Helen Milliken “that the Mormon church, the communist and the
Klu [sic] Klux Klan were obstructing ERA. Classifying our church with communists
and KKK had many inflamed.”82 The Romneys believed that the ERA was so broadly
drafted that it could ultimately be used to justify what they considered immoral
behavior and to outlaw legitimate distinctions in treatment between men and
women.83
The arguments made by the Romneys were consistent with all of the
longstanding arguments made by conservative Republicans, especially Schlafly and
Donnelly, against the ERA. They were particularly impactful, however, because of
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George Romney’s legitimacy as an elder statesman of moderate Republicanism.
Now, after the IWY Conference, he had what he believed was a tangible basis for
linking homosexuality to the ERA.
Despite the fact that this position aligned them with the conservatives in the
Republican Party and put them at odds with many of their longtime friends, the
Romneys refused to change their views. George Romney made it clear that he did
not mean to imply that all supporters of the ERA were “moral perverts.”84 They
were particularly bothered that their opposition to the ERA hurt Peterson. Lenore
Romney wrote to her that “I do not apologize for what I am–for that it is my identity
as a child of God–but I do apologize for offending you–The scriptures tell us that
offences will come, but woe to them by who they come. Woe is me.”85 George
Romney also tried to justify his position to Peterson. He wrote to her that “we did
not take our position lightly or just because of the church. I was burned once before
(Vietnam) by taking a position I had to change because I hadn’t studied the problem
thoroughly first. In the case of E.R.A. I carefully researched the issue first, and
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weighted all the points you make. I could respond to them but there is no point in
doing so because I’m sure your position is one you believe is right.”86 He also made
it clear that while some of the advocates of the ERA had good intentions, “I have
learned from sad experience the truth of the following statement ‘honorable
intentions often deteriorate into shameful circumstances; the singular good often
evolves into plural abominations.’”87
Because of her longstanding friendship with the Romneys. Peterson felt
particularly betrayed, although she should not have been surprised. Earlier, Lenore
Romney wrote to Peterson that “the homos and lesbians are the main reason for
opposition [by the Mormon Church to ERA] for they believe the next step after ERA
will be acceptance of family unions of homos–with further deterioration of the
sacred relationship of marriage as an institution.” 88 Peterson’s feminist friends
tried to help her deal with the Romneys’ statements. Callow offered Peterson both
sympathy and humor. “I’m glad I was able to make you laugh by sending you a copy
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of Gloria Steinem’s remarks about ‘Ayotolla Romney.’ My heart has ached for you.
I had always admired the Romneys from a distance. I still felt a personal sense of
betrayal. For you, a close friend for years, it must be devastating.”89 Helen Milliken
tried to provide some advice on how to deal with her anger without completely
destroying the long-standing relationship she had with the Romneys. “I do have a
fairly good idea how traumatic this experience has been for you, because the
element of past friendship enters in. My relationship with them has been far less
personal. However, it does occur to me that even your silence would be a strong
message. But perhaps one good blast (BLAST) would be more cleansing, and even
less destructive of a friendship.”90
Peterson was bothered not only by what she saw as a personal rejection; she
was also concerned that the Romneys’ position reflected a growing movement in
opposition to the ERA. 91 She wrote to Helen Milliken, “but oh Lord, am I
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scared?!!” 92 By 1979, she was convinced that the opposition to the women’s
movement was organized, well funded, and a politically connected, growing
component of the Republican Party. 93 Moreover, she was disgusted that ERA
supporters seemed unwilling to take any action to promote their positions. She
wrote, “I tell you frankly Helen I get a little tired of everyone being FOR ERA but
unable to sit down and do something about it--such as in this instance, write a letter.
So be it.”94 Helen Milliken, however, was an eternal optimist. She disagreed with
Peterson, writing to her, “Elly, I do believe you are wrong when you say that people
no longer have any passion for this issue. I see new fires being kindled all along the
way, and the sparks set off by this Romney ruckus will help the cause–if we can
avoid being overcome by some of the smoke along the way. The cause is right, the
principle is just, and I do trust in God–She will provide.”95 Michigan’s Republican
feminists found it difficult to respond to the Romneys’ arguments because they saw
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them as personal attacks, but also because they believed that their attempts to
radicalize the ERA were both irrelevant and inaccurate.96
Despite the elation with which feminists left the IWY Conference, the
National Plan of Action adopted at the meeting, especially its support for lesbians,
had unintended consequences for Michigan’s Republican feminists. At the time,
Peterson was convinced that feminists had sent a powerful message to
conservative women. The unity of the women who attended the Houston
conference, she wrote, “could not be lost on the frightened right wing who had
spent vast sums of money–first, to take over the state meetings and then, in an
attempt to destroy the value of the Houston Conference.”97 But McNamee seemed
to sense this shift and the danger it posed to the politics of the Republican feminists.
She wrote that “for me, this one [sexual preference] represented an idea whose
time has not come, but I’m in the political arena and I’m not looking for any more
issues than we already have in 1978.”98 While there is no record of how she voted
on this resolution, presumably she was one of the few who opposed it. It appeared
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to push her beyond what she had traditionally been willing to endorse, but she
blamed her reluctance on the pragmatics of politics.
Eventually, even Peterson came to believe that the IWY Conference
contributed to the defeat of the ERA.
I believe, in retrospect, our problems began to mount in Houston.
Most of us thought that it would be a plus for the women’s movement
and, of course, in many ways it was. But in terms of the ERA, it gave
new impetus to the anti group. On the plus side we came out of the
convention with many new groups pro-ERA and many new faces. . . .
But out of it came trouble, too. The convention had been ordained and
funded by Congress; and was an official act. The agenda had been
worked over in 50 state meetings and many seminars . . . and what
happened? The press gave equal coverage to a jack leg religious rally
which wouldn’t have been covered with one inch of press any other
time. . . . We must remember, too, that up to this point Phyllis Schlafly
had been a born loser. . . . But Houston and the Opposition to ERA gave
her her heart’s desire–publicity.99
These newly energized conservative women, who Peterson described as the
“frightened right wing,” used the IWY Conference proceedings to recruit others to
their cause by characterizing feminists as “radicals and lesbians.”100 Barbour, with
her emphasis on the radicalism, violence, and “raised clenched fists” at the meeting,
and her analogy to Nazi rallies, captured the characterization that the conservative
women sought. Romney, who relied on the IWY Conference to conflate radical
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feminism and the ERA, further undermined the cause of Republican feminists
within the Republican Party. The IWY Conference pushed Michigan’s Republican
feminists off of the sensible center of the women’s movement, and once they
shifted leftward, conservative women were able to characterize them as radical
crazies who were unfit to represent women, especially within the Republican Party.
The IWY Conference had placed Republican feminists in a precarious position. The
pressures that were building on them as they tried to reconcile their feminism with
their Republicanism were ready to explode.
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CHAPTER 7 THE SENSIBLE CENTER BECOMES IRRELEVANT: 1980 TO 1983
Our party, the party of Lincoln, the party of human rights, has been the party
that has turned its back on women.
–Helen Milliken
We must each march to his own tune . . . and mine is certainly that I must be a
loyal citizen AND woman before I become partisan.
–Elly Peterson

In July 1980, Detroit served as the site for the Republican national convention.
Commentators predicted that this quadrennial meeting would be significant
because “Republican leaders meeting in Detroit believe they are on the verge of
forming a new majority party with a New Deal-type coalition built on a conservative
base.”1 This conservative challenge did not bode well for Michigan’s Republican
feminists, whose survival depended on the ability of the party’s moderate faction
to stop the conservative tsunami. What otherwise might have been a chance for
these activists to show off their state and celebrate their partisanship became
instead a fight for survival between the moderate and conservative wings of the
party. While Michigan’s ratification of the ERA had not been rescinded, the
proposed constitutional amendment was still three states short of ratification and
faced a deadline of September 30, 1982. In Michigan, abortion was legal and
available to poor women through Medicaid, but that was only due to Governor
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Milliken’s successive vetoes of repeated legislative attempts to end such funding.
Conservatives, who opposed both the ERA and abortion rights for women, were
about to take over the national and state Republican parties.
As predicted, conservative Republicans nominated Ronald Reagan as their
presidential candidate, which they celebrated as the culmination of many years of
hard work designed to take control of the Republican Party. Moderate Republicans,
on the other hand, including Republican feminists, were fearful about their future
in a party run by conservatives. Not surprisingly, moderates also lost control of the
Michigan Republican Party when conservative Richard Headlee replaced Milliken
at the top of the ticket in 1982.
With the conservative takeover of the Republican Party complete,
Republican feminists faced new partisan challenges. They expected opposition to
the ERA, abortion and the rest of their feminist agenda from the party and its
leaders. Thus, they anticipated a struggle “to maintain a feminist presence in the
Republican Party.” At the same time, conservative control over the Republican
Party undermined the multipartisanship of the NWPC, making it increasingly
difficult “to maintain a Republican presence in the feminist movement.” Despite
the pressures placed on them by the changing Republican Party, Michigan’s
Republican feminists tried to hold themselves and their causes together. Each was
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forced, however, to individually reassess her attempts to reconcile her feminism
and partisanship in light of the presidential election of 1980 and the Michigan
gubernatorial election of 1982. Not surprisingly, the outcome was different for
each of them.
The disagreements between Republican women that were apparent at the
IWY Conference came to the forefront in Detroit at the 1980 Republican National
Convention. While Republican feminists had managed to maintain some modicum
of support for the ERA in the 1976 Republican Party platform, all partisan support
for abortion rights had been abandoned. Going into the 1980 convention,
presumptive candidate Reagan had already stated that he supported gender
equality, especially with respect to wages, and indicated that he was willing to sign
legislation on a piecemeal basis that promoted income equality for women. But he
believed that the ERA was unnecessary and, in fact, jeopardized many of the
legislative protections offered specifically to women. 2 He claimed that he
supported equal rights, but opposed the constitutional amendment that would
guarantee those equal rights.
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ERA activists objected to his position. While they conceded that the cause of
gender equality had progressed, they knew they had more to do and would never
stop until the constitution protected their rights. Callow ironically noted “Ronald
Reagan’s promise to urge all states and Congress to amend their discriminatory
laws is also a sign of progress. It is, in effect, an admission there are hundreds of
laws that need change. State legislatures and Congress have had the power to
change these laws all along, but have not. ERA supporters do not expect either
Reagan or themselves to live that long.”3
While Reagan set the stage for the convention debate that would inevitably
occur over the ERA, the leaders of the debate on the convention floor were familiar
adversaries. Schlafly was an advisor to Reagan and a convention delegate. A
majority of convention delegates supported her STOP ERA movement. Moderate
Republicans within the party, including the NRWTF and convention hosts William
and Helen Milliken, the latter representing ERAmerica, fought to continue the
party’s endorsement of the ERA. In a familiar argument, Governor Milliken
contended that a broad-based party was essential to win the presidential election
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and that if the party repudiated its support for the ERA, it would lose women
voters.4
The NRWTF arrived at the preconvention meetings, however, handicapped
by the bridges that it had burned at the 1976 Republican presidential convention.
Freeman concluded that Republicans became powerful within their party through
their connections to the party’s power brokers. Thus, the NRWTF, which derived its
earlier influence from its connections to the then ascendant moderate wing of the
party, was relatively powerless by 1980 as its fortunes sank with those of its
moderate mentors. To make matters worse, the NRWTF had been able to retain a
pro-ERA plank in the 1976 platform only through its ties to Reagan’s opponent,
Gerald Ford. Even in 1976, Republican feminists operated from a position of
weakness, dropping efforts to retain a pro-choice plank because they believed that
any linkage of abortion with the ERA would jeopardize their chances of retaining
support for the ERA in the platform. By 1980 they had no real power or influence
within the party, having lost it all to Schlafly and her supporters.5
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The party’s platform writing subcommittee, which arrived in Detroit a week
early, drafted a compromise between moderate and conservative Republicans
concerning the ERA. It provided that that the party “reaffirm[s] our party’s historic
commitment to equal rights and equal opportunity for women, a commitment
which made us the first national party to endorse the Equal Rights Amendment.”6
At the same time, the compromise did not include a specific endorsement of any
version of the ERA. Instead, it included the more ambiguous statement that “we
are proud of our pioneering role and do not renounce our stand.”7
The compromise language, however, pleased no one. ERA supporters, led by
the NRWTF, wanted more than a passive statement in which the party failed to
denounce the ERA. Helen Milliken joined with other members of the NRWTF to
lobby the platform committee to change the language promising not to renounce
the ERA to a statement of support for it. Conservatives wanted it made clear that
the party did not support the ERA at all.8 Schlafly warned that if the moderates
pushed too hard for a plank endorsing the ERA, she had the votes to adopt a plank
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renouncing it outright.9 She told the feminists that “we think leaving the ERA out
altogether is a generous compromise. . . . We’re willing to go along with it in the
interests of party unity. But we’ve got a majority of votes on this subcommittee and
a big majority on the whole committee. If they push us, we’ll give them a plan which
repudiates the ERA entirely.”10 Conservative Senator Jesse Helms was more blunt.
He asserted that “conservatives have the votes to pass ‘a tough, mean anti-ERA
plank’ if proponents of the measure persist in their efforts to push the issue to a
test.”11
With respect to women’s issues, the final Republican platform included
conservative priorities, including support for exempting women from the military
draft, and an assertion that the government should not interfere with the integrity
of the family.12 It reflected Reagan’s preference to fight discrimination with specific
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laws, rather than a constitutional amendment, and to permit the states to make
their own decisions about the ERA. The Carter administration was reprimanded for
trying to pressure states into ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment.13
In a concession to moderates, the plank “acknowledge[d] the legitimate efforts of
those who support or oppose ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment” and
“reaffirm[ed] the Party’s historical commitment to equal rights and equality for
women,” but never specifically mentioned the ERA.14 Republican feminists agreed
not to pursue this fight on the floor of the convention. In exchange, Reagan
promised to meet with them when he came to Detroit to accept the party’s
nomination.15
Donnelly was pleased with the platform. She noted that it “combine[d] a
neutral position on the Equal Rights Amendment with the strongest women’s rights
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platform that the Party has ever had.”16 Conservatives embraced what they called
a “compromise plank” in the 1980 Republican Party platform because it repudiated
the ERA and the threat it posed to the traditional family, supported measures
intended to provide economic equality for women and, at the same time,
recognized that women were different from men and, therefore, needed some
protections.17 Donnelly noted that “the Republican Party has taken a far-sighted
step which recognizes the differences between the Women’s Movement of the 70’s,
and what could be identified as the Women’s Movement of the 80’s.” 18
Conservative women believed that they would finally realize their goal of becoming
the legitimate representatives of women’s interests in the Republican Party.
Women’s groups sponsored protest rallies to indicate their opposition to the
party’s official position on the ERA. On Sunday, July 13, 1980, the day before the
convention opened, a rally called “The Family of Americans for ERA” convened in
downtown Detroit. Organized by Women in Communications, participants tried to
refute the notion that the ERA was unnecessary and the fight was over. It was a
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complicated rally that focused on the “construction of a simple home–a house
raising–on a flat bed truck in a park near the convention site. The house will be only
partially completed to symbolize women’s limited buying power and the unfinished
task of passing ERA. Planks in the house will be painted with the states which have
ratified ERA and the names of individuals and organizations contributing $1000.”19
The family the organizers referred to “include[d] representatives of all states, ages,
ethnic and income levels, the ‘Doctor, Lawyer, Indian Chiefs’ of society, as well as
housewives and football players, well-known VIP’s, including celebrities
intermingled with average citizens.”20 NOW organized a protest march on the first
day of the convention, which was attended, according to one report, by
approximately twelve thousand marchers, including Helen Milliken, who wore her
Republican elephant pin upside down “in distress.” Drawing on the history of the
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party as the original proponent of equal rights for African Americans, some people
carried signs picturing Abraham Lincoln with a tear streaming down his face.21
Republican feminists fared no better on abortion, but on this issue they did
not even have a favorable plank from the 1976 convention to use as a possible
point of reference. While the final platform acknowledged that some Republicans
favored a woman’s right to choose an abortion, it then dismissed their concerns by
specifically endorsing “a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the
right to life for unborn children. We also support the Congressional efforts to
restrict the use of taxpayers’ dollars for abortion.” 22 This so-called “human life
amendment” would render Roe invalid. While they did not favor a constitutional
amendment to guarantee equality for women, Republicans endorsed one to outlaw
abortion by recognizing that a fetus became a person, entitled to all of the legal
rights conveyed by such status, at conception.
Michigan’s Republican feminists quickly became aware of their place in the
Reagan Republican Party. The majority of Michigan’s delegates, who reflected the
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moderation of the state party in their commitment to George H. W. Bush, found
that they were decisively outnumbered. While at the 1976 convention “the Reagan
forces were considered the ‘lunatic fringe,’” in Detroit they became the
mainstream who ostracized moderates.23 This marginalization was apparent in the
way that the party treated Republican feminists, not only in drafting the platform,
but also at the convention.
Binsfeld, a Bush delegate to the Republican National Convention, anticipated
the opportunities for change presented by this national meeting of Republican
Party leadership. She believed in the importance of political involvement through
political parties and the influence that participants could have on the country. In a
press release, she stated “‘people have abandoned political parties and turned the
elections and government over to the control of special interest groups. The result
is government inaction because there is no unifying force to produce action–a role
historically carried out by political parties.’” 24 She believed that “‘if they [the
American people] join the political process, revitalize the political parties and vote
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in the next election, they can reject stagnant politics and policies and chart a new
course of events for our country.’” 25 She was especially excited about the
opportunities she saw in the creation of the Republican Party Platform. “‘This is the
area where I hope to make a strong contribution. . . . I don’t want the party platform
to be a platitude that’s forgotten the day after the election. Platforms should be
philosophical commitments against which we can test the effectiveness of the
party and the people we elect.’”26 Binsfeld must have been quite disillusioned by
her experiences in trying to influence the platform and the process by which it was
adopted. She was disturbed that they could not even agree to a roll call vote on the
platform that would allow them to publicly record their opposition the party’s
stance on the ERA.27
Republican feminists tried to make the best of a bad situation, but they were
clearly demoralized. To save face, they argued that the outcome would have been
much worse if they had not actively participated in the convention. As agreed,
Reagan met with the NRWTF on July 15, 1980. Attendees, including Helen Milliken
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and other ERA supporters, cited the fact that the meeting took place, and offered
vague representations and broad generalizations about what transpired when they
met, as evidence that it was a success. They noted that “the Reagan meeting was a
clear victory for pro-ERA forces and a tacit acknowledgement by the Reagan camp
that it had underestimated the significance of the issue and the ability of pro-ERA
supporters to rally support and public attention to the issue.”28 Nevertheless, their
influence over Reagan was minimal and they were only able to extract minor
concessions from him. He did, however, agree to consider appointing a woman to
a future Supreme Court vacancy, and ultimately did so with the nomination of
Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981.29
Reagan chose moderate George H. W. Bush as his vice-presidential running
mate, a selection that the members of the NRWTF believed they had influenced.30
In their opinion, Bush was their best chance to moderate Reagan’s strong antiwomen positions. Immediately after the convention ended, the MRWTF wrote to
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Bush, who they had supported for president because he favored the ERA, to hold
him accountable for his subsequent endorsement of the Republican platform,
including its lukewarm position on women’s rights. Victoria Toensing, a Republican
feminist from Michigan who cochaired the Task Force, wrote that “we feel strongly
that ratification of the ERA is both a human issue and an economic issue. We cannot
view the present platform language as anything but a repudiation of the Republican
Party’s forty year support for ratification.”31 Their efforts to hold him accountable
were largely unsuccessful, however, as Republican feminists continued to be
marginalized after the election.
The NRWTF also convinced Reagan to create a Women’s Policy Board under
the leadership of NRWTF members Mary Louise Smith and Kilberg, through which
they hoped “to continue to sensitize the candidate and campaign operatives to the
need to address women’s issues and include women in the campaign process at all
levels.” 32 When they tried to populate the new group, however, Republican
feminist leaders saw just how damaged relations were between Republican
feminists because of the party’s position on ERA. Anne Armstrong, Pam Curtis and
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Mary Louise Smith approached Peterson to try to convince her to become a
member of the board. She turned them all down, indicating that she preferred to
continue her work in support of the ERA, which had become more difficult because
of the opposition of Reagan and the Republican Party. She also shot down any
expectations that Helen Milliken should do more to support Reagan. Peterson
subsequently told Milliken that she wrote to Smith, “the Governor [Milliken] has
come out for the ticket–you are striving to keep the moderate Republican women
in the party and happy and working. . . . I closed that little discussion by saying that
you were committed to ERAmerica and if you were to drop out of that and say you
were working for RR [Ronald Reagan] it would really create problems.”33 Peterson
and Milliken were never able to enthusiastically support Reagan and chose, for the
most part, to continue their work on the ERA.34 Donnelly, on the other hand, was a
Reagan-Bush volunteer in Michigan and became a member of the Women’s Policy
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Advisory Board, not at all what the NRWTF intended when it advocated that the
organization be created.35
NRWTF member Pam Curtis indicated that Republican feminists would
respond in one of three ways to the nomination of Reagan. Some would support
him because they were Republicans and they prioritized partisanship over
feminism. Burnett, for example, indicated that she “happily voted for Reagan and
cheered when he crushed Jimmy Carter in 1980,” despite her pro-choice stance on
abortion, because she was “not a one-issue voter.”36 She called herself a “feminist
Republican” and, by indicating that she did not vote on the basis of a single issue,
tried to reconcile her partisanship and feminism by working within the Republican
Party to make it more receptive to feminist issues. 37 Others would support him
because they wanted to advance within the party bureaucracy or to participate in
a Republican administration. 38 Peterson characterized Kilberg as a member of
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Curtis’ latter group–seeking a “big appointment” in the new Reagan
administration.39
In order to continue to participate in the campaign and support the
Republican Party, Republican feminists were encouraged to redefine women’s
issues. Instead of rejecting Reagan because of his opposition to the ERA and
abortion, women, according to Kilberg, needed to reconfirm their loyalty to the
Republican Party and redirect their efforts to those issues where they might be able
to make a difference. She stated, “I think it is useless and unrealistic for a
Republican feminist to expect to find a change in Reagan’s position on ERA and
abortion. It’s obvious that’s not going to happen.” 40 Reagan argued that gender
equality was dependent on economic security and global stability for all
Americans. 41 Kilberg shifted her position accordingly. She advised women “to
concentrate on a lot of other issues that impact on women–displaced homemakers,
pension reform, day care, the marriage tax. . . . I’m a feminist. But I’m also a
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consumer and wage earner . . . and to me the decision as to whom to support for
the presidency is going to be broader than equal rights and abortion.”42 Republican
feminists who shifted or abandoned their priorities to accept this argument were
able to convince themselves that a Reagan presidency would address their
concerns.
Curtis identified a final alternative for disillusioned Republican feminists.
These women, she believed, would choose to elevate their feminism over their
partisanship and support the candidate who best met their feminist goals–
independent John Anderson. Anderson was a Republican who, in April 1980,
decided to run as an independent, third-party candidate when it became clear that
he would not be able to defeat Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination.
A supporter of the ERA and reproductive choice for women, he was widely seen as
the Republican candidate who was most supportive of women’s rights. 43 Helen
Milliken even chose to endorse him while he ran as a Republican, but did not
believe that she could publicly support him after he left the party.44 In a letter she
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wrote to Peterson early in the 1980 election year, she noted that she thought that
he was best on women’s issues and had widespread grassroots support, but
nobody to organize for him. She further indicated that the governor was not sure
how to proceed with the 1980 presidential campaign. “Bill is agonizing over what
to do ____ what would be the step (and endorsement) that would deflect Ronald
R. I think John A. is really his choice too, but he can’t afford a miss on this one.”45
At least one of Michigan’s Republican feminists became an advocate and
campaign leader for Anderson. Beebe became coordinator of his presidential
campaign in Michigan because she believed that a third party candidate was
necessary. 46 She felt that Reagan was “ultraconservative and hyper-nationalistic,”
and Carter “wasn’t trained to be president” and “doesn’t have the skills to lead a
nation.”47 Under her leadership, Anderson was able to garner enough signatures to
get his name on the primary ballot and won enough votes in the primary to get his
name on Michigan’s final ballot in November. Beebe was even temporarily
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nominated as his vice presidential candidate as a placeholder on the Michigan
ticket until he actually selected his running mate, Patrick Lucey. Ultimately,
Anderson got about 7 percent of the vote in Michigan. Reagan won the state with
49 percent and Carter trailed him, winning 43 percent of the vote in Michigan.48
Once Reagan became president, things went downhill for Republican
feminists. The NWPC effectively purged the NRWTF from its network of feminist
organizations and replaced it with a new, accountable Republican affiliate. In 1979,
the NWPC sought to gain some control over the NRWTF by requiring that all task
force members join the NWPC. When the NRWTF objected to this rule change, the
NWPC pushed the NRWTF out of the organization. The leader of the NRWTF told
members that “Iris [Mitgang, chairperson of the NWPC] indicated that the time had
probably come when the Task Force and the National Women’s Political Caucus
should sever their relationship in a friendly manner with no hard feelings.” 49 A
second group was formed, called the NWPC Republicans, to serve as the partisan
task force of the NWPC. As the leaders of this new organization told potential
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members, “the NWPC is a multipartisan organization as set forth in its purpose and
by-laws and [NWPC Republicans is] intend [sic] to be the feminist Republican voice
and action arm of the mother organization, NWPC.” 50 Leaders of the now
independent NRWTF were discouraged. Chairperson Nancy Thompson indicated
that “it appears to me, and I think I can speak for the other officers as well, that we
should still work to fulfill our original objectives: (1) to promote a feminist presence
in the Republican Party and; (2) to promote a Republican presence in the feminist
movement.”51 However, she was not optimistic about the organization’s chances
to do so. “On the feminist front, I have just reported our exclusion. Earlier in my
letter, I referred to the appointment ‘progress’ of the Reagan administration; it is
equally clear that women, not just feminist women, are being excluded [from
positions in the Reagan administration].”52
Inherent in this reorganization was a critique of the old guard Republican
feminists who made up the NRWTF. As the leader of the new NWPC Republicans
told potential members, “we as Republican women cannot help but view with
50
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mixed emotions the tremendous gains Republicans made in November. The long
standing commitment of the Republican Party to ratification of the ERA is gone. The
lip service paid to equal representation of women in convention delegates and
committee memberships from the local level on up is laughable. We are all aware
of the dearth of women appointed by Reagan to high level government
positions.”53 The suggestion appears to be that the women of the NRWTF were too
closely tied to Reagan and, therefore, were either not interested in or not in a
position to accomplish much for Republican feminists, with the emphasis on
feminists. She continued that “the RWTF has done a tremendous job in trying to
look after our interests with limited resources, particularly at National Convention
time, and I urge you to give them your support. However, I feel that the NWPC with
its grassroots organizational structure can provide the kind of umbrella we need to
build an effective network for impacting our party and our government in general.
As Caucus members we are not only a voice for Republican women but for all
women who share our concerns about equality in our democracy.”54 If forced to
choose, this new group was likely to prioritize its feminism over its Republicanism.
As the NWPC became increasingly Democratic and the Republican Party
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increasingly conservative, NWPC leadership sought to separate its Republican arm
from Reagan Republicans. It did so by creating a substitute for the NRWTF and then
populating it with members who were more loyal to the feminists of the NWPC
than to Reagan’s Republican Party.
Changes in the Republican Party also threatened the multipartisanship of the
NWPC. Caucus leaders believed that women gained political strength from their
large numbers and thus had to prioritize their common feminist goals over their
partisan differences. However, when Republican candidates who received support
from the NWPC began to vote in accordance with the directives of their party and
contrary to the interests of feminists, members of the NWPC suggested that
perhaps its policy of supporting Republican candidates should be reviewed. Others
countered that reversing this policy would undermine the multipartisan foundation
on which the organization was based. Kathy Wilson was the Republican president
of the NWPC from 1981 to 1983. In her obituary, a Democratic strategist noted that
she was “‘so tough that when she burned her bra she kept it on.’”55 While she led
the NWPC, she stressed that “only with the support of both parties will equality be
won. I want my party back, and I’m going to work very hard to get it back, especially
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by supporting progressive Republican women for office.”56 Thus, she argued, the
NWPC could be instrumental in bringing the Republican Party back to its moderate
roots. Ironically, however, she was one of many Caucus members who ultimately
prioritized their feminism over their partisanship and left the Republican Party.57
The ERA was finally defeated with a whimper when the ratification period
expired on June 30, 1982. As head of ERAmerica, Milliken spoke eloquently about
the defeat, and sought to inspire the women who unsuccessfully fought for the ERA
by comparing and connecting them to the suffragists who fought for the vote. She
asserted that these activists “share[d] more than history with our foremothers. We
share a vision.” 58 She stressed that women would continue to pass the goal of
equality from generation to generation until it became a reality.59 Their efforts, she
said, while not successful, provided “us the know-how and the tools to continue
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the fight for equality. Women have become a political force. It will not go away.”60
In fact, women in Michigan began to organize immediately to reintroduce the ERA
in Congress, to establish statewide programs in support of ratification and to
nominate and elect candidates in the November 1982 elections who would support
the ERA and other issues of concern to women. ERAmerica reconstituted itself in
Michigan and committed itself to become an integrated element of the national
ERA movement to adopt the ERA and ratify it again in Michigan.61
Reactions to the defeat of the ERA varied. Burnett and Callow both believed
that the ERA failed because men realized that forced equality would be too
expensive. Thus, they blamed patriarchs who profited from the status quo and had
no incentive to change discriminatory labor and wage structures.62 Donnelly, who
felt vindicated and apparently magnanimous, called for a new sense of cooperation
between women. She indicated, “It’s time to get over the bitterness. . . . I don’t feel
bitter. It’s time to break the ice and find a way for those of us who agree on basic
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issues and positive things to stand together. The defeat of ERA doesn’t mean
women’s rights are lost or anything taken away. It means the debate will continue
in a more reasonable fashion.” 63 Her words, however, could not eliminate the
lingering animosity between those on both sides of the ERA battle and did not
change the minds of Republican feminists.
Michigan’s Republican feminists received another blow when Governor
Milliken announced, in December 1981, that after thirteen years as governor, he
would not run for reelection and, in fact, would retire from politics at the end of his
term in 1982. A four-person Republican primary ensued between three
conservative candidates, L. Brooks Patterson, an Oakland County prosecuting
attorney, state representative Jack Welborn, and insurance executive and
businessman Richard Headlee, and moderate lieutenant governor and Milliken’s
chosen successor, James Brickley. The Republican voters nominated Headlee, and
a former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, Thomas Brennan, to run for
governor and lieutenant governor, respectively. The three conservative candidates
collectively received almost 70 percent, or 450,000 of the 644,429 votes cast in the
Republican primary election, which was indicative of the direction in which the
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party was moving. 64 A Detroit Free Press obituary for Headlee in 2004 noted,
“Headlee was ‘a transformational figure in Michigan politics, involved in re-shaping
the Republican Party from the moderate era of former Gov. William Milliken to the
more conservative, tax averse generation that came to power in the 1990s.’”65 The
Democrats nominated state representative James Blanchard to run for governor,
and former member of the United States House of Representatives, Martha
Griffiths, who had originally introduced the ERA to the US Congress when it was
adopted in 1971, to run for lieutenant governor.66
Michigan’s Republican feminists found that Headlee was not Milliken,
especially with respect to women’s issues. The contrast between Headlee and his
opponent on these issues could not have been clearer. The 1982 Republican
gubernatorial ticket opposed the ERA and abortion rights for women. Blanchard
favored both, including the rights of poor women to have abortions at government
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expense, if necessary.67 Much like Reagan, Headlee opposed the ERA and any laws
that tried to eliminate distinctions between men and women, but claimed to
support equal rights for women. Differences between the genders, he argued, were
biologically fixed and, therefore, could not be eliminated through legislation. He
believed that the argument over the ERA was mere “rhetoric,” and that the
Republican Party had a much better record than Democrats in supporting the
women who held high level government positions in Michigan, including Mary
Coleman, the only female supreme court justice in Michigan.68
Many of Headlee’s comments to and about women were incendiary to
feminists within the Michigan Republican Party. He objectified women as he
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dismissed their concerns. Recognizing that he had a problem with half of the voters
in the state, he met with a small group of women in September to try to convince
them to support his candidacy. The women, however, were not impressed with his
commitment to equality when he announced that “‘women are superior beings.
They have more money . . . because they live longer’–and they inherit their
husbands’ money–‘and they’re pretty.’” 69 He tried to minimize the number and
attack the legitimacy of the women who opposed him, arguing that there were only
nine members of the MRWTF who opposed him because of their rabid commitment
to the ERA and abortion. He called them “‘irrational. . . . so obsessed with this that
they’ve become hardened. They don’t even smile. They’re unhappy.’” 70 He
compared supporters of the ERA to members of “‘the [John] Birch Society’ in their
unwillingness to come up with a compromise ERA that would allow for sexual
differences.”71
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Headlee proved that he was tone-deaf to women’s issues when he crassly
equated his support for women to his reproductive prowess. He argued that in
comparison to Blanchard he could not be considered anti-women since he had nine
children and Blanchard only had one. 72 He often came across as flip and
condescending, like when he sarcastically attributed his belief that “women are
pretty” to “a hormonal imbalance.” 73 Instead of reassuring women that he was
committed to addressing their concerns, his comments proved that he did not
understand or care about women’s issues. In fact, he repeatedly asserted that the
ERA and abortion rights were secondary issues that were not as important as fixing
Michigan’s weak economy and high unemployment rate (while arguing that by
rectifying these problems, he was helping women as well as men).
Problems between Michigan’s Republican feminists and Headlee culminated
on October 5, 1982, when Peterson and about twenty-five other Republican
feminists attended a Blanchard fundraiser to publicly announce their support for
him. Some felt that this luncheon was a staged event, intended to maximize the
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political mileage that Blanchard could achieve by publicizing his endorsement by
“the mother” of Michigan’s moderate Republican Party.74 In fact, the optics of the
luncheon supported that interpretation. Republican women met with Blanchard,
Griffiths and Mrs. Blanchard before the event and entered the meeting room as a
group after all of the other attendees were seated. Detroit Free Press political
editor Hugh McDiarmid concluded that “in fact, the luncheon was strictly a set up,
orchestrated down to the last teacup by Democrats from the Blanchard for
Governor Committee. . . . [T]he Republicans were paraded in like show-biz
celebrities on opening night.”75
When asked about her endorsement of Democrat Blanchard, Peterson cited,
in addition to Headlee’s stand on the ERA and abortion rights, his efforts to
undermine her long-term work to diversify the base of the Republican Party. She
had long worked to bring women and people who lived in the cities, especially the
African American residents of Detroit, into the traditionally white, male, middle
class Republican Party. She said, “‘I gave my [sic] 15 years of my life . . . 24 hours a
day to build a broad based Republican Party. When I left in 1970, I felt completely
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convinced that Bill Milliken would carry on and build an even greater Republican
Party. . . . And to find out now that we are reversing all that. . . . I guess you have to
say I’m a Michigander and a woman before I’m a Republican.’”76 After the luncheon,
she indicated that “none of these women [who joined her that day] are leaving the
Republican Party. . . . They just do not feel Richard Headlee represents the Party.”77
She indicated that they orchestrated this public repudiation to try and convince the
men in the Republican Party to recognize and respect women, their interests, and
their potential political power.78
In 1982, Peterson’s feminist activism seemed to mirror her partisan work of
1970 when she was still trying to convince a male-dominated Republican Party to
empower women. However, her reaction to their leadership decisions was very
different in 1982, to a large extent because she now had twelve years of experience
with the women’s movement. While in 1970 she indicated that she was a
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Republican first and a woman second, faced with Headlee’s candidacy, Peterson
was forced to reprioritize her interests and her partisanship became less important
than her gender. She noted, “We must each march to his own tune . . . and mine is
certainly that I must be a loyal citizen AND woman before I become partisan.”79
While she still wanted to believe that the Republican Party reflected her interests,
she argued that Headlee was an illegitimate, albeit temporary, representative of
the party and, therefore, she could not support him.
Helen Milliken, who had just undergone surgery for breast cancer, was more
politically handcuffed than Peterson and did not publicly support either Headlee or
Blanchard for governor.80 Michigan political journalist Tim Skubick indicated that
he repeatedly tried to get both Governor and Mrs. Milliken to reveal who they
voted for in the 1982 gubernatorial election, but they would never give him an
answer. However, McDiarmid, writing about Skubick’s interview, indicated that
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while they would not respond to the question, based on their disdain for Headlee,
the answer was apparent.81
Some of Michigan’s Republican feminists reacted to Headlee in the same way
that Republican feminists responded to Reagan in 1980 when they met with him
during the national convention. Instead of prioritizing their feminism over their
partisanship, they tried to reconcile their interests with Headlee’s priorities and
policies. McNamee and Binsfeld, for example, seemed inclined to soften Peterson’s
criticism of Headlee. After they met with him, they were convinced that they had
been able to sensitize him to the issues that women deemed important. Moreover,
they believed that policies and programs that he had implemented in his successful
insurance company and campaign indicated that he did understand their concerns.
They contended that Headlee “has shown his commitment to women by having a
woman campaign manager, a day care center for his campaign staff, two women
vice-presidents (actually they are assistant vice-presidents) as well as women
managers at his company and ‘flex time’–a program in which employes generally
set their own schedules to meet family and work obligations–for company
employes.” 82 Thus, they sought to downplay the controversial and insensitive
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public comments that he made on the campaign trail by emphasizing his actual
accomplishments on women’s issues. At the same time, they tried to diminish the
importance of his opposition to both the ERA and abortion by emphasizing his
economic positions. Binsfeld noted that the meeting “was a candid exchange of
ideas and positions, I learned that he already embraces a number of the concepts
that we believe in, and I believe he has a feel for the economic and job problems
women face today.” 83 They recharacterized women’s issues as nongendered
“economic and job” issues so that they could continue to prioritize, or at least
reconcile, their partisanship with their feminism.
In an interview with a student journalist at Central Michigan University
towards the end of the campaign, Headlee criticized those who supported the ERA
in a comment that the Harvard Crimson called, “the gaffe of the year.”84 He stated
that “those people that sponsor the ERA–and it doesn’t mention women anywhere
in the ERA, it doesn’t mention women’s rights anywhere in it, it talks about sex–
they are the proponents of lesbian marriage, homosexual marriage, things of that
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nature, which I categorically resist, categorically reject as part of a basis of a sound
society.”85 This comment was very similar to the public statement that Romney
made about the ERA in 1979. The similarity was most likely more than coincidental,
however, as Romney and Headlee were both Mormons and Romney supported
Headlee’s candidacy for governor.
Like Romney, Headlee was criticized for this statement and soon tried to walk
it back. He indicated that he was not referring to supporters of the ERA, but to the
Michigan Women’s Assembly III, which had just come out with a candidate ranking
that placed him far below his opponent, largely due to his positions on abortion
and the ERA. The Michigan Women’s Assembly III was a bipartisan, collaborative
meeting of almost thirty feminist women’s groups from around the state. The
group met in June 1982 to find ways to use the political power of women to further
their feminist interests in Michigan. It endorsed a new ERA, access to abortion and
lesbian and homosexual rights. These women organized to support candidates in
the November 1982 election who backed their goals and objectives.86
Headlee issued the following statement to explain his earlier comment:
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My comments were made in reference to some of the resolutions
contained in the Women’s Assembly III platform such as support of
lesbian and homosexual marriage, lesbian and homosexual child
custody and adoption rights and permitting minors to obtain birth
control pills and abortions without parental knowledge and consent.
Obviously every supporter of the ERA or every member of the
Women’s Assembly III does not support these provisions. However, as
a group of 28 self-described feminist organizations the Women’s
Assembly III has endorsed them knowing that this hidden agenda
might well be enacted by courts interpreting the equal rights
amendment. It is that very real possibility that caused me and many
others to oppose the Equal Rights Amendment as proposed even
though I fully support equal rights for women.87
His running mate was equally critical of the Assembly. He called it “‘a very radical
organization’ that wants ‘power for women’ and ‘sets women against men.’” 88
Brennan stated that many of Headlee’s other statements were just jokes that were
misinterpreted because of the preconceived notions that women had about
Headlee. He also suggested that critics of the Headlee-Brennan ticket were
engaged in religious discrimination because the two men were Mormon and
Catholic, respectively. “The Democrats are ‘trying to make us look like the guys who
are trying to keep the women barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen.’”89 These men
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seemed unable to craft a narrative that responded to the concerns of women
voters.
In fact, none of the explanations offered by the Republican candidate for
governor or his running mate helped him win the governorship. He lost the election
by 51 to 45 percent, despite the fact that more men voted for Headlee. Headlee
lost largely because six out of every ten women voted for Blanchard.90 Thus, the
gender gap proved to be significant in this election. Milliken biographer Dempsey
noted that Headlee “spoke candidly and sometimes with devastating invective
about his conservative political views. While that appealed to conservative voters,
the trait likely cost him the governor’s job–and all because one of the targets he
chose to attack was the pro-Equal Rights Amendment position of Helen Milliken,
the first lady of Michigan.”91 Ironically, Republican feminists Peterson and Helen
Milliken helped to turn women voters away from the Republican candidate and
contributed to the electoral victory of Democrat Blanchard. Their feminism
trumped their partisanship.
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Republican feminists did not fare well in the Michigan Republican Party after
the 1982 election. Despite Headlee’s loss, conservatives retained control of the
party and Republican women disagreed over who should represent them. In 1983
conservative women prevailed. Angered by the fact that many members of the
MRWTF, including its newly elected leader, publicly supported Blanchard in the
1982 election, conservatives were able to convince Republican Party leadership to
declare “that the Republican Women’s Task Force ‘has no official connection with
this party and no franchise to speak for Republican women.’”92 Since their liberal
views were no longer consistent with those of the party, conservative women
purged the MRWTF as the face of women in the Republican Party. Although
Republican feminists and conservative women had battled for at least ten years
over which group best represented women in the party, the latter had finally
prevailed and, in doing so, made moderate feminists feel ostracized and
unwelcome.93
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Some members of the party were incensed by the way it treated the women
who chose Blanchard over Headlee. Lou Cramton, who had served as a Republican
member of the Michigan legislature, asked Spencer Abraham, chairman of the
Michigan Republican Party, “How do I transfer out of this chicken outfit? I’ve been
a working, voting and contributing Republican for more years than I like to admit
but reading of the purging of the party of people--such outstanding Republicans as
Maxine Swanson, Elly Peterson, Helen Milliken and others in the Women’s
Republican Task Force--who are branded as disloyal sinners by the more
conservative element of our part--leaves me looking for the exit.” 94 Cramton
accurately identified the problem that the party faced.95 It needed to expand its
membership, not exile members who did not agree with its turn to the right. He
queried, “Is a purge going to bring those women--and their votes, and their efforts
and their contributions back into the fold?”96 The big tent approach advocated by
Peterson, Milliken and other moderate Republicans was abandoned on ideological
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grounds and it left many Republican men and women worried about the future of
the party.
The presidential election of 1980 and the gubernatorial election of 1982
made it clear that conservatives had taken control of both the national and state
Republican parties. While Republican feminists tried their best “to maintain a
feminist presence in the Republican Party,” their efforts had largely failed.
Conservatives rejected that presence when they purged the feminist MRWTF from
the Michigan Republican Party. At the same time, they did not fare much better in
“maintain[ing] a Republican presence in the feminist movement.” The NWPC
seemed unwilling or unable to work with a conservative Republican Party because
the Republican candidates it supported, once elected, could not reconcile and
oftentimes prioritized the party over their feminism. As a result, the NWPC seemed
willing to jeopardize the strength that it derived from its multipartisan constituency
by cutting ties with a conservative Republican Party. Michigan’s Republican
feminists had tried to maintain the sensible center of the women’s movement in
order to reconcile their core identities–feminism and Republicanism–but that
strategy ultimately failed. They were each left to process these contradictions on
their own.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION
Not only is it our right as women to actively participate in government, but it’s
time for the female half of our population to accept its full share of responsibility
for governing.
–Connie Binsfeld

Peterson turned seventy in 1984, and her friends and colleagues planned a
large party to celebrate the occasion. Organizers designated the proceeds,
naturally, to the MRWTF. Since women in the Michigan Republican Party, which
was no longer affiliated with the MRWTF, were at odds, at least one political
commentator wondered if the event would become a political free for all. Instead,
it was a bipartisan lovefest. Many of the state’s Democratic leaders, including
Senator Donald Riegle and Lieutenant Governor Martha Griffiths, came to honor
Peterson. George Romney and Mr. and Mrs. Milliken attended. Even conservative
Republicans, such as Headlee’s 1982 running mate Thomas Brennan, and future
governor John Engler, who would select Binsfeld as his running mate in 1990, came
to honor Peterson. Martha Griffiths offered the following tribute: “‘In my judgment,
Elly Peterson is the brightest politician this state has had in this century, Democrat
or Republican, man or woman, black or white.’”1 Michigan’s Republican feminists,
including Peterson, had tried to work within the Republican Party to make it
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inclusive and responsive to the concerns of all, including women who sought
gender equality. How ironic that the proceeds of this tribute to her long and
successful career, which she had dedicated to both the Republican Party and
women’s equality, went to a feminist women’s organization tied to the Republican
Party in name only.
By 1984 the terms “Republican” and “feminist” were widely considered to
be antithetical, forcing each of the seven women studied in this dissertation to
individually decide how to reconcile her feminism with her Republicanism. Three
of them either officially or effectively left the party by retiring from Republican
Party politics. Lee Kefauver moved back to Massachusetts in 1982, where she
registered as a Democrat. In light of her frequent criticisms of William Milliken and
the Michigan Republican Party, and her passionate commitment to abortion rights
for all women, her political shift was not surprising. As a Democrat, she continued
to fight for equal access to abortion and wrote frequently about the misogyny
inherent in the pro-life movement. For example, in 2009 she asserted that people
who argue that life begins at conception are “fetus fetishists” who cannot claim to
be concerned about life because they do not care about the lives of the pregnant
women. She concluded that “in my years of experience dealing with these fetus
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fetishists, I would add that they are the ultimate misogynists.” 2 Kefauver is
apparently still living in Massachusetts.
After campaigning for independent candidate Anderson in 1980, Beebe
remained disillusioned about the Michigan Republican Party. She was convinced
that, going back to 1966, the party had not supported her candidacies. In 1983 she
announced that “there’s no way I want to be identified with the Republican Party
as it is now.”3 While she continued her longstanding support for abortion rights
through her participation in Planned Parenthood, there is no indication that she
remained involved in politics after 1980.4 She died in 2005 at the age of ninety-five.
In 1984, McNamee retired from the Michigan House of Representatives at
the age of sixty. She decided that it was time for her to resign because she was out
of place as a moderate in an increasingly conservative Republican Party.5 When
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asked if she had ever considered becoming a Democrat, she responded, “No. . . .
I’m needed in my own party as a liberal–well, a moderate Republican. And I am a
Republican. I believe in private enterprise, private initiatives to solve problems. I
just want some women’s voices to be heard in decision-making.”6 After she retired
from public office, it does not appear that she ever reengaged in politics. She chose
to reconcile her interests by largely withdrawing from the public sphere. She died
in 2006 at the age of eighty-five.
Peterson prioritized her feminism over her partisanship in the 1982
gubernatorial election. Perhaps hoping that conservative control over the party
was temporary, she clarified that her support for Blanchard did not mean that she
had left the party. Instead, she argued that Headlee’s Republican Party was not the
party for which she had worked for so many years. The party had changed, not her.
She noted, “MY Republican Party is open to all, and it is not necessary that we think
precisely alike, as we goose step along.”7 Years later, however, she announced that
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she had become an independent.8 In 2008 shortly before she died, she endorsed
Democrat Hillary Clinton for president.
Although Helen Milliken, understandably, was always somewhat reticent
about publicly opposing the Republican Party, it appears that she voted for
Blanchard in 1982. Thereafter, she seemed increasingly likely to back the
candidates who agreed with her on the issues that were important to her as a
feminist. Thus, she repudiated conservative Republican John Engler and endorsed
Democrat Blanchard for governor in 1990 and Democrat Howard Wolpe for
governor in 1994, largely because they were pro-choice.9 Wolpe asked her to run
as his lieutenant governor, but she decided not to enter the race. While she
remained active fighting for ERA and abortion rights, she came to believe that
abortion was of vital importance because “‘all other rights’ of a woman [were] of
‘limited value’ without the right to choose when to bear children.”10 She remained
largely uninvolved with a Republican Party that did not reflect her interests as a
woman. But when she died in 2012 at the age of eighty-nine, George Weeks, one
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of Governor Milliken’s long-time assistants, noted that he did not believe “that
Helen Milliken left the Republican Party. ‘I think she was an advocate of the party
returning to what she thought of as its roots. . . . She was clearly a flaming
moderate.’” 11 She had evolved from a childhood steeped in conservatism to an
adult life devoted to moderate and liberal causes.
Even after the Republican Party’s rightward turn, a small feminist presence
remained in the party. Burnett continued to try to integrate her politics with her
gender as an active feminist and vocal Republican, but she never became a
candidate for public office. She supported freedom of reproductive choice,
including government funded abortions for poor women, and tried to moderate
the Republican Party’s opposition to abortion from within. In 1988, Burnett spoke
before the Michigan Republican State Convention in favor of abortion rights,
including Medicaid-funded abortions for poor women. She indicated that she
“completely respect[ed] and honor[ed] other people’s right to object to abortion,
based on their own personal religious or moral beliefs. All I ask is that those who
are pro-life will let us who are pro-choice decide for ourselves, just as they decide
for themselves.” 12 She cloaked her argument in familiar, fiscally conservative
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rhetoric, noting that abortions were less expensive than raising unwanted children.
Most of them, she believed, became a part of the state welfare system. Even as
adults, they were less likely to become successful, productive members of society.
She believed that opposition to abortion “was sexism in an unholy alliance with
religion. There are a lot of men who are not comfortable with the idea of women
having control over their own bodies. (Next thing you know, I imagine they must
be thinking, they’ll want control over their own money.) Denying them this
fundamental right is a lot easier when you’ve convinced yourself that’s what God
wants, too.”13 After her speech, the Republican audience booed.14
Burnett was also critical of the feminist movement which, she believed, had
been taken over by radicals who discouraged participation by women who were
not like them. She was one of those women. Based on her experiences, she was
convinced that radical feminists believed that her wealth in some way
compromised her commitment to feminism. Moreover, she argued that NOW was
intolerant of feminists who were Republicans because of the party’s stance on the
ERA and abortion. Despite the differences between feminism and Republicanism,
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she continued to believe that they could be reconciled. She described herself as “a
fiscal conservative . . . [and] a radical feminist to the core. My mission . . . is to be a
thorn in the side of my party pricking its conscience.” 15 Shortly before she died, she
gave an interview in which she exhorted women to become Republicans and to get
involved in the political process.16 Burnett remained a Republican feminist until her
death in 2014 at the age of ninety-four. Throughout her long life, she was
“committed to maintaining a feminist presence in the Republican Party and a
Republican presence in the feminist movement.”17
Binsfeld also remained in the party, but adopted a different strategy. She
worked from within to promote equality for women, but tried to do so in a way
that did not alienate her conservative colleagues. Because she was a pro-life
Republican feminist, she started from a position that was perhaps more acceptable
to party leaders. Thus, she served in the Michigan Senate from 1982 until 1990,
when she was elected lieutenant governor under conservative Republican John
Engler. She held that position for the next eight years. Binsfeld referenced the
15
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confusing fluidity of the ideological labels attached to feminists when she noted
that she “came down here [to the 1980 Republican National Convention] thinking
I was a moderate. . . . ‘In the Michigan House, I’m considered a conservative,’ she
added. ‘But on this committee, I was probably considered a flaming liberal.’”18
In addition to her work promoting sex education in Michigan’s schools,
Binsfeld put forth other compromise strategies which reflected and integrated her
moderate feminism with the conservatism of her Republican colleagues. For
example, in 1983 she cofounded the Michigan Republican Women’s Caucus as “a
voluntary, nonprofit, unincorporated committee of Republican women who are or
were elected or appointed public officials, or who are working or have worked in
positions affecting public policy. It is not affiliated with any other organization.”19
This organization incorporated Reagan’s goals, noting that “the purpose of the
MRWC is to promote a policy of equal opportunity for women, and to recognize
the important contributions women make to the economy and the government.
The MRWC will focus on issues of economic equality, and will expand upon
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President Reagan’s. and the Republican Party’s, efforts and achievements for the
benefit of all American women.”20
Binsfeld remained an advocate for the ERA because she believed that it was
essential for women to have constitutional protection against legislators who
answered to the political whims of their constituents. After the ERA ratification
period expired in 1982, she proposed that the Republican Party endorse a less
controversial version of the ERA that could not be interpreted to protect abortion
rights. She sought a statement in the 1984 party platform that endorsed the
following proposed constitutional amendment: “Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on the basis of
whether a person is male or female.” 21 President Reagan, she argued, “should
support a modified equal rights amendment because: a. It is right; b. The majority
of the people want it; c. It will help his re-election by making the Democrats focus
on something else; d. The Republican Party has always been the champion of
equality before the law as the cornerstone on which all that we value rests.”22 She
20
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recognized that women had needs that were different from their male colleagues
in the Republican Party. They shared a common identity and an interest in
protecting themselves, not just as economic actors, but also as women. She
continued to dedicate her political career to helping women and children while
remaining true to her Republicanism and her feminism. After serving for for eight
years as a Michigan state senator and two terms as lieutenant governor for
conservative Republican John Engler, she retired in 1998, and died in 2014 at the
age of eighty-nine.
This dissertation illustrates that throughout the 1970s, Michigan’s
Republican feminists appropriated the sensible center of the women’s movement
to maintain a feminist presence in the Republican Party and a Republican presence
in the feminist movement. In this way, they were able to reconcile and promote
two of their core identities–Republicanism and feminism. For a while this strategy
worked. However, as the Republican Party became more conservative, they found
themselves unable to simultaneously promote both interests. The NWPC did not
want to work with a conservative Republican Party that challenged its raison d’etre.
Even the NWPC leaders who vowed to try to change the Republican Party from
within eventually gave up and joined the Democratic Party. In trying to represent
feminists in the Republican Party, Michigan’s Republican feminists became an
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integral part of the struggle between moderates and conservatives for control of
the party. They had no choice but to partner with party moderates to neutralize
the conservatism that threatened their existence. In 1980 and 1982, the
nominations of conservatives to the highest national and state elective offices
signaled that conservatives had won control of the party. As historians have
concluded, the feminist movement was one of the losers in the conservative
ascendency. Beebe, Kefauver, Peterson, Milliken and McNamee prioritized their
feminism over their partisanship and reluctantly retired from politics and/or fled
the party.
However, Burnett and Binsfeld remained active in Republican Party politics.
Burnett continued the strategy she used in the 1970s, trying to moderate both the
feminist political organizations to which she belonged and the Republican Party.
She died fighting and frustrated that that NOW and the NWPC were increasingly
liberal and the Republican Party remained largely conservative. Binsfeld, who was
always closer to the conservative movement because of her position on abortion,
tried a different strategy. She used her elective office to work with Republican Party
leadership on women’s rights, which sometimes required her to compromise. As a
result, her strategies and goals became less robust than those that Michigan’s
Republican feminists had pursued in the 1970s. If not a strong feminist presence,
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for almost twenty-five years Binsfeld reminded Republicans, through her words
and deeds, that women needed to be involved in politics as equal participants. Her
activism suggests that both feminist and political historians need to further explore
the role that Ziegler’s pro-life feminists played in the Republican Party.
While the conservative ascendency largely strangled the feminist presence
in the Republican Party, the activism of Republican feminists nevertheless had a
long-term, political impact. In 2011, revisiting her earlier work, Rymph suggested
that the Republican Party had changed. She noted that in the 1970s, there were
“political feminists,” including Republican feminists, who sought to make sure “that
more women be elected to public office and serve as leaders in the political parties,
and that feminist issues be advanced through the political system.”23 While she was
not willing to identify a rebirth of Republican feminism in the twenty-first century
Republican Party, she did indicate that “Americans, including Republicans, seem to
have accepted–and in some cases even grown to appreciate–transformations
propelled by the women’s movement, while remaining wary of or hostile to liberal
feminism itself.”24 This dissertation describes, on a grass roots level, the genesis of
this change.
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In fact, recent polls support Rymph’s conclusion. They suggest that
Republicans have embraced some of the basic principles of Michigan’s Republican
feminists. For example, in October 2015, 90 percent of Republicans surveyed
agreed that they “would support an amendment to the United States Constitution
that guarantees equal rights for both men and women.”25 According to a 2013
Huffington Post poll, 76 percent of Republicans said “that men and women should
be social, political and economic equals,” yet only 5 percent of the people surveyed
called themselves feminists. 26 Thus, these polls indicate that most Republicans
believe in gender equality and are willing to support a constitutional amendment
that guarantees that equality. If these surveys are to be believed, many of the ideas
about gender equality espoused by Michigan’s Republican feminists have survived,
but are no longer linked to feminism. Instead, they are now mainstream beliefs that
have been adopted at the grassroots level not just by the 5 percent of Republicans
who identify as feminists, but by three quarters of the party’s members. This is the
legacy of Michigan’s Republican feminists.
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APPENDIX-TIMELINE
1910 – Lorraine Beebe born
1914 – Elly Peterson born
1920 – 19th Amendment ratified
Patricia Hill Burnett born
1921 – Ruth McNamee born
1922 – Helen Milliken born
1923 – ERA first introduced in Congress
1924 – Connie Binsfeld born
Phyllis Schlafly born
1934 – Lee Kefauver born
1950s – Conservative movement begins to coalesce
1962 – George Romney elected governor of Michigan (two-year term)
1964 – Romney re-elected as governor of Michigan (two-year term)
Milliken elected lieutenant governor of Michigan
Barry Goldwater loses bid for US president
Peterson unsuccessfully runs for US Senate from Michigan
1965 – Peterson becomes first female chairman of the Michigan Republican Party
Peterson orchestrates moderate takeover of RWFM leadership
Ruth McNamee elected to Birmingham City Commission
1966 – Romney reelected as governor of Michigan (four-year term)
Beebe elected to Michigan Senate (four-year term)
NOW Founded
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1967 – Legislative efforts begin in Michigan to legalize abortion
1960s – Beginnings of Second Wave Feminism
1969 – Milliken becomes governor of Michigan
Beebe reveals her abortion before Michigan Senate
Peterson becomes assistant chairman of the RNC
Burnett establishes first Michigan chapter of NOW
1970 – Peterson resigns as assistant chairman of the RNC
Beebe loses her bid for reelection to Michigan Senate
Michigan Democratic Women’s Caucus established
McNamee elected Mayor of Birmingham
Michigan Republican Party endorses abortion reform
Milliken elected governor of Michigan (four-year term)
1971 – NWPC founded
MWPC founded
HOW founded
Michigan Women’s Abortion Suit filed
1972 – ERA passed by US Congress
ERA ratified by Michigan legislature
STOP ERA founded by Phyllis Schlafly
Plaintiffs win Michigan’s Women’s Abortion Suit in trial court
Michigan Abortion Referendum placed on November ballot, but defeated
Republican Convention held in Miami Beach
Platform contains pro-ERA plank and supports abortion
1973 – Roe v. Wade decided by US Supreme Court
First NWPC conference held
Mary Coleman elected first female Michigan Supreme Court Justice
1974 – McNamee elected to Michigan House of Representatives
Binsfeld elected to Michigan House of Representatives
Unsuccessful effort to rescind Michigan’s ratification of ERA
Milliken re-elected governor of Michigan (four-year term)
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1975 – NRWTF Created
Michigan Republican Women’s Caucus established
Kefauver founded “Feminist Bureau of Investigation”
United Nations declared 1975 International Women’s Year
Eagle Forum founded
1976 – Republican National Convention held in Kansas City
Platform contains pro-ERA plank, but no support for abortion
ERAmerica founded – chaired by Carpenter and Peterson
Michigan ERAmerica founded – honorary chairs: Milliken and Griffiths
Unsuccessful effort to rescind Michigan’s ratification of ERA
1977 – International Women’s Year Conference held in Houston, Texas
Hyde Amendment prohibits use of federal funds for abortion
Governor Milliken overrides prohibition on using state funds for abortion
1978 – Milliken reelected governor of Michigan (four-year term)
Congress extends ERA ratification period until June 30, 1982
1979 – MRWTF Created
ERA America chaired by Helen Milliken and Sharon Percy Rockefeller
George Romney announces his opposition to ERA
Initial ratification period for ERA expires
1980 – Republican National Convention held in Detroit
Platform contains no planks in support of ERA or abortion
John Anderson becomes independent candidate for President
Ronald Reagan elected President (four-year term)
Hyde Amendment determined to be constitutional: Harris v. McRae
1981 – NRWTF purged from NWPC
1982 – Headlee loses gubernatorial election to Blanchard
Extended ERA ratification period expires
1983 – MRWTF purged from Michigan Republican Party
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1984 – McNamee retires from Michigan House of Representatives
Peterson celebrates her 70th birthday
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This dissertation explores feminism in the Michigan Republican Party from
the late 1960s until the early 1980s through the activism of seven women. These
women, Republicans before they were feminists, believed in the efficacy of party
politics to bring about change. Therefore, it was only natural that once they became
feminists they turned to the political system to effectuate gender equality. They
sought to bring feminism into the Republican Party and Republican Party politics
into the feminist movement. The best way to do this, they assumed, was to operate
from the sensible center of the women’s movement. From this middle ground, they
rejected radical feminism and disparaged the apathy of women who were satisfied
with the status quo. As the conservative movement became increasingly anti-

338

feminist and the Republican Party became increasingly conservative, however,
Michigan’s Republican feminists were forced to align with moderates to maintain
their presence in the party. In doing so, they became an integral part of the struggle
between moderates and conservatives for control of the party.
As conservatives gained greater control over the party in the latter part of
the 1970s, Michigan’s Republican feminists found that it was becoming difficult for
them to reconcile their partisanship and their feminism. Conservatives were
squeezing them out of the party and feminist political organizations were reluctant
to embrace members of a political party that challenged their raison d’etre. When
conservative leaders won the Republican Party’s nominations for the presidency in
1980 and the governorship of Michigan in 1982, Michigan’s Republican feminists
had to individually determine how to reconcile and prioritize two of their core
identities. Many of them voted for candidates from other parties, left the party or
retired from politics. Two of them, however, remained active in the Republican
Party, hoping to promote moderation from within. Republican feminists lost when
conservatives gained control of the party, but their activism yielded some benefit.
Forty years later, some of their goals have been embraced as mainstream by
members of the Republican Party.
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